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SONG OF THE INVIGORATING EFFECT OF MONEY 
Upon this earth we hear dispraise of money 
Yet, without it, earth is very cold 
And it can be warm and friendly 
Suddenly through the power of gold 
Everything that seemed so hard to bear 
In a gleaming golden glow'is cloaked, 
Sun is melting what was frozen, 
Every man fulfils his hopes! 
Rosy beams light the horizon, 
Look on high: the chimney smokes! 
Yes, all at once this world seems quite a different on~, 
Higher beats the heart, the glance sweeps wider, 
Richer are the meals and clothes are finer, 
Man himself becomes another man. 
Ah, how very sorely they're mistaken, 
They who think that money doesn't count. 
Fruitfulness turns into famine 
When the kindly stream gives out. 
Each one starts to yell and grab it· where he can. 
Even were it not so hard to live 
He who doesn't hunger yet is fearful, 
Every heart is empty now of love. 
Father, Mother, Brother - cross and tearful! 
See, the chimney smokes no more above! 
Thick displeasing fog about us furled, 
All is filled with hatred now and striving. 
None will be the horse, all would be riding. 
And the'world becomes an icy world. 
So it goes with all that's great and worthy. 
In this world it's quickly spoiled indeed, 
For when feet are bare and bellies empty 
Love of virtue always turns to greed. 
Gold, not greatness is what people need. 
Poverty of soul puts out our hopes. 
Good plus money, too, is what it takes 
To keep man virtuous without a slip. 
He whom crime's already given breaks 
Looks up on high: the chimney smokes! 
Faith in the human race again grows bright. 
Man is noble, good, so on and so forth. 
Sentiment awakes. Need dimmed its light. 
Faster beats the heart. The,glance sweeps wider. 
We know who the horse is, who the rider. 














In Leo Marquard's view, water and power are the two chief 
economic requirements of the Somthern African region: 
"to fulfil those needs, flood waters must be 
controlled for irrigation, and, in the process, 
harnessed to produce cheap industrial power" (1) 
Many other authorities concur in this analysis. 
example, the German geographer JUrgen Bahr writes: 
As one 
"The economic development of South West Africa is 
greatly handicapped by the lack of water and by 
the lack of every source of energy" (2) 
This work essays a political understanding of these two chief 
economic requirements, in the belief that political conflict 
has its roots in an economic base that consists not only in 
social classes but also in the particular geographical and 
technological infrastructural development of a region. For 
example, the nature of railway development in colonial Africa 
had long-lasting particular political and economic effects. 
Similarly, the nature of a hydro~electricscheme has wide 
in:plications. 
The Government of Portugal and the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa, who are, respectively, the rulers of Angola 
and the illegal occupiers of Namibia, as I shall show, agreed 
in 1964 and 1969 to develop the resources of ~he Kunene river 
basin3 • The river forms much of the boundary between Angola 
and Namibia. Portugal and South Africa are developing the 
river in a particular way. I shall argue that this particular 
way of developing the river benefits some of the people concerned 
far more than others. I shall show that if the plans suc<:;eed, 
a colonial region will be modernised, further to facilitate large 
capital accumulation in the hands of the few. 
Consultation with the people of Angola and Namibia,has been. 
lacking. Their specific approval has certainly not been 
obtained, for there was minimal formal 0r informal inclusion 
of these people in the decision-making processes which affect 









derived from universal adult franchise in their respective 
metropoles. 
It is small wonder, therefore, that the dams and powerlines 
are being erected in the midst of what South Africa's leaders 
call a "low intensity war"4, in whi~h people nevertheless die 
2 
high-intensity deaths. Both structural and physical violence 
are seen to be necessary by one grouping to impose their rule, 
. while the "armed struggle for liberation", as it is termed, is 
seen by another grouping to be necessary. 
This paper will examine the Kunene River hydro-electric schemes, 
in their historical, legal, military, strategic, technological, 
economic and political contexts, in order to bring about greater 
understanding of the society and its conflicts. The schemes 
will be seen in a relatively loose theoretical framework, 
involving concepts of modernisation, development and under-
development, colonialism and imperialism, together with capital 
accumulation and violence in the struggle between social groupings 
The primary aim of the work is an impressionistic examination of 
:the detail of the region's social formation, rather than an 
explicit contribution to the more abstract general theory. 
The region is not well researched: the lower reaches of the 
Kunene River are among the least known of any in Africa. 
Further, throughout the world many thoughts on energy and water 
remain mere pipe-dreams. Further- still, the Southern African 
war prevents much crucial information from being obtained or 
published. Therefore this work is a first note on the 
subject: it is not the last word in its field, for that cannot 
I 
yet be written. 
Hegel's Axiom of Internal Relations states that the relations 
by which terms are related are an integral part of the terms 
they relateS. This underlies not only conceptual structures 
of reality, and linguistic systems, but also physical, economic 
and political systems. It is an extraordinarily useful axiom 
of general systems theory. Energy and water are among the 
most pervasive of all the systems by which mankind is relat~d. 
Hence, they are in and of mankind, an essential part of the 










The politics of water in a dry region are so obvious as often to 
be taken for granted by the political sciences; we have needed 
the fossil-fuel crisis of the current decade to~remind us of the 
politics of energy distribution. The energy and the water 
systems of "White" Southern Africa are an integral part of that 
society, yet they have too often been ignored or simplistically 
treated in political s~udies of the area. This work is an 
attempt to redress the balance: it is written with a passionate 
belief in the totality of human existence and enterprise. 
Hence, many disciplines will be used, from poetry to military 
science to hydrology. In essence, however, this is a study 
in political economy, a study of who might benefit and to what 
extent, by a particular planned infrastructural allocation of 
scarce resources. 
Regarding the terminological tangle, the word "Namibia" is used 
in preference to "South West Africa", and the descriptions 
"Ovamboland" or "the Northern areas" are used in preference to 
"O\>Jambo" and "Okavango" wherever the context allows for this. 
The Northern peoples patently prefer the term "Ovamboland" to 
"Owambo" • However, when Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., proudly asserts 
that he .is a born and bred "Suidwester", it would be arrant 
nonsense to call him a Namibian. 
Generally, however, "Namibia" is used, following the example set 
by the United Nations and by the British Government in the 
latter's White Paper, Command 4363, of May 1970. This usag~~ 
is supported by the spirit of the 1971 'World Court' ruling. 
In contrast to John Dugard's approach "Namibia"/here does imply 
a judgment on the status of the territory and on the unlawful 
occupation by the South African regime6 This is done 
because I accept the validity of Danziger's remark: 
"where the ubiquity of social conflict excludes the 
possibility of non-commitment, the intellectual 
stance correaponding to it would become simply 
another version of the "status-quo" ideology" (7) 
As this is being written there is rioting in Luanda and 
fighting between the MPLA, the FNLA and Unita: the future 










will concentrate on the Namibian aspects; but Angola is also 
discussed not only because there is some information available, 
but also because most authorities stress the stupidity of 
conceiving of river basin development in anything less than 
the totality. This work reviews events up to December 1974. 
Occurrences thereafter can at best ·be recorded only partially. 
Research for this work involved over five thousand kilometres 
of travelling in Southern Africa, the use of material in five 
languages - German, Afrikaans, English, Kwanyama and Portuguese -
and work in eleven archives or libraries - the South African 
Library; the South African Museum; the Jagger Library of the 
University of Cape Town; the Johannesburg Public Library; the 
Gubbins Collection and the Wartenweiler Library of the University 
of the Witwatersrand; the Government Archives, Union Buildings, 
Pretoria; the South West African Archives in Windhoek; the 
Library of the South West African Administration; the Library 
of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg; 
and the Library of the South West African Wissenschaftliche 
Gesellschaft, Windhoek. 
In a number of cases the documents used were the only extant 
copies or the only copies available in Southern Africa. I 
express my particular gratitude, therefore, to the librarians 
and others concerned. I also thank those who assisted with 
translations either during interviews or of written work, and 
I particularly thank Deborah Budlender, Lonka Murray and Antonia 
von Stiernhelm for their help in this way. 
Many~people aided me in this work: I record my appreciation. 
Among others, I thank John Dugard, Caroline Clark, Dr W. Pitman, 
John-Kane Berman, Chris Saunders, Jeanette Curtis, Helene 
Budlender, Robert Gordon, Francis Wilson, Dudley Horner, Wilfred 
Moroff, Frances Lund, Robin Hallett, Professor G. Marais, 
Professor Eric Axelson, E~ic Abraham, Geoffrey Budlender, 
Barry Streek, Penny Cumming, Richard Moorsom and Horst 
Kleinschmidt, as well as Richard and Cathy Wood, Tim Owen, and 
other friends in the Diocese of Damaraland. 
I acknowledge the financial assistance of the Human Sciences 










University of Cape Town. The work and its conclusions are 
my own, and are not, of course, necessarily the opinions of 
either Council. 
5 
The present work is an enlarged and revised version of an 
earlier paper on the same topic. Keith Gottschalk was 
especially helpful in the revision, not only in providing 
meticulous criticism, but also in suggesting additional sources 
of material. The revision also benefitted from my participa-
tion in two conferences - the UCT Extra-mural Studies Course, 
organised by Helene Budlender, and the Conference on Energy 
and its Future in Southern Africa, organised by Professor 
Dutkiewitcz. 
I especially acknowledge the help and support of my supervisors, 
colleagues and friends in the School of African Studies and 
elsewhere in the University of Cape Town, as well as the 
stimulation and aid provided by many people throughout Southern 
Africa during my period with the National Union of South 
African Students, when much of my thinking was developed. 
Contrary to much commonly-held belief, leadership of Nusas 
carries many academic benefits. An academic work is never 
the product of one person: I willingly acknowled~~ the 
contribution made by my environment. 
I am grateful to the following for granting me interviews in 
Namibia in July 1974: 
Mr C. Aragao, Consul in Windhoek of the Republic of 
Portugal; 
Mr Braune, Senior Hydrologist, Department of Water 
Affairs, SWA Administratibn; 
Dr J.L. de Vries, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, Windhoek; 
Mr L. Kremer, Consul in Windhoek of the Federal German 
Republic; 
Mr Dirk Mudge, M.E.C., Acting Administrator of South 
West Africa; 
Mr H. Stengel, Department of Water Affairs, SWA 
Administration; 
Mr Strauss, Department of Information, Windhoek; 











Mr Stephanus Venter, Administrative Manager of the 
SWA Water en Elektriese Korporasie; 
Richard Wood, Bishop Suffragan of the Diocese of 
Damaraland. 
6 
In addition, Bryan O'Linn, Vice-Chairman of the United Party 
in SWA, and Kurt Dahlman, editor of Die Allegemeine Zeitung, 
were kind enough to give of their experience in off-the:::'record 
interviews, as were a number of black Namibians from many walks 
of life, including priests, teachers, students, and migrant 
labourers. 
I am particularly grateful to officials of the SWA Administration 
for their cordiality and co-operation. All strategic 
information on Namibia is confidential, and while I must record 
that no official in any way broke that c nfidentiality, 
nevertheless, within the bounds of what was permissible, the 
officials of the SWA Administration were very generous. 
The material available on Namibia is voluminous: Heinrich 
Stengels' "Bibliographie Wasserwirtschaft in Slidwestafrika" 
(1974) runs to 514 titles, while Richard Logan's geographical 
bibliography lists 2009 items, and John Dugard, giving only 
"standard works in a highly selective bibliogra.phy,,8, records 
over 500 names. Nonetheless, the area is 'under-researched', 
and political studies of the infrastructure are well-nigh 
non-existent. The bibliography g~ven comprises works 
consulted in the preparation of this work, rather than all 
those potentially relevant. 
The following is inscribed on the arches of the Central 
Government Buildings, New Delhi: 
"Queen Victoria said, 'in their prosperity will be 
our strength, 
in their contentment, our 
security, 
and in their gratitude, our 
best reward'" (9) 
This dissertation will measure the Kunene schemes against Her 
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THE LEGALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA. 
Increased accumulation, in Johannesburg, London and New York, 
of the profits made from the extraction of Namibia's raw 
materials depends on power and water from the Kunene River 
schemes, as will be shown below. The legality of these 
profits and the legality of South Africa's plans for the Kunene 
River depend on the lawfulness or otherwise of South Africa's 
presence in the territory over which South Africa was given a 
mandate as a "sacred trust of civilisation" by the League of 
Nations after the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. 
In December 1974, unanimously, without debate or dissent, the 
Security Council of thp United Nations Organisation delivered 
an ultimatum to the Republic of South Africa to withdraw its 
"illegal administration" from the territory. 
Council set as a deadline the 30th May 1975. 
The Security 
In the 'event 
of non-compliance, the Council would immediately consider the 
;appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter of the 
United Nations. Much had changed since the 1919 Peace 
Conference. 
The Peace Conferences of Europe, be they in Paris or Vienna, 
would seem either to create or to ignore as many problems as they 
might solve. One eminent historian has claimed that the 1919 . 
Treaty of Versailles caused the Second World 'irlar "as much as one 
event causes another,,1. A more tragic indictment of a Peace 
Conference would b~ difficult to find. This century's pre-
eminent Western economist, writing what has been called "one of 
the finest pieces of polemic in the English language,,2, condemned 
the treaty as "an act of wickedness and folly,,3. 
However, whatever tharesults in Europe, the Treaty had long-
lasting and unhappy consequences for the people of one ex-colony 
of the Kaiser, that land first named "South 'iflest Africa" by the 
explorer Andersson4 in 1861 and how known by the nations of the 
world as "Namibia,,5. This chapter will examine some aspects of 










"A mandate should be conferred upon His Brittanic 
Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the 
Government of the Union of South Africa to administer 
the territory aforementioned" (6) 
A.J.P. Taylor gives a cynical view of the Paris proceedings: 
"The fate of the German colonies had also been settled, 
mainly on the insistence of the British Dominions. 
South Africa and Australia refused to surrender the 
territories which they had conquered - German South 
West Africa and New Guinea. Lloyd George derived 
malicious amusement from the way in which the spokes-
men of these two democratic countries, supposedly 
unspotted with European wickedness, defied Wilson 
on old-fashioned imperialist lines. Mandates were 
hastily invented to save appearances, and the British 
themselves took German East Africa, and some 7 
miscellaneous territory in West Africa, as their share" • 
These themes, of South African imperialism defying those 
statesmen who wished to create a "good" international order, 
9 
and of the resulting shabby compromise being shrouded in high-
sounding words which mayor may not have meaning, run through 
the paper pribble-prabble which lawyers now call "The South West 
Africa/Namibia Dispute". The world's judges have deliberated 
upon it often and at length, while copious screeds have been 
w~itten, but the two themes remain, right through-to the 
Secretar'y-General Waldheim' s visit to the territory in 1972, 
and beyond. 
John Dugard, from the plethora of r~levant documents, has 
produced an excellent and meticulously researched 581 page 
volume of writings on this "international cause celebre of 
the century"8. His work should be read in the original: 
I 
I shall attempt neither to summarise nor to compete, but shall 
give the bare political and legal facts, followed by an 
assessment of the present situation. 
Imperialism in Southern Africa was no new phenomenon in 1919. 
The sUb-continent had been divided by Shaka, by Portugal, by 
Germany, by Britain, and by the Boers. Yet South Africa has 
never been monolithically imperialist, as this conversation 














We must work together. I know the Republic 
wants a seapovt. You must have Delagoa 
Bay. 
How can we work together there? The 
harbour belongs to the Portuguese, and they 
wont hand it over. 
Then we must simply take it. 
I can't take away other people's property. 
If the Portuguese won't sell the harbour, 
I wouldn't take it even if you gave it to 
me, for ill-gotten gains are accursed". (9) 
10 
Smuts had no such scruples about ill-gotten gains when he 
conquered German South West Africa and nor did the Germans when 
they took it from its people. By 1919 the imperialist aims 
of some South Africans were clear. A.T. Hennessy, Secretary 
of the Unionist Party in South Africa, wrote to Patrick Duncan 
about Botha's plans for the Peace Conference as follows: 
"I have some pretty good inside information as to 
Botha's plans. He expects to come back with German 
South West, Rhodesia, and perhaps a long-lease of 
Delagoa Bay" (10). 
At the Peace Conference Smuts and Botha confronted Wilson and 
an ambiguous compromise resulted. Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations established a Mandates System with_ 
wording "ambiguous enough to satisfy annexationists and inter-
nationalists simultaneously,,11. Thus Smuts and Botha 
achieved their goals and yet had conceded one crucial point: 
civilisation could call those who exercised its 'sacred trusts' 
to account for their actions. South Africa did not annex 
the territory, but accepted a Mandate, on behqlf of civilisation, 
to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and 
the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory,,12. 
Smuts conceded this with his customary skill and addressed the 
Peace Conference as follows: 
"If you give your sanction to our work you will 
demonstrate that world public opinion is in favour 
of the ultimate self-government of all peoples, 
without distinction as to race, religion, or colour, 
or previous condition of servitude. It provides 
for a careful supervision and scrutiny as to the way 










In the following twenty years pressures arose repeatedly in 
South Africa for the inclusion of the territory as a Fifth 
Province of the Union, and South Africa's own "South West 
Africa Commission" found that South Africa was not doing all 
that it might in the exercise of its 'sacred trust'. 
"It is on the constructive side of the government 
that Native Administration is not entirely satis-
factory, i.e. in regard to those functions which 
go beyond the bare necessities of government and 
the maintenance of law and order •••••• Education 
is defective and medical services. for the Natives, 
primitive and inadequate. In the North very 
little is done for the improvement of their daily 
lives" (14). 
11 
South Africa has, however, claimed that the Permanent Mandates 
Commission was completely satisfied with her administration of 
the territory. By contrast, J. Karina, in a thesis for 
Edinburgh University, has shown that South Africa was more 
heavily criticised for her administration of the territory 
than any other mandatory power administering mandated territories1 
By 1946 Smuts was prepared to try again for annexation or 
incorporation16 and this time "consulted" what were known as 
tl1e "Non-White" inhabi ants, through their "tribal leaders", 
claiming'the following results17 : 
For: 208 850 Against: 33 520 Not Consulted: 56 790 
This "consultation" was heavily criticised and the General 
Assembly did not accede to Smut's request, recommending instead 
that the territory be placed under trusteeship, which South 
Africa refused. With the coming to power gf the Nationalists, 
reports on the territory were no longer submitted to the United 
Nations. A deadlock was reached and the political conflict 
was channelled into legal argument, leading to the involvement 
of the International Court of Justice, which has given its 
Opinion four times - in 1950, 1955, 1956 and 1971--- and its 
Judgment twice - in 1962 and 1966. 
In 1950 the eourt gave its opinion by 12 votes to 2 that South 
Africa had obligations internationally under the mandate, 











was not obliged to place the territory under the UN Trusteeship 
system. Further, South Africa had no power to modify 
unila~erally the international status of the territory, but 
had to act with the consent of the United Nations. South 
Africa rejected the opinion. 
In 1955, following the conflict over the procedure to be 
followed at the General Assembly in dealing with the territory, 
the Court unanimously gave its opinion that the voting procedure 
proposed by the General Assembly was correct. "South Africa 
rejects this opinion on the grounds that it was premised on the 
unacceptable 1950 opinion,,18. 
In 1956, the General Assembly, lacking reports on the territory 
from South Africa, asked the Court whether oral hearings from 
petitioners could be permitted, again in terms of the 1950 
opinion. The Court gave its opinion, by 8 votes to 5, that 
such hearings would be consistent with the 1950 opinion. The 
oral hearings took place and the UN "Committee on South West 
Africa" concluded, in 1957, that the policies pursued by South 
Africa were contrary to the mandate19 • 
in 1962" after Ethiopia and Liberia had again brought the 
question of the ter itory's status before the ICJ, the Court, 
by 8 votes to 7, rejected South Africa's four preliminary 
objections and held that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
on the merits of the dispute. Four years of written and oral 
debate ensued on the merits of the case. In 1966 the Court 
gave a judgment. The Court of 1962 had been changed by 
intervening elections and, in addition, three;judges did not 
participate because of death, recusal and illness. The 1966 
Court refused to give judgment on the merits and returned to 
the question of jurisdiction. It held, by the President's 
casting vote, the votes being tied, that Ethiopia and Liberia 
had not established a legal right or interest in the matter. 
This judgment was explosive. Dugard writes: 
"In effect, this decision constitued a reversal of 











Assembly of the Mandate and considered that South Africa's 
presence in the territory was illega1 22 • This was reaffirmed 
in Resolutions 269 and 276, while in Resolution 284 the Security 
Council asked the International Court of Justice for an opinion 
on 
"the legal consequences for States of the continued 
presence of -South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)". 
The composition of the Court had again altered, although this 
time not during a hearing. In 1971 the Court gave its 
opinion: 
"by thirteen votes to two, 
(1) that, the continued presence of South Africa 
in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under 
obligation to withdraw its administration from 
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to the 
occupation of the territory; 
by eleven votes to four, 
(2) that States Members of the United Nations are 
under obligation to recognise the illegality of 
South Africa's presence in Namibia and that the 
invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning 
Namibia, and to refrain from ny acts and in 
particular any dealings with the Government of 
South Africa implying recognition of the legality 
of, or lending support or assistance to such 
presence and Administration; 
(3) That it is encumbent upon States which are 
not ~embers of the United Nations to give 
assistance, within the scope of subparagraph 
(2) above, in the action which has been taken 
by the United Nations with regard to Namibia" (23). 
Thus, in terms of decisions of the world's General Assembly, 
Security Council, and Court of Justice, South Africa's 
occupation and control of Namibia are illegal. More 
particularly, the fragmentation of the territory into separate 
ethnic "nations" by South Africa is illegal, and the Kunene 
River schemes are illegal. 
South Africa is refusing to obey an advisory Opinion on 
international law, having gone before the International Court 
of Justice, and lost her case. 
South Africa has rejected the Opinion on political and legal 











publication of the S.A. Institute of International Affairs, 
24 by Professor John Dugard and Advocate E.M. Grosskopf, S.C • 
Dugard examines in detail the accusations levelled at the Court 
by Mr Vorster and by Mr Justice van Wyk that the Court used an 
unacceptable "mumbo-jumbo", illegal' form of reasoning and that 
the Court was deliberately "packed". Grosskopf queries the 
reasoning used in four of the Court's major findings:. on 
whether the Council of the League of Nations had the power to 
revoke the Mandate; whether the General Assembly has the power 
to do what it purported to do in Resolution 2145 (xxi); whether 
the Security Council was acting within its powers; and, finally, 
he queries the conclusion of the Court that apartheid constituted 
a breach of the Mandate and a violation of the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The most obvious replies to these charges of "mumbo-jumbo legal 
reasoning" and of "court packing" are brief. It ill becomes 
positivist upholders of law, order and firm government to ignore 
and reject a court's final opinion, no matter how illogical that 
opinion may seem. Further, it ill becomes a government whose 
present electoral strength may partially be the result of a 
disenfranchisement of "Coloured" voters achieved only after the 
Appeal Court had been enlarged from five to eleven judges, to 
complain of "court packing". If "mumbo-jumbo legal reasoning" 
and "court packing" do occur, they can never increase faith in a 
legal system, be it national or international. Nevertheless, 
in reality, the processes are not entirely alien to the South 
African "way of life". 
However, the objections to the 1971 Opinion must be examined 
in turn. As to "court packing" Dugard shows "that the 
1971 Court is no different from previous Courts,,25 It 
complies with its statute in consisting of "juriconsults of 
recognised competence" from the major legal systems and main 
for~of civilisation. What better arbiters of civilisation's 
'sacred trust' '1 Grosskopf makes great play of Dugard's 
concession that the Court in rejecting South Africa's applications 










of the Statute. 
sentence: 
However, Grosskopf ignores Dugard's next 
"With the knowledge of hindsight, one can safely 
say that even if these applications had been 
upheld, the Opinion on the merits would not 
have been materially different" (27).. 
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Grosskopf makes four major charges against the Court and, 
having the advantage of a reading of Dugard's paper, reiterates 
them in an addendum. 
Grosskopf first challenges the Court's finding concerning the 
ability of the League of Nations to revoke the Mandate. The 
question was whether the C-mandates, under which the territory 
fell, were so close to annexation as to be irrevocable, or 
whether the right to international supervision carried the 
corrollary of revocation in the event of breach. 
The weakest point of international law is that it is so seldom 
effectively enforced. Prima facie, law requires teet~ if it 
is to be law and not mere moral exhortation. The mandate 
instruments are silent on revocation. However, can one 
believe that the authors of the systems were so insincere in 
their high-sounding words that they conceived of Mandates with 
no teeth, with no ultimate sanction? Did Smuts,t s "caref~l 
supervision and scrutiny as to the way in which mandates are 
exercised" (quoted above) have no method of enforcement, no 
ultimate penalty for abuse of the mandate? These are not 
the words of the "internationalist" Wilson, they are those of 
the "annexationist" Smuts from South Africa. Smuts was later 
to draft the Preamble to the United Nations Ch~rter. Are we , 
to believe that on both these occasions his words were nothing 
but pious patter? Ought we not, in determining his intentions, 
to take the ordinary meaning of his words? 
In 1971 the Court invoked the customary legal rule that a treaty, 
saving an express indication to the contrary, is revocable in 
the event of an important breach. Thisiis a common method" 
of interpretation, for if a statute is silent on a point, the 











In attempting to show that the revocation was not among the 
intentions of the auhtors of the system, Grosskopf takes a 
technical procedural point, claiming that the Council of the 
League of Nations would not have been able to revoke a mandate 
because the relevant Member would have to be represented and 
could therefore prevent the unanimity required by the procedures' 
of the Council. The Court rejects this suggestion, claiming 
that obviously the agreement of a wrongdoer to the sanction to 
be applied to him could not be required 28 • 
Both Grosskopf and Dugard note that the Court had previously 
affirmed this requirement for unanimity, but Dugard remarks 
that on these previous occasions the Court had merely assumed 
its applicability, without a finding being necessary. Further, 
Judge de Castro, in a Separate Opinion, found that the purpose 
of the unanimity rule was the protection of a State's sovereignty, 
but that it was inapplicable to the mandates system as a State's 
sovereignty was not in question29 • 
Smuts certainly envisaged revocation where necessary. The 
1971 Opinion quotes Smuts writing in 1918: 
"In case of any flagrant and prolonged abuse of 
this trust the population concerned should be able 
to appeal for redress to the League, who should in 
a proper case exert its authority to the full, even 
to the extent of removing the mandate and entrusting 
it to some other state if necessary" (30). 
It is surely not conceivable that Smuts meant the League to be 
prevented by the unanimity rule from ever removing a mandate. 
Smuts drafted the Preamble to the United Nations Charter. 
Could he have held so Iowan opinion of interrtational law as 
to require the consent of a wrongdoer before the wrongdoer 
could be punished? Yet even if Smuts did hold this view, 
the World Court now does not, for international law is not 
forever immutably fixed. 
The second and third objections raised by Grosskopf relate tq 
the powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council 
to do what they purported to do. Resolutions of the Gen.eral 











However, the Court seems to find that Resolution 2145 (xxi) 
derives binding legal force from confirmation by the Security 
Council. The Court has read the powers and duties of both 
bodies very widely, no doubt on the above given premise that 
the law should have teeth if it is to be law and not prayer. 
It is here that the divergence between South African attitudes 
and the Court's attitudes can best be seen: Dugard conceives 
of a conflict between legal ideologies, between positivism and 
teleological, natural or sociological theories of law. The 
Court has used wide interpretations of the various statutes in 
the teleological belief that the high-sounding words of the 
authors of the 'sacred trust of civilisation' should have 
meaning in practice. South Africa has argued for narrow 
interpretations, for a limited, muzzled version of international 
law. The one doctrine sees a close link between international 
law and morality, the other sees the two concepts as being very' 
distinct from each other. The Court has chosen, in effect, 
to pay heed to the high principles expressed by those who. 
drafted the law and to interpret the law in that light. In 
my opinion this is a correct approach for, as a bitter opponent 
of the legality of Resolution 2145 (xxi), Professor Marinus 
Wiechers has written: 
"Law does still provide the best and most acceptable 
means of solving an international dispute. At the 
same time law affords the most solid basis on which 
states can conduct their foreign relations with other 
states. Seen in that light, international law is 
not merely a set of rules which can be applied 
mechanically; it must be realised that international 
law also serves as a vehicle for conveying and 
giving expression to philosophical and moral values" (31). 
The final major objection raised by Advocate Grosskopf concerns 
the merits of the case and the Court's finding in that regard. 
Grosskopf maintains that, having declined to hear South African 
factual evidence on whether "Separate Development" constituted 
a breach of the Mandate, and having then ruled that South Africa's 
refusal to submit reports on the territory to the United Nati~ns 
constituted sufficient grounds for revocation, the Court should 
\. 
not have devoted space to a discussion of the alleged iniquities 











Apartheid constituted a violation of the Purposes and Principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. He concludes that the 
Court produced a propaganda piece dressed up as a legal opinion. 
John Dugard, by contrast, maintains' that the Court should not 
have given an opinion on Apartheid because the Court had found 
that it was for a political body, the General Assembly, to 
determine whether the Mandate had been violated. Once the 
General Assembly had done so there was. no need for the Court 
to do so of its own accord. 
What is of note, however, is that both Dugard and Grosskopf 
deem the finding about Separate Development's incompatibility 
with the United Nations Charter to be irrelevant. They see 
it as an obiter dictum on which evidence had not been taken. 
It thus does not detract markedly from the Court's major 
finding that South Africa's presence in Namibia is illegal and 
that she should withdraw. 
However, concerning the Court's remarks on apartheid in the 
territory, it must be noted that South Africa's ready willingness 
to give evidence as to the "facts" is worthless so- long as her 
opponents do not have equal access to the "facts", or, inde~d, 
so long as there is no free political debate and no free black 
press in the territory. So long as South Africa's more 
Draconian political laws, such as thB Terrorism Act, are 
extended to the territory, so long will the "facts" of the 
situation be hidden. Guided tours for the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations are no substitute: such ,tours are 
remarkable for what the Secretary-General does not see. 
An example of the usual restrictions on information about the 
territory can be found in the "PERMIT TO ENTER NATIVE AREAS OF 
SOUTH WEST AFRICA" issued by the authorities, which includes 
the following: 
" •••• Lodging by whites with coloured or natives is 
not permitted. Under no circumstances maya 
permit holder interfere with the domestic affairs 
of the native. 
No trading whatsoever with the natives in the Native 










No kraals and/or the Ruacana Falls may be visited 
without written permission. The behaviour of 
the permit holder in dealings with the natives 
where necessary must at all times be worthy. 
No agitation may be started and the administration 
of the Government or any of its officials may not 
be criticised. It is strictly prohibited to 
shoot or interfere with wild animals or game and 
no places of concealment at waterholes for photo-
graphy or any other purpose may be constructed. 
The taking of photographs for pUblication 
purposes; for instance, cinema distribution, 
television, newspapers or magazines, is prohibited •••• 
If a permit holder enters native areas as a guest 
of permanent European residents he may only travel 
in the area or leave public roads in the company 
of his hosts ••••• 
The wearing of ultra-mini skirts or shorts by women 
in the Native Areas is prohibited •••• " (32). 
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The Ruacana Falls are, of course, the site of the major power 
plant in the Kunene scheme. The document demonstrates the 
usual limitations placed on access to the "facts" of the 
situation. The weakness of South Africa's version of the 
"-
facts was adequately demonstrated in late 1971/early 1972. 
South Africa published a book on "Owambo", which, in its section 
on the migrant labour system, gives the impression of a 
satisfactory system, with some minor defects. -Attempts were 
being made to cure the defects, but on balance the system was 
"beneficial to th  general economy,,33. Within a few weeks 
of the book's pUblication the Owambo migrant labourers staged 
a general strike on a huge scale - precisely because the migrant ( 
labour system was unsatisfactory. 
thus questionable. 
South Africa's "facts" are 
The other maj or argument as to the " f"acts" concerns the 
plebiscite offerred by South Africa in 1971. John Dugard 
is correct in persistently maintaining that a free plebiscite 
would be the best available way of ascertaining the "facts". 
However, perhaps Judge Zafrulla Khan of the Court is correct 
in maintaining that South Africa should withdraw before a free 
plebiscite could be held, for South Africa's powers of 
influencing a plebiscite are great. The question is probably 
academic, for South Africa is highly unlikely to agree to all 











Dugard lists, and nor is she likely to risk a free plebiscite 
after the fiasco of the "Owambo Legislative Assembly" elections 
in August 1973, where a boycott campaign was so successful that 
only thirteen hundred (1 300) people voted, which represented 
2,5% of the registered voters, and. even less of those eligible 
for a vote 34 • 
The above paragraph was originally written before the second 
"Owambo Legislative Assembly" elections were held in January 
1975. These latest elections confirm the assertion that 
South Africa is highly unlikely to risk a free, nationwide 
plebiscite in Namibia. 
In the 1975 elections the boycott campaign did not succeed 
inside Ovamboland, but it was highly successful among contract 
workers in the South. However, some 60 000 voters, or 55% 
of the registered voters,did go to the polls. The vast 
majority of these votes were cast in Ovamboland towards the end 
of the five-nay election: in some areas the polls were taken to 
35 the voters by nine mobile units - away from Press eyes 
Superficially, the election was "freer" than the previous one, 
for political parties no longer had to submit their constitutions 
to the "Owambo Cabinet" and candidates were exempted from a 
clause of Proclamation R17 of 1972 which required prior 
permission for public meetings to b~ held. (This Proclamation 
will be examined in detail in a later chapter). 
Nevertheless, the elections cannot be described as free or 
democratic, even if one accepts for a moment an ethnically-
delimited electoral system. The elections were clearly 
a fraud. 
Both Proclamation R17 of 1972 and the Terrorism Act, No 87 of 
1967 still applied and provided for indefinite detention without 
trial. Political prisoners were not freed in order to 
participate. In the words of a jo~rnalist not noted for 
his support of SWAP 0 , the "Owambo" tr:tbal police, 
"spend much of their time making use of naked 
intimidation, unlawful assault, and arbitrary 
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Both Proclamation R17 of 1972 and the Terrorism Act, No 87 of 
1967 still applied and provided for indefinite detention without 
trial. Political prisoners were not freed in order to 
participate. In the words of a jo~rnalist not noted for 
his support of SWAP 0 , the "Owambo" tribal police, 
"spend much of their time making use of naked 
intimidation, unlawful assault, and arbitrary 











The system of "tribal floggings" had not yet even received the 
"improvements" made later in 1975, let alone been stopped. 
The entire cabinet was appointed to the Legislative Assembly 
in advance, two months before the elections 37 • Most of the 
appointed Legislative Assembly members were loyal to the ruling 
Owambo Independence Party which needed to win only four of the 
forty-two elected seats to retain power. 
SWAPO was thrice refused permission to hold a public meeting 
in connection with the elections. Nevertheless, a meeting 
was finally held, but it was forcibly broken up by the tribal 
1 . 38 po l.ce • 
Finally, there are widespread and seemingly well-founded 
allegations that most of the votes cast were coerced. These 
allegations are borne out by the fact of the tiny number of 
votes cast by migrants in the South, where coercion would be 
more difficult and less secret. 
Bishops Aula and Demeni reported that workers en route south 
were forced to vote before being allowed through the Oshive110 
border post. It was reported that voters were prevented 
from ploughing, or were threatened with the loss of essential 
services, pensions, education for children, or emp10yment f 
unless they voted. "SWA Administration" vehicles were used 
in Ovambo1and for hunting out and picking up anyone to take 
them to vote, quite regardless of whether the persons concerned 
were on their way to the polls or not~9. 
Even if no "Owambo" was in fact forced to vote, the elections 
can still not be called "free". If coercion to vote did 
occur the elections are merely that much more fraudulent. 
The elections were hailed by most sections of the South African 
press as a "defeat of SWAPO", yet at most one can perhaps 
declare "no contest". The organisation had clearly called, 
its youth leaders to leave the territory to be educated and 
trained for a contest that has still to be fought, in which 











vividly successful among contract workers in the South, who 
could not be coerced into voting. We cannot know for 
certain what occurred inside Ovamboland, but perhaps we need 
not seek too far for the reasons behind the startling rise in 
the poll from 2,5% to 55% of the registered voters. Be 
that as it may, the 1975 elections may not in fact dete~mine 
with whom the rulers must eventually bargain at a conference 
table, and SWAPO may yet be at that table if they in fact have 
support among the people of Namibia. 
The point to be demonstrated here was that South Africa is 
unlikely to risk a free nation-wide plebiscite in Namibia. 
The successful boycott by contract workers in the South 
emphasises this. The elections do, however, call into 
question the usefulness of the proposed constitutional 
conference of the "leaders" of the different "peoples" of 
the territory, if this is the manner in which those leaders 
are to be chosen. 
To return to the legal aspect of the dispute about the status 
of the territory: in short, it was submitted that South Africa 
had contravened the spirit and the letter of the Mandate given 
to her to administer the territory as a 'sacred trust of 
civilisation', and the International Court of Justice has in 
due course given its Opinion that South Africa's occupation 
of the territory is illegal. With the exception of South 
Africa, all the States of the World; including all the major 
powers, accept that Opinion as part of the 'law of the United 
Nations ,40. From the Opinion it flows that South Africa's 
activities in the territory are illegal, the K~nene River 
schemes are illegal, and the proposed fragmentation into separate 
nations is illegal. A constitutional conference based on 
"elections" which in their turn are based on that ethnic 
fragmentation would, if held under South African auspices alone, 
also be illegal. 
The legal debate is voluminous and has been covered very briefly 
here. The arguments for South Africa, as advanced by 










They did this despite their belief that the South African 
occupation was illegal. 
25 
Eveleigh's words, in one sense, proved truer than their writer 
knew. The Namibian dispute is tightly tied to detente in 
Southern Africa, and vice versa. South Africa, by June 1975, 
had not convinced the rest of Africa that appreciable change 
was occurring fast enough in Southern Africa. The essence 
of the conflict lay in colour discrimination and gross 
exploitation. Neithef was diminishing fast enough, if at 
all. Hence Africa demanded a mandatory arms embargo and 
the Western Great Powers cast their vetoes for assorted and 
geo-political reasons. 
The South African Prime Minister's attempts at achieving 
detente will be considered in a later chapter, in the light 
of his strategic economic plans. In this chapter we have 
discussed the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia, 
and we have seen that Namibia is an integral part of the armed 
conflict in Southern Africa. The next chapter will consider 
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MILITARY AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE1 • 
The Prime Minister)of South Africa, the Honourable B.J. Vorster, 
has promised the "Owambo Executive Council" that the Kunene 
project would be zealously defended 2 • To this, and other 
ends, South Africa is arming rapidly and massively. Popular 
movements of Angola and Namibia, such as UNITA, SWAPO and the 
MPLA, have condemned the Kunene schemes and aim to prevent their 
completion3 • This chapter will examine aspects of the 
military conflict, together with the structural violence 
by which domination is maintained in Namibia. 
Tables' One and Two show that South African military expenditure 
is expanding astoundingly. She now spends in one year what 
in the ,1960's she spent in five. According to Grundy4, 
writing in 1973, sheAhas, in the ten years from 1960, increased 
her military expenditure by 800%. However, in the sixteen 
years from 1960 the increase has been over 2 100%! This is 
~t current prices because a price index for military goods is 
not publicly available. However, for a rough guide, the 
wholesale price indices could be used. If wholesale prices 
correspond to military prices, South"African current account 
expenditure on defence, at 1963 constant prices, has increased 
from some forty-seven million Rand in 1960 to approximately 
four hundred and seventy-seven million Rand in 11975/76, that is, 
a real increase at constant prices of approximately 1 000%5. 
What was adequate to cope with African nationalism at the time 
of the Sharpeville killings, when'the ANC and the PAC were 
reaching their prime in South Africa (so far), is but a tiny 
fraction of what the South African Parliament now believes is 
needed. 
Arms are expensive, and are financed in South Africa from profits 
achieved perhaps at the expense of just returns to black labour. 











At current prices from 1950 to 1965 South African military 
spending averaged only 1.23% of the G.D.P., but by 1975/6 
military expenditure is 15,8% of the State's spending, and 
3,7% of the G.D.P. These percentages are still low by 
world standards, however. Canada from 1962 to 1967 spent 
29 ' 
on defence between 16,6% and 22,6% of her state budget; 
Tanzanian spending ranged from 14,3% to 17,6% from 1963 to 
1969; in the United Kingdom the range,was from 13,7% to 16,8% 
from 1962 to 19676 • 
TABLE ONE7. 
S.A. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFENCE ESTIMATES 1960 TO 1973 
Year Estimate 
1960-61 R 44 000 000 
1961-62 72 000 000 
1962-63 120 000 000 
1963-64 157 000 000 
1964-65 210 000 000 
1965-66 230 000 000 
1966-67 256 000 000 
1968-69 253 000 000 
1969-70 272 000 000 
1970-71 ' 257 000 000 
1971-72 317 000 000 (Budgeted) 
1972-73 344 000 000 (Budgeted) , 











TABLE TW08 • 
S.A. DEFENCE ESTIMATES, IN RANDS, 1973-1976 (AT CURRENT PRICES). 
1973-4 1974-5 1975-6 
--
Current Account R 492 232 000 705 567 000 954 832 000 
Capital Account 11 343 000 18 538 000 47 543 000 
Armscor Ltd 23 121 000 10- 496 000 22 539 000 
Armaments Board, 15 362 000 19 596 000 29 927 000 etc 
TOTAL DEFENCE R 542 058 000 754 197 000 1 054 841 000 EXPENDITURE 
TOTAL STATE R4 494 167 000 5 622 800 000 6 643 408 000 EXPENDITURE 
% of State 
Expenditure 12,06 13,41 15,87 
on Defehce 
% of G.N.P. s'") 
spent on 
Defence (9) 
2,9 3,8 4,1 
It was suggested that the 1974/75 budget was extraordinary in 
that it took advantage of the current buoyant financial position 
to buy early what would otherwise have been bought later in the 
ten-year armaments plan10 • The bulk of the defence bpdget 
for that year was reported to have been completed in November 
1973, so that it is supposedly not a response to the coup in 
Portugal in 1974. There was certainly unusual wealth 
available, for the Republic experienced a comfortable real 
, 
growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product of 4,3% in 1973 and 
7,2% in 1974. Greatly improved export prices for gold, 
maize, and other goods resulted in a real growth of Gross 
National Product of 9,5% in 1973 and 10% in 1974. The 
per capita growth in real G.N.P. averaged 7% per year over 
1973-197411 , although the skewed distribution of South African 
G.N.P. probably did not change markedly. South Africa's 










Ostensibly the 1974/75 budget aimed to use par~ of this 
"windfall" wealth, and future budgets ought to have been 
correspondingly smaller. However, the 1975/76 defence 
budget again showed marked increases despite a reversal of 
, 
31 
the previously favourable balance of payments. The 1974/75 
"windfall year" argument was then deftly turned round and 
the explanation of the 1975/76 increases reads as follows in 
RSA WPE '75, the Defence White Paper: 
"34: Despite the increases, these figures will 
compare favourably with most Western countries, 
and mainly reflect merely the systematic replace-
ment of obsolescent equipment. This replacement 
forms part of a long-term programme under which the 
S.A. Defence Force is being modernised so as to 
maintain a preparedness, meeting the prevailing 
circumstances. The accent falls on the improve-
ment of the capability of the S.A. Defence Force 
rather than expansion of its weaponry. A further 
important factor is that extended payments have to 
be made for equipment ordered or delivered during 
the more favourable fiscal and balance of payments 
conditions of the preceding years. The larger 
operating costs involved in taking into commission 
the more sophisticated equipment also contribute 
to increasing expenditure" (emphasis added) 
We now understand: in a "rich" year one increases the defen,ce 
budget to buy early what had'been planned to be bought later, 
and one'thus places additional orders and receives new 
equipment. In the following year, however, one has to 
increase the defence budget still further, not only because 
of increased operating costs in commissioning new equipment, 
but also to pay for the additional equipment ordered or 
received during the previous ("rich") year ••••• 
Whatever the official explanation, to the la~en one thing 
is clear. There are vast real increases in defence spending, 
and these are being paid for, at least in part, from the increase 
in national income. That is, South Africa is spending an 
increasingly larger part of an increasingly~large state budget 
on defence. To suggest that the "windfall" growth in 
Gross National Product, resulting from better gold and farm 
produce export prices, might rather have been used more directly 
for black mineworkers or black farm labourers would no doubt be 










Defence White Paper 1975 speaks for itself: 
"45: The National Service System. The revised 
national service system now provides for the 
manpower needs of the S.A. Army without plunging 
the country into a state of mobilisation ••• " 
Enormous South African military expansion has meant the 
creation of a large state-controlled armaments industry. 
The military-industrial complex is capable of producing a 
vast range of modern weapons, not least the French Mirage 
F I fighter, a devastating weapon .. due 'for production in 
large quantities by 1977, which will make military defeat 
of South Africa far more difficult. 
The South African factories presently manufacture an 
armoured personnel carrier, two versions of the French 
Panhard armoured car, and a 90mm gun. The Minister of 
Defence recently announced plans to produce battle tanks 
in South Africa. The South African war machine is 
becoming huge and versatile12 • 
However, the regime's defence depends more on the loyalty, 
neutrality or, at least, demoralisation of the black people, 
than on'technological superiority. Therefore, police 
and security force expenditures must also be considered, 
33 
and they too are increasing rapidly. As one parliamentarian 
put it: in 1974 the annual cost of ~leeping soundly at night 
was a record R891 million. By 1975, Defence, Police and 
Prisons cost over R1 348 million!13. 
This militarism is a part of a world trend: ih 1967 the 
world spent on arms three times what it spent on health, 
and forty percent more than its education spending14 • However, 
South Africa's military growth is disproportionately high 
for Africa. In 1960 she accounted for 20% of Africa's 
military spending, but in 1968 she spent 36,3% of the total 
spent by African countries15 • She is expanding her forces 
more rapidly than the African bloc is. 











development. Instead of investing for development, a small 
country like Zambia buys sophisticated Rapier missile Air 
defence systems. Could abetter example be found to 
demonstrate Hegel's Axiom of Internal Relations, given above,16 
The relations between South Africa.and Africa are an integral 
part of each and the development of both is stunted thereby. 
Ali Mazrui and A. Gingyera-Pincywa have commented: 
"Southern Africa is not a dormant target waiting 
to be attacked and to defend itself against freedom 
fighters. It poses challenges of its own, beyond 
its borders - challenges that form an important 
rationale for military expenditures in neighbouring 
states, especially Zambia and Tanzania. The 
regional arms race between Southern Africa and free 
Africa is leading to a diversion of Zambia's and 
Tanzania's resources away from development and 
towards more sophisticated deterrents" (17). 
However, this regional arms race is negligible in global 
terms. Hoagland18 has shown that on~y six countries 
(America, Britain, France, Russia, China and West Germany) 
account for some 85% of the world's military spending, 
while the remaining 130 countries account for merely 15%. 
The super-powers can change any African military situation 
overnigAt in many ways as was demonstrated in the recent 
war of the Day of Atonement. 
General Spinola has emphasised the point, claiming that' 
despite their rhetoric, the "communist bloc" did not wish 
to end the conflict in Portuguese Africa: 
"The Soviet Union is fully aware that when it 
wanted to it could provoke an uncontrollable 
deterioration in the situation of Portugal' 
Overseas ••••• Even today the communists prefer 
their protagonists to be martyrs, not policemen"'· (19). 
He suggests three reasons for the Soviet Union's action, 
political prudence in refraining fro~ forcing the West to 
choose between the new countries of Africa and the Portuguese; 
convenience in avoiding the need for large aid to newly 
independent areas; and global strategy in not eliminating 












Similarly, despite Western rhetorical dislike of apartheid, 
the West's actions exhibit more complex motivation. NATO 
authorised the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic to 
plan for contingencies outside the NATO area, and one SACALANT 
official disclosed plans "designed to go to the aid of our 
potential allies 'n Southern Africa if the need should arise", 
although another claimed that the interest was only in the 
'sea route around the Cape. The United States has allegedly 
supplied military defoliants in large quantities to white 
regimes in Southern Africa and has reportedly decided to sell 
reconnaissance aircraft to South Africa20 • 
South Africa's "internal security" operations depend on 
Belgian small-arms and on French helicopters, armoured-cars 
and fighter-bombers, most of which are built under licence 
in South Africa. In addition, they depend on British 
Bedfords and Land-Rovers. In 1973 the Defence Department 
reported that while truck bodies and trailers were being made 
entirely locally, other truck components were still being 
imported to a large extent21 • Even under a Labour Government 
the Royal Navy carried out exercises with the South African 
fleet until June 1975 and it is not known whether -the supply 
of truck components has been stopped. Thus rhetorical 
opposition to apartheid is translated into military co-operation 
with the South African forces. 
The West is not monolithic and different groups say and do 
different things. In such a situation prediction as to 
future behaviour is difficult, especially if the West in effect 
is hedging its bets, backing both the Vorster gbvernment and 
the guerilla movements. 
However, Western investment in apartheid m~y be crucial. 
South Africa's enormous increase in defence spending since 
1960 is in part an exercise pro~pted by the huge capital outflow 
after the Sharpeville killings, to convince foreign investors· . 
of the security of their assets in the country. In turn, 
some Western investors perhaps insure their profits from the· 











The South African war bears some comparison with the Vietnam 
war and with the war on Laos and Cambodia, for even after Nixon, 
United States decision-making on war does not seem too radically 
altered. Walter Goldstein has argued very convincingly that 
a refusal to change the.basic structures and procedures of the 
American political system will lead almost inevitably to another 
Vietnam-style war22. It will not require a paranoid President 
who secretly records his own intimate conversations, for one 
should remember that the Vietnam war was planned by the liberal 
advisers of liberal Presidents and given solid backing by the 
military-industrial complex, which still exists. The 
i~stitution of one man, Henry Kissinger, as a world peace-maker 
is no guarantee against such a war if its causes are fundamental. 
Hoagland is among many. writers who list racial confrontation 
in Southern Africa as a conflict area for the 1970's23. 
Western investment:in apartheid, coupled to Western political 
~yst~ms.of decision-making about war, can lead to Western 
support for apartheid in an escalated South African' war. 
The support may be open or secret, by governments or by military 
and industrial interest-groups, for Western profits from cheap 
black labour in Southern Africa are very high. ("Detente" 
m~y allow "racial mixing" in theatres and "even" 6n rugby-field$, 
but it is unlikely materially to reduce profit rates, and ~he 
Southern African conflict is economically based. Desegrega-
tion of a R5-a-seat theatre is largely irrelevant to th~ 
squatters of Crossroads or the "useless appendages" of Dimbaza). 
Nevertheless, the South Africans seem to be planning at most 
for Western neutrality: there is a tone of loneliness in 
their official plans. . They face the possibility of a 
majority-ruled hostile Angola and Mozambique, together with 
a growing war in the rebel British Colony of Southern Rhodesia, 
which colony will have about 90% of its borders surrounded by 
potentially hostile states. South African military plapners 
see their problem as follows: 
"THE THREAT,,24. 
"It is common knowledge that for the past two 
decades or more our country has been the whipping 
boy on the international scene. We must endure 










differ, but to all of them our country's 
government is the immediate object of their 
attacks. There are clearly identifiable 
courses in their strategy against us. These 
embrace: 
(a) Efforts to isolate the Republic of 
South Africa from the rest of the world 
community, for example by the imposition 
of economic boycotts, by persistent 
unfavourable propaganda, boycotts and 
demonstrations in the spheres of sport and 
art and even in those of science and culture; 
(b) The creation of disturbances to disrupt 
law and order; 
(d) The support and encouragement of terrorism 
against the Republic of South Africa; 
(e) The creation of real and fictitious 
situations that can be exploited so as to 
persuade the United Nations to declare that 
these are a threat to world peace; 
(f) Efforts to persuade the Western Powers 
to approve and support the United Nations in 
a possible intervention by force". 
The present South African Minister of Defence, the 
Honourable P.W. Botha, explains: 
"The statement that the Republic of South Africa 
is engaged in a struggle to preserve and protect 
that which rightfully belongs to it would probably 
be regarded as a truism •••••• As a result of the 
relative check-mate in the struggle between the 
super-powers in the sphere of nuclear weapons, 
we find ourselves in a position of increasing 
importance in that struggle. Like the rest 
of the free world, The Republic' of South Africa 
is a target for international communism and its 
co-horts, - leftist activities, exaggerated 
humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related 
ideologies. In addition, the Republic of 
South Africa has been singled out as a special 
target for the by-products of their ideologies, 
such as black racialism, exaggerated individual 
freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other 
slogans employed against us on the basis of 
double standards..... Because the Republic of 
South Africa holds a position of strategic 
importance, these ideological attacks on the 
Republic of South Africa are progressively being 
converted into more tangible action in the form 
of sanctions, boycotts, demonstrations, isolation 
and the like. This renders us - and the Free 
World - the more vulnerable to the indirect 
strategy applied by the radical powers in the 











violence, whether employed openly or 
dissimulated behind ideological fronts. 
Geographically, the Republic of South Africa 
is a part of the Third World; in the military 
and cultural spheres it is a captive ally of 
the West, and ideologically a direct obstacle 
in the path of communism". 
The Minister concludes that internal policy, foreign policy 
and defence policy must be co-ordinated and integrated: 
"particularly in the present international 
climate which is typified by total strategy and 
which obliges us'to face the onslaughts of 
monolithic organisations which are in absolute 26 
control of all the means available to their states" • 
38 
Without wishing to deny the enormity of the threat facing the 
Minister, one must point out that the only monolithic 
organisation in absolute control of all the means available 
to its states would be a Supreme Deity. However, the South 
African Defence Force is convinced of the support of the 
Almighty, and it encourages the religious beliefs of its troops: 
"the Chaplain has a message to convey - the 27 
message of the Bible, the Soldier's firmest anchor" • 
This analysis of increasing militarism in South Africa, 
displayed by tne remarks of the Minister of Defence and by 
the growing military expenditure, is given further support_ 
by the "ATTITUDE SURVEY OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS" shown in 
Table Three. Five thousand students in different nations , 
were surveyed, and a "compulsion-comparison factor" was 
established. A rank/order comparison of students' and 
nations' attitudes and behaviours was prepared, in terms 
of the categories of conservatism, militarism" nntionalism, . . 
religiosity and compassion. By comp~rison with fburteen 
other countries, the survey found "white" South Africp.n 
students, and their nation, to be extremely militaristic • 










TABLE THREE: MILITARISM AND COMPASSION. 
RANK ORDER SCORES OF STUDENTS AND NATIONS 28 • 
NATION STUDENT ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR 
.. 
C M R N C 
0 I E A 0 
N L L T M 
S I I I P 
E T G 0 A 
R A I N S 
V R 0 A S 
A I S L I 
T S I I 0 
I M T S N 
S Y M 
M 
Denmark 4 14 14 13 1 
~etherlands 9 13 7 14 2 
IUnited Kingdom 10 11 10 11 3 
r.cugoslavia 14 6 9 10 4 
~weden 3 12 11 12 5 
~anada 7 8 13 7 6 
C'z echos lovakia 11 10 5 9 7 
IU.S.A. 2 9 12 6 8 
Finland 6 4 6 8 9 
lCeylon 13 5 4 1 10 
Australia 
/ 
5 3 8 5 11 
Brazil 8 7 2 3 12 
India 12 2 3 2 13 

































Sample Size: 5 000 r = .74, significant at the .01 
level of confidence. 
The survey does not attempt to distinguish between English-
and Afrikaans-speaking students, and it must be queried whether 
a~single poll of so small a sample can adequately ascertain 











languages, but the results do perhaps give a statistical 
description of white South African attitudes compared to those 
of other countries. As a further table prepared by Alcock 
and Eckhardt shows, in Amnesty International's Reported 
Incidence of Torture by Nation, South Africa falls in the 
category of nations where torture is widespread and encouraged29 • 
Again, this information must be treated with some reservations, 
for nations do not give publicity to the torture they use. In 
short, however, there is evidence of a rapidly-arming highly 
militaristic group in South Africa, whose methods deviate from 
the Queensbury and Geneva rules for conflict. 
The strategy of this group 9aS been clearly stated: 
"Our posture is defensive and not offensive. 
Defence, however, cannot be merely passive; our 
policy demands a measure of retaliatory capability. 
The main task of the Defence Force is to ensure 
within its capabilities and the terms of Government 
policy that the Government will have the time and 
freedom of action needed to develop its internal 
and foreign policies.... Departmental strategic 
policy of the Defence Force is aimed at preventing 
crises rather than seeking solutions when matters 
have come to a head. Prevention includes the 
deterrent element, preparedness and presence in the 
threatened sphere. 
The.Defence Force must at all times be able to 
assist the S.A. Police in preserving internal 
order". (30) • 
The stress is laid on the importance of buying time in which 
the Government can carry out its 
notably the creation of separate 
'tribal' divisions of the people 
plans for Southern Africa, 
nations based on the old 
of the region. "Separate 
development" is dealt with more fully below with regard to 
Namibia, but it must be noted that the RSADF sees itself as 
necessary in gaining time to achieve "separate development". 
General Spinola saw a similar role for his army: 
"To the armed forces therefore only belongs the 
duty of creating and maintaining for the necessary 
length of time - naturally not very long - those 
condttions of security which will allow of finding 
those political and social solutions which are the 











negotiated future settlement based on federalism or qualified 
franchise, in which the mine-owners will still be able to make 
a (slightly smaller) profit. From all three groups the 
"West" still draws its raw materials at low prices, and is hence 
prepared to tolerate the situation~ despite rhetorical 
denunciations of apartheid. The Defence Force on the 
borders and backing up the police provides the threatened 
or actual violence whereby the system has survived so far. 
Can the RSADF win its civil war in Southern Africa or, more 
especially, in Namibia? General Spinola asserts that for 
the rulers, "a purely military victory is not possible"34. 
Lewis Gann, by contrast, writes that there is "no hope for 
violent liberation in Southern Africa,,35. The General has 
much combat and command experience; Gann is a Senior Fellow 
of the Hoover Institute for War and Peace. G.ann wrote in 
1972 and has already been proved wrong in the case of Portugal 
Overseas where the present decolonisation is clearly a result 
of the "war of liberation". Gann may yet be proved wrong 
in other areas too, especially in those areas where the terrain 
is suitable for guerilla operations, such as much of Southern 
--
Rhodesia, and Northern Namibia. At least one authority, 
C. Petersen, has stressed the vulnerability of Ovamboland~ . 
which has very few white inhabitants, and thick sub-tropical 
bush 37 • Thus Gann's dogmatic denial of any ,hope" for 
violent liberation must be more carefully examined, especially 
for some areas. Depending on the course of events in Angola, 
Ovamboland may prove very difficult to hold militarily. 
Jean Baechler38 has drawn on the extensively-documented French 
counter-revolutionary wars in Indo-China and Algeria to produce 
a strategic assessment of such wars which may shed some ligBt 
on the Southern African conflict, especially in Namibia, whose 
white settler society is similar in some ways to that in Algeria. 
He gives a framework, based on von Clausewitz's classic39 • 
War is a duel between two protagonists with two grand 
strategies, either the attack (to win the war), or the defence 











by other means. To these classical maxims, Baechler adds 
features applying to revolutionary war. 
Each of the protagonists has three features to be examined: 
the combatant forces, domestic politics, and the attitude of 
the international community. Political occurrences in any 
of the three spheres may affect the war more directly than in 
conventional war. Political dynamics are thus more important 
in revolutionary wars than in conventional wars. This means 
that especially in revolutionary wars the political goal must 
determine the military objective. The defence, seeking not 
to lose, is superior to the attack in such wars. Finally, 
the opposing strategies are dialectically linked: one should 
not sneer at the strategy of one's opponents (as the French 
did to their cost in Indo-China). 
The insurrection's political goals are sovereignty and 
legitimacy. It seeks decolonisation and the re-conquering 
of national identity; it seeks the possibility of freely 
choosing a place in the international system. Baechler writes: 
"What is probable is that the longer and harsher 
the war, the more extremist the regime which will 
finally take over from the colonists" (40).-
This is a foreboding note for Southern Africa, whose leaders 
are arming for a long battle, despite moves towards "detente". 
The Namibian insurrection fits Baechler's framework: its 
political goal is independence, sovereignty and de-colonisation., 
For the insurrection, Baechler maintains, the conquest of the 
people by its opponents will result in the people's support 
for the insurrection, or at least neutrality.' The insurrec-
tion should seek to convert neutrality to active support, 
especially by political training, and by popular programmes, 
such as demands for land reform. Both these occur in the 
Namibian case, where leaders leave the territory for training, 
and where opposition to land apartheid is the paramount 
political tactic. 











insurrection seeks to destroy alliances made by the colonists 
internationally, and to influence world opinion against the 
colonists, while seeking direct help. Again, the Namibian 
case is in point: world opinion is actively lobbied, and 
direct help received as much from the constitutional monarchies 
of Scandinavia and Europe as from America or the "East". 
If the political goal is legitimate sovereignty and 
de-colonisation, the military strategy is to destroy the enemy's 
moral and material centre of gravity wh~ch might lie, as with 
Charles XII or Gustavus Adolphus, in the Army, or, given a 
revolutionary war, in the national will to fight. The 
strategy of insurgents is to turn into a majority the group 
that supports negotiation and peace. In the Namibian case 
this means convincing the occupiers that a long war would be 
more expensive than negotiation. This may not be difficult 
in the Namibian case. The strategy is, that of defence, for 
the insurgents seek not to lose, not to be destroyed. To 
this end they follow the classical maxims, retreating before 
superior forces, attacking only when sure of absolute 
superiority, never engaging all their strength in a single 
b.attle, and breaking off combat if losses are excessive. 
The strategy of attack (such as the battle at Dien Bien Phu) 
is not currently applicable in Namibia by the insurrection, for 
they do not have sufficient strength. The grand strategy is 
the destructio  of the colonist's will to fight for the 
territory, and the means is a long protracted war. 
The strategy for the occupiers can be seen in the same 
framework. The political goal is a particuldr reform of 
the society so as to protect the income and life-style of 
the ruling group~ and so as to satisfy or control the 
aspirations of other groups. The goal in Namibia is thus 
the fragmentation of the country into separate "nations", in 
which process the living standards of the ruling "nation" may 
not fall. However, this political goal is by no means 
totally accepted by the ruling groups in Namibia or.South 











The ruling groups have internal political tensions and are 
divided or divisible. This weakness has perhaps not yet 
been fully exploited by the insurrection. 
open;" 
"All options are 
For the occupiers, the enemy's centre of gravity is the people of 
the territory. Thus, short of genocide, which would have huge 
international ramifications, the occupier's military strategy 
must be to win or to neutralise the population. Baechler lists 
several methods: the occupiers are using all simultaneously, 
excepting rapid genocide. The first method is to win hearts 
and minds, which is accurately shortened to WHAM! This involves 
actual or promised economic and political reform; skilful 
propaganda; sensitive, responsive administration; and highly-
trained, tactful soldiering. The South African forces recently 
announced their intention of using this method in Namibia: its 
efficacy will be considered below. The method has the 
disadvantage of alienating those supporters of the occupation 
who categorically oppose reform, but in Namibia these seem to 
be unable materially to influence the situation, for Dirk 
Mudge arid John Vorster are consummate politicians. 
The second military strategy for the occupiers is a large-scale 
mobilisation of the people, the elimination of the potential 
enemies, and the atomisation or demoralisation of the population,· 
which is packed into armoured hamlet~ or aldeiamentos, as in 
Southern Rhodesia, Portugal Overseas, Vietnam, and Algeria. 
South Africa's re-settlement camps, such as Dimbaza, are p~rhaps 
a non-military version of this method. It is a method that 
has seldom been militarily successful, and offers excellent 
opportunities for the opposing forces. 
unlikely to aid a wEAM campaign. 
Further, it is 
The third military strategy is the use of the Cleavages 
which might divide the population, be they ethnic, linguistic, 
or religious cleavages. This is obviously used in 
Namibia, for both separate development and federalism are 
sophisticated political versions of this strategy. One 
cannot easily measure the unity of the people of the terri-












Within these strategies, various military tactics are 
available: the war of movement, the war of territorial 
security, the counter-guerilla war, and the war of annihilation. 
The war of annihilation has been used before in Namibia: 
the Herero population was reduced by the Germans from 80 000 
to about 16 000 people in 1904 to 1905, in such a war42 • 
Baechler writes: 
"on the whole it was impossible for France to resort 
to such extremes. However, a totalitarian regime 
with hegemonial power might not hesitate to do so" (43). 
The war of territorial security, usually linked to the strategy 
of atomisation (above), involves garrisons guarding limited 
areas, having recourse to rapid re-inforcement. Such a war 
requires vast numbers of troops, which leads to political 
difficulties for the occupier. 
The classical war of movement, in World War II style, involves 
huge mechanised attacks. In revolutionary warfare such 
methods are generally foolhardy: the.enemy merely disappears 
and receives propaganda opportunities from the inevitable 
"mistakes" of huge attacks. If South Africa does intend 
using its specially created conventional force, it must have 
other objects in mind, for conventional attacks on guerillas 
are foolish. 
The counter-guer~lla war has proved very effective. It 
involves small professional bands of soldiers using guerilla 
tactics to chase and destroy guerilla groups. The bands 
are as self-sufficient as is possible for government forces 
a successful guerilla is supported by the countryside, however. 
The bands are,licensed to use extreme methods; they have one 
advantage over the guerilla, which is air support. The method 
was very successful in Malaysia under the British and, using 
the "style-para", the Casbah of Algiers was cleaned out in 
44 six months. South Afric"3 probably envisages using this 










"Tough and relentless, they are trained to 
operate with an almost automatic fury" (45) 
47 
However, the method has disadvantages, especially in Namibia. 
The extreme methods used would mean harmful international 
propaganda, and a stregthening of those at home who wish to 
negotiate peace. These methods preclude any winning of 
hearts, ,preclude easy political solutions, and invite United 
Nations intervention, especially if the counter-guerilla band 
crosses the border in chasing its foe. Counter-guerilla 
military "victory" can mean political defeat. 
Baechler, writing about successful revolutionary wars, 
concludes that it is difficult for a revolutionary war not to 
succeed. The various strategies and tactics of the occupiers, 
outlined above, all have exploitable weaknesses. Baechler 
writes: 
"All the insurrection needs is not to lose 
militarily in order eventually to win politically. 
Because of the strategic defensive advantages of 
the insurgents, the established authorities cannot 
win a counter-revolutionary war; they can only 
lose the war or pervert their political ideals" (46) 
Spinola agrees in part: 
"The forces of the law and order can always lose 
a subversive war, but they will never win one, for 
the simple reason that the construction of victory 
does not lie in their sphere" (47). 
Thus Baechler argues that political, victory is inevitable for 
the insurgents if they do not lose militarily, while Spinola 
claims that victory can only be achieved politically,nnbt 
militarily, by the occupiers. I would avoid any suggestion 
of inevitability, for such things have no time/limit, but on 
balance, a military and political victory in Namibia, in the 
long run, is very difficult for South Africa to achieve. To 
do so she must maintain her national will to fight a long, 
expensive and bloody war, she must win the population, or 
totally destroy the insurgents, she must make separate 
development or federation work in Namibia, and this must be 
done in such a way as not to disturb the high standard of 











A tall order - or is a politically-creative strategic withdrawal 
the answer? 
The military leaders may see the benefit of a WHAM campaign48 
but can they implement it, as they recently attempted in the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel? The racialism of their troops 
probably militates against a successful WHAM campaign, as is 
shown by the "Guide for the South African Army on how to treat 
Bantu" issued to troops in the Transvaal: 
"Every tribe has its totem, usualLy an animal, 
the best known being a baboon, blue ape, fish or 
kudu. Avoid the bad habit of abusing a Bantu 
as an ape or baboon, or saying his mouth is like 
a crocodile, because one of these animals can be 
his totem, and this is a gross insult to him •••• 
The Bantu is also a person, an entity with a name 
and surname. If it is known to you, call him 
by his name and surname and add Mister (--------), 
particularly if you are in his Homeland •••••• 
If a hand is extended to you for greeting, take it. 
Your hand will not change colour". (49). 
When I asked a meeting of Namibian migrant labourers and 
students whether South Africa could win the hearts and minds 
of the Northern peoples of Namibia, the reply was polite 
laughte~. The meeting stressed its hatred of war and 
violence, and pointed out that the WHAM campaign arose from 
a desire to win the war, not to alter the social system. 
It may be instructive here to'consider the views of U.S.A. 
strategists, schooled in the white heat of the Vietnamese 
inferno. Michael T. Klare writes: 
"Rather than acknowledge the political nature 
of the insu+gent battlefield, the academic' 
strategists would have us view insurgency as 
a system, a mechanical process that is subject 
to external manipulation. From this perspective 
it is not necessary to win the hearts and minds of 
the peasantry, but onlY - through bribery and 
intimidation, - to secure their withdrawal from 
the insurgent movement" 
He goes on to quote Charles Wolf, Jnr., of the Rand Corporat~on: 
"The main concern of counter-insurgency efforts 
should be to influence the behaviour and actions 
of the populace, rather than their loyalties and 










concerned with insurgent movements can do 
much to influence the behaviour and actions 
of the populace that make the operation of 
the insurgent system substantially more 
difficult. The primary consideration 
should be whether the proposed operation is 
likely to increase the cost and difficulties 
of insurgent operations, rather than whether 
it wins popular support". (50). 
49 
In Ovamboland the "reforms" of early 1975 would seem to have 
made little effect on the harshness of South Africa's indirect 
hegemony. Admittedly, official flogging must now be done 
in private rather than in public, but setting aside such 
dubious "improvements", it can be seen that the severity of 
laws such as proclamation R17 of 1972 remains essentially 
unaltered. Could it be that South Africa is heeding the 
advice of the American strategists and is "increasing the 
difficulties of insurgent operations" through "bribery and 
intimidation"? This is perhaps their true goal rather than 
"winning hearts and minds". It is, of course, a more 
realistic goal in the short term. 
However, whatever the outcome of the military conflict, be 
it "inevitable" victory or defeat, the purpose here is more 
to show the actual and latent military violence which maintains 
the system in the territory, as well as to show the potential 
for conflagrat on.' The KUnene schemes are in the firing 
line51 , are important to a political victory for South Africa, 
and will, if completed as presently planned, assist in large 
capital accumulation in Johannesburg, London and New York. 
The linkage between capital accumulation and violence, traced 
for South Africa by Legassick52 , can be seen i~ Namibia. It 
should be recalled that the South African occupation is illegal 5S 
and it must be questioned whether General S.L.A. Marshall of-
the United States who testified so elqquently at the World 
Court in 1965, that the territory was "less militarised than 
54 any of its size he had ever seen" ,could undertake a tour of 
the country today and still give the same evidence. 










unsympathetic to the interests of the South~5, reports from 
Oshikati: 
"You see the occasional White soldier on 
border duty, in his drab brown, and even less 
frequently you see a policeman ••••• Yet at the 
same time you know that Ovamboland is in a 
very tight ~ecurity grip". (56) 
50 
Whereas earlier clashes and shootings in Ovamboland usually 
involved police troops, in 1975 such incidents also involved 
57 the South African Army per se • 
Further published evidence of militarisation of Namibia comes 
from press reports of a recent air crash at the Grootfontein 
air base, near Tsumeb 58 • A South African Air Force Buccaneer 
bomber, valued at R2 250 000 was totally wrecked "after a 
cross-country exercise" and a commission of enquiry has yet to 
report. (The Buccanners were, of course, sold by Britain 
to South Africa under the guise of sophisticated naval weapons, 
unsuited for landward "internal security" operations: why then 
a "cross-country exercise", terminating at Grootfontein?). The 
point remains: even with South African tight control of Defence 
information, publicly available evidence would indicate that 
Namibia is now somewhat more militarised than General Marshall's 
testimony shows. Nevertheless, South Africa continues 
proudly to cite his evidence~9 
The tanks of the military may lumbeE threateningly by, but the 
society they defend is supported more subtly and effectively 
by another weapon: the structural violence of the migratory 
contract labour and influx control systems, allied to the 
political control resulting from legislation iuch as the 
Terrorism Act, Number 83 of 1967, and Proclamation R17 of 1972, 
in Ovamboland. 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwazulu has described a similar system 
operating in South Africa as follows: 
"The migratory labour system is destroying my 
people. Families are not just living apart, 
but also growing apart in different cultures. 
Zulus now have to maintain two households on a 
wage that would be laughable to any other race 











The social disruptions and devastation caused by the system have 
been documented61 , but they could never be completely described, 
for language has its limita~ions. Helen Suzman's speech on 
her Private Member.' s motion to abolish the system, made in 197~, 
is an excellent summary of the damage and demoralisation 
achieved by the system62 ; there is no need of extensive 
elaboration here. A South African Cabinet Minister (before 
joining the Cabinet) once said of the system: 
"It is not possible to ensure any stability in 
a society which struggles for soci~l existence, 
which cannot find a basis for any permanent 
relations at all" (63). 
The 1971/72 mass Ovambo strike bears adequate testimony to the 
existence of this structural violence in Namibia: the workers 
struck not only for higher wages, but also because of the whole 
oppressive system which split their families, prevented their 
free movement or association, and prevented any labour mobility~4 
Marginal l:!changes" resulted but fundamentally the system is no 
less oppressive. 
For an understanding of the attitude to the migrant that existed 
on the mines, where conditions were perhaps slightly better than 
on the farms, we turn to H.C. Eedes, "These Contracted Ova.!!!!2.£. 
Workers Live Well", which was published in 1955 in the SWA 
Annual: 
"A radio address system is in operation, and this 
assists the Compound Officers in summoning and . 
locating labourers required in the offices. It 
is also used for providing light recorded music 
during the day. Flood-lights have been 
installed in the enclosure of the compound, and 
at the most suitable points, and the whole! 
compound can be suitably lit •••• The Native 
labourers are given a great amount of freedom in 
the compound in their off-shift time. They may 
do carpentry work, repair bicycles, in fact do 
anything useful which will keep them out of 
mischief. They may also apply for passes to 
leave the compound for the purpose of visiting 
in the town. These passes are usually granted". 
The above quotatio~ speaks for itself, and needs no comment. 
The labour system has been reformed since 1955, but the compound 










labour battery system, in which labour is produced in much 
the same way as the ill-fated battery hen. As pressure 
increases for reform it is, however, conceivable that family 
housing will replace the compound. Today new mines are 
designed with this in mind. 
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The labour reforms of 1972 to 1975 in Namibia represent the 
extension to Namibia of the sophisticated South African system 
of bureaucratic control of labour. A legal/administrative 
machine for the complete control of labour was created for 
the Republic by, inter alia, the Bantu LaBour Act. Number 67 
of 1964, and the Bantu Labour Regulations of 1965 and 196865 • 
The essential elements of the South African labour-controlling 
machine were extended to Namibia by legislation~such as the 
Owambo Nation Registration Enactment66 ; the Labour Enactment 
for Owambo {as amended) 67; and the Regulations for the 
Establishment of Employment Bureaux in the Territory of South 
West Africa68 • The essence of South African influx control 
had been extended to Namibia much earlier by the Native Urban 
Areas Proclamation {as amended)69. 
None of these was repealed during the much-vaunted "scrapping 
of pass· laws" (timed to coincide with the debate arising in 
the Security Council)70. With the possible exception of 
the Masters and Servants Proclamation, most of the laws 
scrapped had largely been supersede? by more sophisticated 
methods of achieving the same ends. The letter from the 
South African Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations on 27th May 1975 was diplomatically ambiguous 
on the point: 
n •••• on 9 April 1975 various proclamations long in 
force in the territory were repealed or am~nded 
because they were obsolete or embodi~d unnecessary 
restrictive or what might be termed discriminatory 
aspects" (emphasis added). 
Thus the crucial legislation still remains in force. 
Even if the special committee set up to remove points of 
friction in the law recommends -that the influx control 










the essential control of movement and of labou~ could still 
be carried out under the various labour laws. 
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The labour bureaucracy installed by these laws ensures a complete 
control over all employment of "Natives"in the territory. It 
thereby controls most "Natives", for in general "Natives" do 
not have any alternative to employment, although for some, there 
is access to land in the "homelands". Generally the 
productive resources are not in the hands of "Natives" who 
must therefore seek employment. A "Native" may only be 
employed through a labour bureau in a proclaimed ar~a71, and 
once classified as an "employee" or "work-seeker" he must 
report for employment within a certain time after becoming 
unemployed. The officer-in-charge of the employment bureau 
has enormous powers to control, in various circumstances, when, 
where, and by whom an employee shall be employed. In certain 
circumstances he may even, for example: 
"order that such workseeker and his family, if any, 
return to his home or last place cf residence or. 72 
any other place indicated in the order" (emphasis added) • 
An elaborate system of registration of employees, employers and 
employment has been established. The labour bureau system 
was extended to the "homelands" and under laws such as the 
Owambo Labour Enactment, tribal labour officers classify 
work-seekers into categories: 
"Provided that the classification shall, as far 
as possible, be made according to the \",ishes and 
qualifications, physique and ability of the 
person, and the availability of employment in the 
var i ous categories" (emphasis added) (73) • 
The implications of the system, which are not immediately 
apparent, are illustrated by the following example of workers 
under a similar system in South Africa74 : 
"Mr Thupudi is a young man who recently left school 
in the Orange Free State and, very much against his 
own wishes, has been classified as a mineworker by 
the labour officer. When he argued, he was told 
that he had to work on the mines because his father 
had done so". 
"Mr Senone is registered as a workseeker at a labour 










industrial growth point. 
a month in a factory and 
sell his labour for what 
other place". 
He is earning R1G 
is forbidden by law to 
it is worth in any 
For a Namibian example, the following is extracted from a 
letter signed by a group of Ovambo contract workers: 
"The Ovambo goes to the labour bureau and says., 
'I am a driver and want work as a driver'. He 
1s told, 'You are going to build rooms, and the 
pay is R5 a week'. If he says, 'I don't want 
building work, and I am not satisfied with R5 
per week', he is chased back to Ovambo and there 
are no means of self-protection. Is this a 
good system in which to find-work?". 
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In Namibia the labour laws are, it would seem, being enforced 
with some vigour, although it is within the powers of the 
authorities to vary the vigour of enforcement to meet various 
l Ot O 1 0 d ?5 Th t t t- h po ~ ~ca or econom~c nee s e con rac seems _0 ave 
been substituted for the "IP" of previous years. Blacks 
are s~ill "repatriated from the white areas" at "enormou~ 
cost to the State" according to the Di~isional Commissioner 
of POlice?G. He reported that in the past the police had 
concentrated on rounding up deserters or vagrants, but in 
future ~hey would concentrate on illegal employment. Thus 
influx control still exists, and is achieved by the contract 
employment system, as well as by laws preventing unauthorised 
departure of "homeland citizens" from their "homelands". 
The eno~mity of the Southern African migrant labour system 
may be becoming increasingly well-documented; the vastness 
of the mass population removal scheme may be r 1ceiving 
increasing attention??; yet the basis of these schemes has 
received relatively little attention by comparison. One 
must have a population registration system to back up such 
schemes if they are to succeed and it is here that the South 
Africans have used modern technology on a surprising scale to 
register and control people from allover the sub-continent, 
including Namibia. 
The hugeness of the South African computerised data processing 
system for registrat~on of people is proudly described in the 











"One operator has already maintained 21 735 key 
depressions per hour measured over a period of 
a month, which feat is regarded as a world record. 
The Department was the first in the world to make 
use of this type of punch equipment on such a 
large scale". (78) • 
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The report advises that at the 31st March, 1974 the Depart-
ment's Reference Bureau had on record ~welve million, twenty-
eight thousand, three hundred and fifty-six sets of fingerprints 
of people from allover Southern Africa, including an unknown 
number of deceased people. During the year, 1 676 932 
comparisons of fingerprints were made for the issue of 
replacement identity documents where the identity numbers were 
known; 928 100 other sets were compared with the record to 
guard against duplication; and 256 646 sets were identified 
by search. These figures included 335 844 fingerprint sets 
of citizens of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique79 • 
The system has included Namibia in its ambit. For example, 
under the Owambo Nation Registration Enactment80 , a National 
Register is created of "Owambo Citizens". Their particulars, 
including photographs and fingerprints, are listed81 • This 
enactment makes provision for an arrangement whereby the R.S.A. 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development compiles and 
maintains the Register82 • Provision is made on the 
registration application forms for a full set of fingerprints, 
which is added to the Department's Register. 
The Department reports that in the year ended 31st March, 1974 
"mass registration of the citizens in Owambo, Kavango and 
Eastern Caprivi" was completed. Registration cards were 
issued to 56 730 male and 73 953 female adult "citizens of 
83 Owambo", a total of 130 683 people. The estimate of 
the total population of "Owambo" at the time, including 
migrants and children, was 396 00085 • The registration' 
would seem therefore to have been a thorough process. 
It is, of course, no simple scientifically-based task to 










skin-colour. The activities of the Race Classification 
Board in South Africa itself bear ample testimony to the 
difficulties involved. Despit,e the practical problems, 
Namibia is, however, being divided up by the registration of 
her people in separate "nations". While in practice the 
process may be highly arbitrarily carried out, in law the 
separate nations exist. 
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Thus, based on population registration into separate "nations", 
structural violence controls Namibia. Freedom of movement, 
of employment, of associCl;tion" and even of family life, are all 
affected. This structural violence is maintained by an 
enormous computerised bureaucracy which can identify individuals 
and thereby ensure that they perform their allocated function. 
in the economy. Changes brought about in the "move away 
from discrimination" have so far been marginal. There is 
nothing petty about apartheid, but even if one were to accept 
the concept, the elimination of "petty apartheid" in no way 
means that "grand apartheid" is to be forsaken. In Namibia 
the labour and population registration systems are continuously 
at work, enforcing "grand apartheid". 
The res~lt ~s a legal-admin~strative machine which, by imposing 
criminal penalties on deviations from the imposed employment 
pattern, effectively controls the economic and social behaviour 
of the people of Namibia. Yet, what of their political 
behaviour? Here too violence is used to punish serious 
political oppositLon. The full story may never be known: 
Clive Cowley lists several "mysteries", such as the destruction 
of the Owambo-Kavango Church prin·ting press by ~n explosion on 
the 11th May 1973; the shooting of five men in Epinga by police 
"in the ccurse of executing their duties"; the numerous 
allegations of torture since the 1971/72 strike85 • 
Yet, in addition to brute force, structural methods are used to 
criminalise political opoosition, in much the same way as 
economic mobility is crirninalised. As well as statutes 
such as the Terrorism Act, No 37 o~ 1967, Ovamboland is 











30 . . 87 o tr~bal pol~ce and an unknown number of South African 
policemen or troops. 
Proclamation R17 needs to be read in the original. No 
summary can convey the Proclamation's import, but its essential 
aspects will be discussed here. 
Firstly, it was retrospective in that it validated acts done 
after the the 25th January 1972, a date prior to the publication 
of the Proclamation88 • After the strikes, large numbers of 
workers had returned to Ovamboland, and the Proclamation 
validated the suppression of the resulting political activity. 
Actions of the officials were protected by a retrospective 
indemnity against civil action and against criminal prosecution 
where the official had acted in good faith under the 
Proclamation89 • 
The Minister is empowered to prohibit any person from entering 
into, being in, or remaining in any part, or the whole, of 
Ovamboland90 • 
With exceptions, such as bona fide church services, concerts, 
or sports gatherings, any meeting is unlawful, unless authorised 
in writing by the Native Commissioner 91 • Any individuai may 
be prohibited from attending an otherwise lawful meeting92 • 
The onus of proof is reversed: a meeting is deemed unlawful 
until the contrary is proved. A meeting is defined as a 
gathering at which more than five persons are present at any 
t
. 93 one ~me • 
A person suspected of having informaticn concerning an offence, 
or having committed an offence, or of being about to commit ,an 
offence, may be indefinitely detained, without access to legal 
advisers, until the person has answered fully and truthfully, 
to the satisfaction of the responsible officer, all questions 
put t'J him concerning the suspected offence94 A detained 
person rr.ay be released upon such conditions as the Minister 











Special conditions relating to, for example, the carrying of 
dangerous weapons, may be applied to certain areas, called 
Prohibited Areas 95 • 
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It is an offence to say or do anything intended or likely to 
have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority 
of the State, the Ovamboland Government, or any official, chief 
or headman. Further, one may not organise or take part in 
any boycott of a meeting convened by officials, chiefs or 
headmen, nor any boycott against any person with the object of 
causing him loss, disadvantage or inconvenience. It is an 
offence to make certain. threats , or to disobey lawful orders 
from chiefs or headmen, or to treat any chief or headman with 
d " t t t "d· 1 96 Ch" f h d lsrespec , con emp or rl lCU e. le s or ea men are 
empowered to try and to punish those who commit certain of the 
offences against those chiefs or headmen; that is, they may 
. d . th· 97 JU ge ln elr own cause 
Some of the above provisions may have been temporarily suspended 
or amended - for example, during elections - but, in short, any 
serious political opposition is criminalised almost completely 
at the discretion of the various authorities, under this 
obviously Draconian law. 
This Chapter has shown that South Africa is arming mightily 
and now has the ability to use vast-direct or structural 
violence in its defence of, among other things, the Kunene 
River schemes. However, the Chapter has also shown that 
continued control of Namibia by the ruling groups is no small 
; 
task and that they may, in fact, lose control, although no 
certain predictions can be made. A contradiction present 
in any migrant labour system is that the oscillating migrants 
form a perfect channel for ideas and organisation to flow 
between town and countryside, as was seen in the 1971/72 
strikes. Whether that channel will need to be used is 
uncertain. 
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one should recall that the South African government did not 
send a representative to the recent Conference to update the 
Geneva War Convention. 
"Informed sources said South Africa had decided 
not to send a delegation because of the delicate 
stage in relations between South Africa and 
Black African countries ••••• South Africa did not 
want to clash with representatives of •••• African 
national liberation movements" (98). 
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Whatever the reason for not attending the conference, it is 
likely that if structural violence is replaced by more direct 
violence, the conflict will be marked by ruthlessness - on 
both sides. Even at present there is evidence of ruthless-
ness. The Bishops of the Churches of Ovamboland were asked 
by the authorities why the young and educated people were 
fleeing the country in 1974. They gave a number of reasons, 
among them the following: 
"The oppressive powers of the police have caused 
grievances among Ovambos and all South West African 
people. Those who oppose the inhuman constitution 
are being flogged, tortured with electric shocks, 
detained for long periods without trial and the 
conditions of imprisonment are inhumane". (99). 
To summarise: South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia, 
and intends to back that occupation with vast military might. 
The population is being fragmented, atomised and demoralised, 
even to the extent of floggings being imposed on political 
leaders. 
Military and structural violence are essential to the system, 
but attempts are simultaneously made to win hearts and minds, 
and to achieve "separate development", or at l~ast some form 
of "self-determination". 
One Namibian, whose doctoral dissertation concerned the German 
colonisation of the territory, was recently made Bishop of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Windhoek. 
situation: 
He summed up the 
"The brutal, bloody colonialism of the Germans 
has been replaced by a brutal bloody new 100 
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NAMIBIA AND NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI. 
"One mode of good government is taken as being 
for the people to obey those la~s that are 
laid down, but another is to lay down well 
'~those laws that the people abide by". 
Aristotle: Politics (1). 
The theories underlying German and subsequent South Africdn 
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domination in Namibia are not new. Twenty-three centuries 
ago, Aristotle presaged the wisdom of indirect rule, albeit in 
a different moral framework (above). Nearly two centuries 
ago, Prince Metternich provided the model for the diplomacy of 
detente. Global detente under Henry Kissinger, and local 
detente under John Vorster, are steeped in Metternich's doctrines. 
However, to understand the political instance of the Namibian 
social formation, we must turn to the work of Niccol~ 
Nachiavelli, placed in the context of twentieth century 
capitalism. 
Four hundred and sixty years ago, the grand master of the 
theory of realpolitiK laid down the groundrules of colonialism 
and neo-colonialism, in Book Five of "The Prince", entitled: 
"How cities or. principalities 1rlhich lived under their O\'lr. laws 
should be administered after being conJJ.Y_~red,,2. His 
groundrules have been applied by the Germans and South Africans 
in Namibia almost as Protestant Biblical Commandments. 
After a short geographical description of Namibia, this Chapter 
will examin~ techniques of domination there, in the context of 
Machaivelli's groundrules, and in the context of the develop-
ment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. In 
short, drawing on "The Prince", this Chapter will discuss 
aspects of Namibia's history, geography, and apartheid economics. 
These topics are tightly inter-related, but the economic base 











that the labour system was crucial to the structural violence 
by which Namibia is controlled. We also saw that the size 
of the South African Gross National Product was important in 
determining the military capability which backs up social and 
economic violence in controlling Namibia. In the same way, 
an understanding of the economy is crucial to an understanding 
of the development of political domination by the ruling groups. 
The labour system outlined in the previous chapter is internally 
related to the property relations system which the colonists 
imposed in bringing capitalism to the territory. These 
labour and property relations are the cornerstones of domination 
at the political level. An awareness of them must be used 
to enrich Machiavelli's analysis, which was written before the 
advent of capitalism as we know it. 
In as blatantly capitalist a system as that found in the 
territory it is not being too "economic deter.ministic" (in a 
non .... Marxist framework), nor too "economistic" (in a Narxist 
framework), to stress not only the importance of labour and 
property relations, but als  the importance of wage levels 
and income distribution, in~describingcolonial political 
domination. Relations of production, and the ~esulting 
distribution of income, lie beneath and interact with the 
political process. The interaction must be examined, 
which is no mean task. It is an ongoing task, as well, 
but a start will be made here. 
This chapter will, accordingly, examine the establishment of 
these relations of production by the colonists. However, 
Namibia has a particular distribution of productive resources. 
Therefore, to understand the political economy, the geography 
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Namibia is a warm, dry country, falling into the "extremely 
arid" and "arid" world homoclimatic regions shown on Map One. 
Arid climates are so lacking in ~oisture that they cannot 
regularly support ordinary crop growth. They are among 
mankind's most fundamental physical problems, for they cover 
more than one-third of the earth's. land surface, while cultivated 
3 ground covers barely one-tenth • 
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that, with the possible 
exceptions of Australia, the south-western United States of 
America, and the Republic of South Afrlca, states having arid 
climates generally fall into what is popularly called the 
"Third World" - an expressive term, despite its disadvantages 4 • 
Namibia, with its arid climate, is no exceptionS. 
the familiar features of a "Third World" state. 
It displays 
It is an 
outpost of imperial capitalism. It is essentially a 
producer of primary raw materials for the world market.· It is 
generally not a centre for secondary and tertiary industries, 
nor is it a locus of accumulated capital, in world terms·~ 
Its people labour largely to survive, and for capital to be 
accumulated elsewhere. 
Namibia is· extremely sparsely populated, but has a vast area 
of 824 269 square kilometres, including the South African 
enclave at Walvis Bay. Iri this huge area, roughly the 
size of Nigeria, fewer people live than in the city of Cape 
Town. Namibia's 852 000 people would form but one percent 
of Nigeria's 80 000 000 people. The territory is the size 
of Britain and France taken together, but its population is a 
tiny fraction of theirs, and it has an average ~opulation 
density of approximately one person per square kilometre6 • 
Of forty-nine areas or states in Africa listed by Hodder and 
Harris in 19677 , Namibia was fifteenth largest by area, but 
only fortieth largest by population at that time. Thus, 
only nine African territories had a smaller population in 1967. 
Table Four shows the comparative physical sizes of some African 
states: population figures have been omitted, for they have 











AREAS OF SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIESO 
COUNTRY AREA IN THOUSAND SQUARE KILOrlETRES 
SUDAN 
ALGERIA 


























The territory stradd~es the Southern tropic. Its three 
major perennial rivers, the Kunene, the Okavango, and the 
Orange, form the boundaries with South Africa and> Angola. 
These rivers mainly drain the South African and Angolan 
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highlands, not Namibia. The territory's remaining boundaries 
are the Atlantic Ocean, which joins the mouths of the Kunene 
and Orange Rivers; the parallel of latitude 17 0 23'23,73"S, 
wh~ch joins the Kunene River at the Ruacana Falls to >the 
Okavango River; the meridians 21 0 E and 20 0 E, stepped along 
the parallel 220 S, which join the Caprivi Zipf~l to the Orange , 
River~ and finally the borders of the Caprivi Zipfel, a finger-
like extension of Namibia across Northern Botswana to touch 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
As is obvious, these boundaries were politically drawn by 
European imperialists, and bear little relation to geographical 
or local human factors. Thus the Cuvelai River system with 
its non-perennial system of drainage by Oshanas into the Etosha 
Pan is split in two by the Angolan border, as is the Kwanya~a 











9 Cuvelai drainage system We see that "separate development", 
in allocating land, must cope with this uncomfortable historical 
division, which is repeated throughout Africa. Further, the 
use of the perennial rivers as boundaries has greatly complicated 
modern river-basin development and disputes have arisen over 
both the orange10 and the Kunene11 Rivers. 
These boundaries enclose three major topographical areas: 
the Namib desert, between the coast and the great escarpment; 
the central plateau, running from the ~aynes Mountains in the 
North to the Fish River Canyon and the Karasberge in the South; 
and the monotonous plains of the Kalahari basin in the North 
and East.. The Central plateau is romantically called the 
"land between two deserts". l'tlap Two shows the topographical 
areas. 
These three topographical areas have climatic divisions. 
Geographers classify climatic regions using a system called the 
Koppen-classification, named after its designer. Map Three 
shows a Koppen-classification of Namibian climate by w.s. 
Barnard. An essentially similar map was included in 
South Africa's "Counter-Memorial" to the International Court 
of Justice in 196612 : A climatic region is defined as an 
area having approximately uniform conditions of rainfall, 
winds, temperature and sunshine. Barnard's Koppen-










.. TABLE FIVE 
BARNARD'S KOPPEN--CLASSIFICATION FOR NAHIBIA. 
DESCRIPTION CLASSIFICATION 
Cool coastal desert of 
the Namib 
Cool desert of the Central 
Plateau 
Cool desert of the Southern 
Plateau 
Warm desert of the Inner 
Namib. 
Warm desert of 
Namaland 
Transitional desert of t~e 
Eastern Kaokoveld 
Transitional desert of the 
Orange River Valley 
Semi-desert of 
Damaraland 
Cool Central Highland 
semi-desert 
Warm sub-tropical steppes 
















erature over 180 C 
Mean annual temp-







All monthly means 
between 220 C and 100 e 
Summer rainfall 
Rain seldom at any 















































This climate is the result of Namibia~s position on the African 
continent. Her coast is washed by the Benguela Current 
flowing northwards from the very cold South Atlantic regions. 
The winds on the Coast circulate around the South Atlantic 
high, and blow from the South or the South East. These 
cold winds, blowing over a cold current off-shore bring little 
rain, but they cause mist banks on the coast, and cool the 
coastal Namib desert. 
Temperature increases generally from South to North towards 
the tropical areas, and from East to West towards the interior 
of the continent. Temperature is affected by altitude, 
however, and very high temperatures are recorded in the low-
lying Orange River valley, in the South, while more moderate 
temperatures occur much further North, en the Central Plateau. 
The mean annual distribution of rainfall is shown by Maps Four 
and Five, drawn by different geographers. Their maps are 
dissimilar, but the basic pattern emerges. In the ~.ame way, 
Maps Six and Se~ show the pattern of rainfall reliability.. 
Map Ei9.h.i. is taken from a 1906 German map of precipitation 
in the territory, and sho~s the lower Kunene region in detail. 
It can clearly be seen that rainfall increases towards the 
North-East. 
Rain is brought by two streams of air, flowing towards the 
Kalahari summer low, meeting at the inter-tropical front over 
the North-Eastern corner of the territory. The North-
Easterly winds bring rain from the wet tropical belt, \~ile 
the Sciuth-Easterly winds move across the continent from the 
Indian Ocean. Both air-streams pass over l~rge areas of 
high ground before reaching Namibia and are nearly dry on 
arrival. 
Rainfall is therefore generally low and unreliable, increasing 
to the North and East away from the almost totally dry Namib 
coastal regions. Rainfall reliability also in~reases to 
the North and East, and on the coast rainfall. may vary by as 
much as an 80% deviation from the mean annual J:"a.infall. The 











originate within the territory, evaporation is high, ground-
water is hard to come by, and there are severe periodic 
droughts. Water is therefore a problem. 
Soils and climate interact in determining the types of 
vegetation which in turn affects agriculture. There are in 
Namibia two basic types of vegetation: those of the dry West 
and South, and those of the wetter, hotter North-East. Climate 
relegates cUltivation to the status of a minor industry. 
Stock-farming is the major agricultural occupation. The best 
stock-farming land is the hard-veld of the Central Plateau. 
The Namib is obviously useless for stock-farming, while the 
Kalahari sandveld in the East is waterless, and the hotter, 
wetter North, with exceptions, is unhealthy and unsuitable. 
Namibia's physical characteristics have been geographically 
described. In this harsh, arid land, how did the German 
and South African colonists interact with the people they 
encountered, to produce the social formation which new exists? 
We noted above th~Machiavelli set out the groundrules in 1514: 
"How cities or principalities which lived under-
their own laws should be administered after bein9.. 
conquered" • 
"When states newly acquired as I said have been 
accustomed to living freely under their own laws, 
there are three ways to hold them securely: 
first, by devastating them 
next, by going and living there in person 
thirdl'y, by letting them keep their own laws, 
exacting tribute, and setting up an 
oligarchy which will keep the state 
friendly to you. 
In the last case, the government will know that it 
cannot endure without the friendship and ~ower of 
the.prince who created it, and so it has to exert 
itself to maintain his authority. A city used 
to freedom can be more easily ruled through its 
own citizens, if you want to keep hold of it, than 
in any other way". (14) 
Care must be taken in transposing sixteenth century doctrines 
into the twentieth century. World industry now produces 
in three years as much as it did in all the years from mankind's 











continues to expand astoundingly15 Such quantitative 
increases in production represent a qualitative jump into a 
new industrial political economy. Hence, the doctrines of 
even one of the sixteenth century's greatest minds may not 
always be apposite. 
For example, Machiavelli's careful distinction between 
R bl · , p. . 1· t· 16. t 1 fl· epu lCS ana rlnclpa l les lS no a ways use-u In a 
century where monarchs, if they exist, seldom have real power. 
In the same way, whereas Machiavelli speaks of "exacting 
tribute", and is treating of an essentially tributary mode 
of production, we are dealing in Namibia today with a social 
formation. whose dominant mode of production is capitalism17 
Nevertheless, in establishing and maintaining capitalism, 
Namibia~s rulers have clearly used variations on all three 
of Machiavelli's themes: the major fault of the rulers perhaps 
lies in their inability to choose clearly between the thre~ 
options - or is it a desire to obtain the best from all three 
worlds? 
Firstly, the Germans devastated Namibia's cent:.ral region 
during the Herero genocide of 1904_518~ 
Next, both the Germans and the South Africa~s settled 
there in relatively large numbers. 
Thirdly, both regimes allowed certain groups, notably the 
Ovambo, to keep their own laws, setting up an oligarchy which 
would keep the state friendly to the conquerors. Each of 
Machiavelli's options can be seen in Namibian history, and we 
shall trace each in some detail, while describing the penetration 
and domination of Namibia by capitalism. 
It is not suggested, of course, that the rulers had either read 
Machiavelli or explicitly planned all their strategies in 
advance. History is a far more complex organism than that, 
and should rather be seen as a rich network of chance occurrences, 
probabilistically linked t:o the future and to the past, with 
each chance occurrence being determined by its internal 
relationships with all the others, with the social formation, 











Machiavelli's general theory, adapted f:or the circumstances 
of capitalist production, cogently illuminates Namibian history. 
To deal firstly with the devastation: we see that its roots 
lie in the late nineteenth century and in a military pride and 
fury epitomised by General von Trotha, which rapidly eclipsed 
the more political diplomacy of Governor Leutwein. 
German rule in Africain the nineteenth century was marked by 
an imperial brutality perhaps rivalled only by Muhamed Alits 
conscription of the Egyptian fellahin to conquer the Sudan, 
and by Leopold of 
from the Congo. 
wrote in 1892 to 
"the German", as 
the Belgians in his extraction of wealth 
Hendrik Witbooi, leader of one rebellion, 
the British magistrate at Walvis Bay about 
follovvs: 
"he has already beaten our people to death for 
debt. It is not just and right to beat people 
to death for th~t. He flogs people in a shameful 
and cruel manner. We stupid and unintelligent 
people, for so he thinks us to be, we have never 
yet punished a human being in such a cruel and 
improper way, for he stretches people on their 
backs and flogs them on the stomach and even 
between the legs, be they male or female, so 
Your Honour can understand that no-one can 
survive such a punishment". (20) 
The 1904 to 1905 annihilation was documented by the Union 
Government in 1918 after their conquest of the Germans. This 
t 21. f th . . 1 . t . f' . t repor 1S ar more .an an 1mperla power JUs 1 ylng 1-S 
actions by the misdeeds of another imperial power: it is a 
sickening history of cruelty, right up to 1915. In the 
year 1914, some 46 719 stroke~ were officially inflicted on 
2 787 people, an average of 17 lashes each, fer "crimes" such 
as "being cheeky", "refusing to obey orders", or "being lazy 
22 and not working well" • 
In his dissertation on the subject, Arnold \oJallenkampf makes 
great play of not using the South African Repor~ of 1918, 
nor the German reply of 1919, on the grounds that both the 
"Blue Book" and the "White Book" are obvious propaganda. 











arrives at conclusions which are probably very little removed 
from those which could be drawn from a reading of the two 
Books. 
The order of magnitude of Herero people killed cannot be 
questioned: some 16 000 survived out of a population of 
between 90 000 and 60 000 (giving highest and lowest estimates 
respectiv~ly)23. Table Six is extracted from the Union 
Government Report, 1918, and illustrates the results of Dr 
Karl Dove's maxim of 1902, "leniency towards the natives is 
cruelty towards the whites,,24. 
TABLE SIX 
POPULATION ESTIMATES 
PEOPLE ESTIMATES BY LEUTWEIN, 1911 CENSUS DECEASED 
1894, AND SCHWABE, 
1903 
fHERERO 80 000 15 130 I 64 e70 
~OTTENTOTS 20 000 9 781 to 219 
BERGDAMARA 30 000 12 831 '.- '17 169 
-
TOTALS 130 000 37 742 92 258 
"-
I .-
Drechsler, whom Bley cites with approval in this connection, 
while criticising him severely in other contexts 25 , argues that 
the best proof of the accuracy of these figures, at least 
concerning the Herero and the "Hottentots", is the lack of 
a contrary response in the German ("White Book" of 1919. 
I 
Drechsler 26 makes two small corrections, pointing out firstly 
that 1 000 Hereros had escaped into British territory, and thus 
should be added to the total of survivors, and secondly, that 
the 1898 Typhus epidemic killed some 10 000 Herero, which 
decreases the number for which the Germans must be held 
responsible. Drechsler concludes: 
"With thes e quali fications, hO\vever lit cannot be 
denied that German Imp.:::rial ism brought upon i tsel f 











What prompted the Hereros ~to rebel, producing this passionately 
bitter, controversial colonial war, which culminated in 
genocide? With the hind-sight of history we can see, right 
across the African continent, many similar examples of 
resistance to the land alienation which follows initial conquest. 
Mere generally, we can view resistance and devastation simply 
as one of Machiavelli's three possible types of domination 
aft er conques t • 
Historians of the more detailed record have, of course, listed 
more particular caus~s. Wallenkampf, for example, suggests 
that repeated miscarriage of justice, unsavoury trade relations, 
the mixing of cultures, and, above all, the alienation of 
Hereroland, had all created friction between colonist and 
colonised 28 • de Vries shows that the political goal in the 
territory was "the robbery of ground and property from the 
Hereros" • He writes: 
"The.,earlier centres of Hereroland (Okahandja, 
Otjosazu, Waterberg, Omburo and Omaruru) were 
taken from them. That these centres were 
not only the political nerve-centres of the 
nation, but also, which is more important, the 
site of the graves of the Herero-ancestors, was, 
in the eyes of the Herero, the greatest evil 
which a people could do to them". (29) 
For whatever reasons, when the Bcnd,elslNarts rebelled far to 
the South and forced the Gerffian administration to move their 
troops away from Hereroland, 
30 "The Hereros rose to throw off the yoke". 
As in all colonial societies, there had long been sp~culation 
of rebellion. The years since 1884 had, of course, been 
marked by many minor campaigns. Neverthel~ss, when the 
Herero rebelled on the 12th January 1904, many Germans were 
taken by surprise - not least the Administration, which, 
surprisingly for a settler society, had no facilities to cope 
with a general insurrection. Military forces comprised 
seven hundred and twenty-nine men, one paymaster, twenty-seven 
officers, nine sanitary officers, three veterinary officers, 
and eight hundred horses - to control an area one and a half 












The bulk of these forces were hundreds of miles to the south, 
putting down the Bondelswarts uprising. Without reinforce-
ment, they would have proved hopelessly inadequate to the 
task of repressing the Herero and subsequent Nama rebellions 
against colonial rule and colonists'- land-grabbing. 
Similarly, the Director of the German Colonial Office, Steubel, 
was unprepared, as were the German General Staff and the 
Chancellor himself. Many reasons were advanced for the 
"sudden" revolt: while others blamed Governor Leutwein' s 
"leniency towards the Natives", Steubel decided that the 
uprising was "an act of God,,32. 
The lack of preparation prompted Imperial Germany to an 
excessive military response, thus turning a revolt into a 
full-scale war of annihilation, furiously waged to defend 
the military reputatton of Wilhelm II and his army33 Martial 
Law was declared on the 19th May 1904, and by July 1904, 
the "lenient" Leutwein had lost his supreme command to General 
Lothar von Trotha, a veteran of the Boxer revolt, commander 
of the troops who had put down the Wahehe revolt in East Africa, 
and as vicious a soldier as any ever to fight in the sub-
t · t34 con lnen • 
In response, the Herero assembled round the Waterberg, 
(which, incidentally, once more stresses the importance of 
water in the territory) and they were routed in a great battle 
on the 11th August 1904, those escaping being ruthlessly 
chased to die of thirst in the arid Omakeke sandveld. 
f 
Lothar von Trotha, resolved on extermination, ordered that: 
" •••• every Herero, with or without a rifle, with 
or without cattle, will be shot. No women and 
children will be allowed in the territory; they 
will be driven back to their people, or fired on. 
These are the last words to the Herero nation 
from me, the Great General of the mighty German 
Emperor". ( 35) • 
Vo~Trotha wrote to Leutwein a few weeks later: 
"The Herero nation must perish: since I did 
not succeed in exterminating it with my cannon, 











However, the mighty German Emperor was persuaded, in the uproar 
that broke out both in DSWA and in Germany, to countermand on 
the 8th December 1904, the order of his Great General. The 
Great General's other policies, however, remained in force: 
that all Herero cattle should be confiscated, that Hereros 
would be employed in return for food but without payment, 
and that gang-leaders and murderers would be tried by special 
courts 37 • 
General von Trotha was finally replaced by Lindequist in 
November 1905. Not only had von Trotha wrought the 
destruction which was described statistically above, but, 
moreover, peace had not yet been established and the war 
dragged on unt~l early in 1908. Leutwein wrote in 1906: 
"At the cost of several hundred million marks 
and several thousand German soldiers, we have, 
of the three commercial assets of the territory, -
mining, farming, and native labour - managed to 
destroy the second entirely and two-thirds of the 
last. What is, however, more blameworthy, is 
the fact that with all our sacrifices we have up 
to this day)not been able to restore peace". (38). 
Leutwein describes a temporary destruction of the economy of 
the territory. In analysing the social formation, it is 
clear that there were many complex "causes and effects" of -
the war. However, at a more abstract theoretical level, 
it is equally clear that the rebellion was of great importance 
in the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of 
production. 
this day. 
The economy, recovered, and is capitalist to 
Some whites died in the rebellions: Bley puts the figur.e at over 
two thousand casualties 39 , but a more accurate death count, 
perhaps, exists in the public gaze, recording 1 750 deaths. 
Table Seven gives an English translation of the plaque on the 
equestrian statue which dominates Windhoek. This perfectly 
maintained monument is perhaps the second-most macabre in the 
whole territory today. (The most macabre monument to German 











PLAQUE ON WINDHOEK MONUMEN'lAO. 
IN HONORARY MEMORY OF THE BRAVE GERMAN SOLDIERS 
WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR KAISER AND REICH FOR 
THE DELIVERY AND PRESERVATION OF THIS LAND DURING 
THE HERERO AND HOTTENTOT RISINGS, 1903 TO 1907, 
AND DURING THE KALAHARI EXPEDITION OF 1908. 
IN HONORARY MEMORY ALSO OF THE GERIvlAN CITIZENS 
WHO WERE SACRIFICED BY THE NATIVES IN THEIR 
REBELLION. 
THOSE WHO FELL, THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED, AND THOSE 
WHO PERISHED, THOSE WHO WERE WOUNDED AND THOSE 
WHO DIED FROM SICKNESS:-
SOLDIERS 100 OFF'ICERS 
254 NCO's 
1 180 CAVALRYMEN 




THOSE KILLED IN THE UPRISINGS:-
119 MEN 4 WOMEN 1 CHILD 
84 
Thus, not without some cost in men, the Germans ~xercised the 
first of Machiavelli's options for a conqueror. Their 
detailed reasons for doing so have been examined in the works 
of scholars such as Bley, Drechsler, de Vries and Wallenkampf, 
all of whom worked from primary sources. The essential 
outline of the process has been given above, based largely on 











Bley's scholarly work concludes that in the Herero rebellion 
ideas developed that were not to become relevant to Germany 
until 1914, nor fully until 1933. Perhaps, in this context 
a piece from Aimee Cesaire's "Discourse on Colonialism" is the 
best comment on the Herero annihilation: 
"Until Nazism had been endured, one supported it, 
one absolved it •.•• one legitimated it because, 
until then, it had only been applied to non-
European peoples..... If the very Christian 
middle-class man of the 20th century does not 
pardon Hitler, it is not because of the crime 
itself, of the crime against mankind, of the 
humiliation of man himself. It is because 
Hitler's crime was directed at the white man, 
was a humiliation of the white man, and because 
Hitler applied to Europe Imperialist methods 
which were until then only applied to the 
Algerian Arabs, the coolies of India, a d the 
African blacks". (Translated in Kesteloot, 19731: 66). 
Certainly there was objection to the Herero annihilation, but 
it was nevertheless allow~d to continue for some time, and no 
material reparation was made. The ruling groups continue to 
profit to this day by that massacre, as we shall see when 
considering the territory's economic geography. The South 
Africans and the "West" never exercised the colonist's option 
of devastation, for the Germans had been allowed to do so with 
an efficiency which left a mark visible to this day. Th~re 
was no longer a need for devastation, but the South Africans 
and the "West" condoned, inherited and perpetuated the results,. 
making little material reparation, despite propaganda to the 
contrary. They therefore cannot escape Cesaire's bitter 
indictment of greed and hypocrisy. 
If the South Africans did not massacre a people, but merely 
benefited by the results, they were still not averse to the 
use of force. They crushed the final Bondelswarts rebellion 
of 1922 very fiercely, for the Administrator was, in his words, 
"determined to inflict a severe and lasting lesson". Simil-
arly, the Rehobothers were forced into submission in 1925. 
Machiavelli's second method of ruling a conquered state is far 











capitalism it is not the Prince who "settles there in person", 
for a Wilhelm II or a George V would far prefer the glory, 
power and comforts of Europe to life in what might be called 
a backwater were it not a desert. Nevertheless, Germans, 
Englishmen and South Africans were enticed and encouraged to 
settle in the territory42. The· leaders they produced, 
men such as Lindequist, Hahn, Hofmeyer, even Jannie de Wet, 
and of. course the highly competent Dirk Mudge, have been able 
to retain control at least as well as their "Princes" might 
have. The institutions and history of settlement will not 
themselves be examined here, for they are not markedly different 
from similar settlement projects elsewhere. 
It will suffice to say that Machiavelli's second strategy was 
also used, and we proceed to examine the results of the 
>~ 
application of the first two strategies, devastation and 
settlement, in Namibia, after which the third strategy will 
be considered. 
The result of the application of policies of devastation and 
settlement in Namibia is the establishment of c~pita;L:Lsm as t:he 
dominant mode of production. Land and productive resources 
were alienated fr0m the people of the territory in large 
measure, and a wage labouring class was thereby created. A 
fraction of this wage labouring class has a special relationship 
to production in what are now called "homelands". This will 
be dealt with when considering the third strategy, below. 
Generally, however, alienation of land and productive resources 
accompanied the establishment of imperial monopoly and oligopoly 
capit~lism. This linked Namibia into the \-lprld system of 
capital accumulation. 
The most macabre monument in Namibia today to German rule is' 
not the equestrian statue in honour of 1 750 Germans who died 
while 92 258 "Natives" were killed. It is the system of 
land allocation which was inherited by the South Africans from 
the Germans, which was violently enforced during sUbsequent 
resistance, and which is being entrenched today by the plan 











allocation of land ownership is maintained both by the threat 
of military violence and by the structural violence of the 
influx control and contract labour systems. We have also 
seen that much of the land was violently taken in a war of 
annihilation, rather than being freely given or sold. 
To understand the result of Machiavelli's first two strategies, 
of devastation and settlement, and to understand the present 
land and resource allocation, we must return to the economic 
geography of the territory. 
Namibia is not, as we saw above, generally suited to crop 
production, with the possible exception of the Kunene, Cuvelai, 
and Okavango regions. Again with these exceptions, soil, 
vegetation and climate dictate that the Central Plateau i~ the 
best stock-farming land. It was over this land that the 
Herero and Nama wars of devastation were fought in 1904-1908, 
with the result that today the settlers own and occupy the 
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This can be very clearly seen on the map. Wellington, 
working from the Report of the_ Sv.!A Long-'l'erm Agricultura.l 
Policy Commission, has drawn a map - reproduced as Map Nine -
showing the best areas in use for stock-farming. In Mao Ten 
he has drawn the pattern of land use by the inhabitants before 
1904. The best stock-farming areas, delimited in the East 
by the Kalahari sandveld and in the West by the Namib desert, 
are clearly the areas occupied by the people of the territory 
before 1904, although some German settlement had commenced. 
Map Eleven, taken from the work by BleX, shows the combined 
pattern of German and tribal land use before 1904. 
The German geographer, Carl Schmidt, presented a dissertation 
in 1922, studying European settlement in DSWA in great detail. 
His detailed map of European settlement in 1903 is reproduced 
as Map Twelve, ".!hile that for 1911 is reproduced as !'1<-l.p '1'hirteen... 
Helmut Bley's combined map of European and Tribal areas in 1911 
is reproduced as MaR Fourteen, and, finally, the Ilseparate 
development" proposals for the territory, as drawn by the Africa 
Institute,appear as ~ap Fifteen. 
A careful comparison of Maps Nine to Fift~en clearly shows that 
the result of devastation and settlement froIli 1904 to 1911 was 
the alienation of the best productive pastoral land from the 
people of the territory by the colonists, the Northern areas 
excepted. Further, this pattern of settlement was taken 
over by the South Africans, and with min~r exceptions appears 
as the plan for separate development as outlined by the 
Odendaal Commission. Thus, the ruling groups, with their 
"separate nations" plan of the nineteen sixties, have,taken 
, ' 
for their ''nation tl most of the be~t pastoral la~d, with the 
Herero, particularly, being displaced to the dreaded Kalahari 
sandveld. 
The settlers are, of course, far fewer in number than the 
43 ruled groups ,but have far more land. Wellington's 
discussion of this is now famous: he showed that on the 1960· 
census figures, the ."average" "white" rural family controls 
2 008 hectares, while an average "blackl! rur.al family has 68 











exacerbated by qualitative differences: for a further example, 
the "white areas" usually have sufficient ground water, whereas 
the same cannot be said for much of the "homeland" area. 
Referring back to the "sacred trust of civilisation", Wellington 
has written: 
" .•.. the Union Government's policy was crystal 
clear. So far as the land was concerned the 
best must be kept for the '<vhi tes; for the Natives 
the worst was good enough ••••• The adoption of a 
sound land policy which would be just to the 
Natives was surely of the utmost importance for 
the fulfilment of the sacred trust. Failure 
in this at the very beginning was not merely a 
blunder, it was moral turpitude". (45). 
This division of land, resulting from devastation and settlement, 
has produced the present pattern of ownership of productive 
resources, and hence the present grossly-skewed distribution of 
both income and wealth in Namibia. The economy is based on . 
primary industry, and the major primary production sectors are 
fishing and mining, in addition to pastoral farminq, di~cussed 
above. In the same way that the best pastoral farmland is 
owned by the ruling groups" so too is fishill9.. kEpt away from 
the ruled people. Map Fifteen clearly shows that no !'home-
land" has any access to the sea, under the Odendaal Plan, and 
the ports are in the "white" areas, '""i th 'v'Jal vis Bay, the mos t 
important harbour, being technically a part of tile Cape Province. 
Aside from the ports, the barren coastal Namib areas would 
generally not be a loss to a "homeland", and the Namib's 
population would be negligible, plan or no plan. However, 
the Namib has one item of enormous value: diam~nds. These, 
on land and on beds offshore, are also kept firmly in the 
. 46 control of the rullng group • 
Apart from diamonds, the other large source of revenue is base 
mineral mining. The Ovambo peoples, and even the Ova:1imba 
of the harsh Kaokoveld, have been sme~ting and trading in iron 
and copper since they moved into the region, which has been 
estimated by Vedder to have occurred in about 1550, long before 











traded in copper from Tsumeb, and obtained iron from various 
places, notably in what is now Southern Angola. The Ovambo 
still mine at Tsumeb, but they do it now as contract workers 
for the benefit of the ruling groups, in Southern Africa, in 
Europe and in America. 
Map Thirty-One shows the major mineral developments in Namibia: 
with very few exceptions they fall outside the "homelands". 
The Tsumeb copper, lead and zinc mines are a very clear case of 
a colonial or imperial group exploiting resources which had 
anciently been the preserve of a local group. The territory 
has a long list of base mineralsresources, some of which are 
in the "homeland" areas, such as a large haematite iron-ore 
deposit in the forbidding and inaccessible Kaokoveld. 
Generally, however, economically exploitable deposits are· 
in the areas taken by the ruling groups. 
Diamond and base mineral mining are clear examples of the 
importance of monopoly capitalism in Namibia. Over three-
quarters of the mineral exports are accounted for by two concerns, 
which are either wholly owned or controlled by three firms, one 
South African and two American. Thus, not only does the 
settler area presently cover the better mining aLeas; but 
ownership of the mines presently vests in foreign capitalist 
enterprise, which also has the crucial control of ~ining 
technology. The territory's largest single employer is.the 
Tsumeb Corporation Limited, whose profits averaged R12 900 000 
12.£f annum in the decade up to 1972. American Metal Climax 
Incorporated (AMAX) are large shareholders in the 'I'sumeb 
Corporation, and reported in 1974 on the labour regulations 
, 
in the territory as follows: 
"'I'here are a number of laws which affect employment 
in the mining industry ••••• These regt:.lations require 
that mining employees in nearly every position of 
senior responsibility, such as mine manc.gers, mine 
captains, mechanical and electrical engineers, 
surveyors, shift-bosses, onsetters (cagers), and 
hoist drivers (for conveyance of men), must be 
white. The regulations effectively limit black 
employ~es to unskilled, semi-skilled service and 
clerical positions". (48). 











not simply embodied in ownership, have nonetheless been able 
so far to reserve for themselves access to skills and even to 
a share in the surplus. Their role as settlers in the 
political economy has until now enabled them to be allied to 
the ruling, owning groups at the expense of the colonised 
workers, from whom they are divided. 
Settler workers have far greater rights of ownership of product-
ive resources than colonised workers, although not all, of 
course, are able to exercise those rights. They have general-
ly been able to appropriate to themselves a greater share in the 
economy by way of their more extensive rights to ownership and 
to legitimate political par~icipation. 
Some workers, thus, are more privileged and have relations to 
the productive sources different from those of other workers. 
The settler workers will fight to maintain these privileges, 
but it is not impossible that in time they will lose control 
of their exclusive rights to ownership, skills, or p~litical 
participation, although geographic separation presently protects 
their position. A~ present, settler workers are clearly part 
of the ruling groups, entitled to own, and having political 
control of, the best productive resource areas. 
Thus devastation and settlement, after conquest, have resulted 
in the ruling groups gaining control of the major productive 
resources - the best pastoral farmland, the mines, and ~he 
fishing industry. In addition, such capital accumulation 
as is not expatriated, is located largely in the settler areas. 
With small exceptions, secondary and tertiary industry is 
; 
located in what are presently settler areas. Ivlore important-
ly, the modern communications infrastructure is carefully kept 
in the hands of the ruling groups. 
Railways, sho\'Jn on Hap Fifteen, are routed to tl1e outside 
world o~ly via Walvis Bay, Luderitz or the Northern Cape. 
Thus even an enlarged Ovamboland, including the Tsumeb mines," 
given "independence" at some future dab~, 'tJould still be tied 











information, and can therefore withhold it from public 
t
. 57 scru lny 
Thus, the ruling groups in linking the territory to world 
capitalism have acquired most of the important productive 
resources of the territory, in the form of fisheries, farms, 
mines, factories, harbours, towns, transport, communications, 
information and expertise. They did this,?as we have seen, 
by foliowinq at least two of Machiavelli's three groundrules 
for conquerors. 
Yet, what of Machiavelli's third groundrule? 
strategy which he clearly prefers? 
YA city used to freedom can be more easily 
What of the 
ruled through its own citizens, if you want to 
keep a hold of it, than in any other way". (58). 
The South Africans and the Germans used this strategy too, 
~ 
from the t1me of their first occupation of the territory. 
Embodied in phrases such as "separate development", "self-
determinationltl, and "the future of the territory will be decided 
by the people themselves", Machiavelli's third groundrule is 
becoming the primary strategy of the ruling groups in their 
search for a suitable political solution to conflict in 
Namlbia. Whether the rulers can use this strategy success-
fully in some form or another will depend on the consciousness 
and organisation of the ruled groups. 
At its most successful in the capitalist era the strategy 
results in efficient neo-colonial exploitation. This is 
the equivalent of what in Machiavelli's era waq "exacting 
tribute" • However, under capitalism the process is more 
opaque. We cannot trace the exaction of surplus as clearly 
as we could point to the payment of tribute. However, 
we can study the geographical locati.on of the accumulation of 
physical capital resources, which seldom occurs at the periphery 
of a neo-colony, but occurs far more often at the centres of 











Machiavelli's third strategy has clear military application. 
It is the equivalent at the political level of the "win hearts 
and minds" military strategy.. Thus, it is not entirely an 
accident that those areas of Namibia whose "separate develop-
ment" towards "self-determination" is most advanced, are also 
the areas in the military firing lines, the areas in which a 
"WHAM" campaign is being carried out, and the areas least 
touched by devastation or settlement in earlier times. 
"East Capri vi", "Kavango" and "Owambo". in the north of the 
territory are the "separate development' nations" closest 
to independence; they are also the areas where the military 
threat is. most immediate. 
It is not surprising to find correlation between military·and 
political strategies. We saw above, with von Clausewitz, 
that war is but an extension of politics, and that in an 
"insurgent" situation, political goals are of special importance. 
We also saw that for the ruling groups to win, in the longer 
term a poiitical solution is required. 
The case of Ovamboland illustrates the development of this 
possible political solution. With the possible exception 
of the early slave and other trading before formal conquest or 
control, Machiav lli's third groundrule has always informed 
European relations with Ovamboland. 
For several centuries geographical factors, such as deserts and 
"skeleton coasts", together with the fierce reputation of the 
Ovambo warriors, deterred European penetration~ Once the 
Europeans had overcome these mental or physical hazards, they 
travelled through, but did not stay in, the Southern Kunene 
basin or Ovamboland~ 
The Germans and the Portuguese did, ~owever, vie with each 
59 other for control of Ovamboland as a labour source ,and for 
access to the Ruacana Falls for power generation. The Ovambo 
Kwanyama tribe, caught between the two, sporadically resisted 











Ovamboland. In 1972 the "Owambo Government Services" 
comprised ten "white" officials and some thirty-eight chiefs 
or other Ovambo officials to govern 342 455 people in 53 300 
I 72 
square kilometres of land. In 1975 The Department of 
Bantu Administration and Development reports their staff in 
Ovamboland to',be 74 "whites" and 299 "homeland citizens,,73. 
These are assisted by 300 Tribal Policemen, 3 Traffic Officers 
and an unknown number of South African policemen or soldiers. 
Lack of "white" settlement does not, however, mean lack of 
"white" influence. The industrial economy has penetrated 
to the farthest corners of Southern Africa in its labour 
recruitment schemes. Pressure of increasing population 
on a restricted land area, among other factors, as we have 
seen, resulted in Ovambo people working in very large numbers 
on the farms and mines of the south. Even the small 
Ovahirrlba group of the remote and untamed Kaokoveld are not 
untouched: Davis reported a meeting with an Ovahimba in 1964, 
who spoke Fanagalo, the lingua franca of the gold mines, and 
who had been to the Witwatersrand. 
Thus capitalism became the dominant mode of production, although 
vestiges of other modes may still be seen. T~e contemporary 
labour position illustrates this. Reliable figures on 
employment are not released, but very tentative estimates have 
been made75 • These indicate that of a total male and female 
labour force of 116 000 people in 1970, 46 000 people were 
involved in sUbsistence agriculture, whereas 59 000 were 
involved in other production in Ovamboland and in the South. 
Some 43 000 of these latter are migrant contraGt workers. , 
At an arbitrary 10% unemployment rate, 11 000 are estimated 
to be unemployed. 
From t0ese figures it is clear that althcugh many workers will 
have a relationship with sUbsistence agriculture, the people 
of Ovamboland today are highly dependent on employment, 
especially in the South, where most of Namibia's productive 











Thus Ovamboland may be .seen as a labour reservoir 76 in which 
workers are born, educated, grow old, and die, being supported 
(at l~ast in part, perhaps) by the land, and from which workers 
must "temporarily" migrate on a contract basis. 'fhe labour , 
bureau system by which this is controlled was discussed in a 
previous chapter. 
Ovamboland thus becomes a place in which workers may be 
allocated "political opportunity" by the ruling ideology. 
The denial of rights in the other are~s of Namibia in which 
the workers spend much of their lives is thereby officially 
validated. 
Similarly, as in other areas of Southern Africa, income from the 
land may be used by the ruling ideology to legitimate low wages 
paid in the South. The workers and their families are said 
to have two sources of income, even though the income from the 
land may often be tiny or non-existent. 
However, iq the face of increasing population, a redefinition 
of the people's needs", and low agricultural productivity, this 
legitimation is becoming less tenable. Development schemes, 
such as those of the Bantu Investment Cor.pora"tion, or the 
Kunene schemes, are therefore both ideologically and 
economically useful. They may be seen as an attempt to 
improve the reproduction of the labour force in a politically 
safe way. They may also assist or enlarge the c~ass of 
owners in Ovamboland, whose existence may in time become 
valuable to the ruling groups, in terms of the maintenance of 
a friendly oligarchy. 
Separate development is thus a modernisation of "indirect rule". 
Customary law,su~tably modified, and the royal houses, suitably 
pruned, are used in the creation of an oligarchy which will keep 
"the state friendly to the ruling groups77 This oligarchy 
is modernised: increasingly more" people are ,I elected", rather 
than appointed, to the Legislative Assemblies. 










access to important productive resources. They must therefore 
seek employment. The ruling groups have Q';;Jnership of most 
of the productive resources of Namibia; they rule the other 
areas indirectly, and extract labour from these areas through 
a vast bureaucratic network. 
At the same time an even older rule Is followed than those laid 
down by Machiavelli: divide et imp-era. By perpetuating the 
division of the people of Namibia into separate "nations fl , the 
South African Prime Minister is able t·o declare, "the J2eoples 
of Namibia must decide". By contrast, a democratic method 
would be for the people of Namibia to decide. 
In the longer term, "achiavelli' s third strategy applied to 
Ovamboland means eventual independent government of the "Ow<:i.rooo" 
state by an oligarchy both able and willing to keep it friendly 
to the ruling groups to the South. The friendship would, 
of course, be spurred on by economic necessity, and the South 
would thereby continue to get its labour. 
The third strategy may not, in fact? prove viable, for the 
simple reason that the oligarchy may not be able to maintain 
control. Rule of a state through its own citizens requires' 
some support for those citizens who must rule. 
is by no means easily created in Ovamboland. 
This support 
Possibly the 
situation is more like Machiavelli's "Republics" than his 
"Principalities lt • 
" ... in Republics there is more life, more hatred, 
a greater desire for revenge; ~he memory of 
their ancient liberty does not and cannot let 
them rest; in their case the surest way ~s to 
wipe them out, or to live there in person". (78) 
How many South African soldiers must now illive there in person il ? 
Thf~ third strategy has further stumbling blocks. The 
/I economic necess it y" whereby the poLL ticall y independent states 
are to bp kept friendly may, in fact, be turned against the 
rulers. There are three crucial factors which, in the 
economic geography. which we have described, do not lie in the 










fisheries need large quantities 
before they can produce profit. 
0 -'" _ .L power, "vater and labour 
The small, but growing, 
106 
secondary industry and the growing industrial and administrative 
towns also need these three factors. The achievement of the 
twin goals, of separation, and of economic prosperity for the 
ruling groups, depends on a selution being found to the problems 
of energy, water and labour. For the economy to expand, 
these problems must be solved. The three commodities must 
be provided at the centres of production in s~fficient quantity 
and at suitably low prices. This must be done in such a way 
that the ruling groups continue to dominate, no matter how 
indirectly. 
Namibia has no known important coal or oil deposits, and these 
fuels must be imported. The only other inanimate source of 
power is hydro-electricity, which can come only from the three 
major perennial rivers. Two of these are in "borrlelands", 
and the third is not very suited for the production of hydro-
electricity in most of its lower reaches, although some 
development is being considered. Thus, to find the power 
needed for the mines,- the South African ccc'.lpation musi: i~p0rt 
coal for thermal power stations, or the waters of the Northern 
rivers must be harnessed. The planned South Afric~n solution 
is discussed in a separate chapter below. 
Namibia has been blessed by some dedicated and imaginative 
water engineers, serving black and white alike. There is 
now generally sufficient ground-water or other water .for the 
white farms to get by. However, the growth of new mines, 
and of the industrial and administrative town~, is beginning 
to overtax the available water supplies. Accordingly the 
South African occupation plans to bring water over long 
distances from the Fish River tributary of the Orange River 
in the South" and from the two Northern rivers, which are, 
of coursE, in "homeland" regions 0 These plans are discussed 
in a chapter below. 
The present splution to the problem of the supply of labour 











important here, however, is the realisation that, given 
sufficient consciousness, the ruled groups may be able 
effectively to interrupt supplies of power, water and labour, 
and thereby enforce dramatic changes. 
In the light of Machiavelli's strategies for colonists, this 
chapber has considered aspects of the economy, geography and 
history of Namibia, to show that the land allocation to the 
"separate nations" proposro and implemented under "separate 
development" is grossly skewed in favour of the ruling 
occupying groups. The three resulting problems for the 
ruling groups are labour, water and power. The labour 
"solution" has been briefly considered. Before discussing 
the planned "solutions" to the water and power problems, 
South African economic strategic planning for the whole of 
Southern Africa must be examined. In doing so in the 
n~xt chapter, the application of Machiavelli's third (or 
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Impun~u, was exiled in 1932, in addition to 
Mandume's killing in 1917. 













STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PLANNING BY SOUTH AFRICA'S RULERS. 
In Febru~ry, 1974, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, envisaged 
a Southern African economic power bloc of sovereign, independent 
states', unlinked politically or constitutionally, in which 
every state could realise its own aspirations without being 
instructed by another on internal affairs. Mutual economic 
interdependence would bind these states together into a power 
bloc which would be a bulwark against communism. The 
ultimate aim of the communists was not Mozambique, Angola or 
Rhodesia, but rather it was South Africa, and control of the 
sea route in the event of a conventional war. For South 
Africa, Mr Vorster rejected any idea of federation, for all 
t~me: the solution was black independent states in South and 
Southern Africa. In a federation every person and state 
''!II 
would sacrifice sovereignty: this would not occur in Mr vorster'~ 
economic bloc of politically independent states1 • 
It is in the light of his plans for an economic bloc that 
Mr Vorster's "move towards detente" in 1974/75 must be seen. 
To establish viable politically independent states in what- he 
calls "Rhodesia" and "South West Africa" requires, in the longer 
term, an end to their constitutionally ambiguous positions. 
In attempting to resolve these ambiguities he is great~y aided 
by South Africa's economic do~inance in the region. 
In this spirit the South African government detlares: 
" •.. all options are open to the peoples of South 
West Africa in regard to their political and 
constitutional futupe. One of the options 
open to them is a unitary form of government. 
It is, however, a matter for them to decide 
among themselves, and in terms of its stated 
policy the South African Government will not 
irtterfere in the decision of the peoples, 
whatever that might be". (2) • 











Africa hopes that an ethnically divided, consultative conference 
will make the decision for the territory's future. Mr Vorster 
made this clear in his famous Windhoek speech in May, 1975: 
" ••• nothing will occur in the territory which is 
not in accordance with the free choice of its 
population groups. It is for them and nobody 
else to choose - and, as I have repeatedly said, 
'all options are open to them"'. (3). (emphasis added). 
We examined in an earlier chapter the manner of election of 
what Mr Vorster calls the "true leader~" of those population 
groups. However, there was a far more important paragraph 
in his Windhoek speech, a paragraph which did not, perhaps, 
receive sufficient attention: 
"Without wishing to anticipate the results of 
these consultations, I nevertheless want to put 
to you my firm conviction that the peoples of 
South West Africa will not be so short-sighted 
as to pursue a course which will disrupt the 
foundations of the economic system of the 
Territory, to the material detriment of all the 
population groups which have their homes there". (4). 
Thus, even in his Windhoek speech, shortly before the meeting 
of the Security Council, Mr Vorster ingenuously dis~loses the 
great influence which the "foundations ·of the economic system 
of the territory" may have on the eventual choice bet'vJeen the 
"options". The economic foundations have been carefully 
built over a long period of time. 
"Economic interdependence and political independence" of small 
states could fragment and control the people, not only of 
Namibia, but also of all of Southern Africa, as Mr Vorster's 
speech of February 1974 made clear. This sp~ech, and the 
subsequent "move towards detente", is clearly rooted in 
Machiavelli's third groundrule for dominance, which was 
discussed in the previous Chapter. 
The "move towards det~nte" has the support of most of the South 
African ruling groups. Mr Vorster and Mr Oppenheimer 5 both 
see benefits, perhaps for different reasons, or perhaps to 












Several authors make the easy generalisation that South African 
planning is monolithic. To separate the various planners 
and ihterest groups is very difficult when the real planning is 
not done publicly. There are, however, discernable different 
groups planning for Southern Africa, such as the National Party, 
or the large mining and industrial groups such as the Anglo-
American Corporation, Limited. Each group has· some power 
over South Africa's future. The groups do not always act 
in concert. Thus South African planners are not monolithic, 
although the State has the upper hand in many cases. I 
shall attempt to differentiate, where the information is 
available, but generally the sum of the plans is given. 
Since the introduction in this century of conscious scientific 
State economic planning, debate has occurred about its effect 
on group and individual freedom. This debate is perhaps 
more important in the increasingly interdependent.states of 
today than it was originally. 
The inimitable Barbara Wooton wrote a simple, pragmatic book 
in 1944 called "Freed·om under Plannir!.SL". She set out her 
safeguards for freedom under the mild "socialist" eccnomic 
planning which she advocated. For Wooton, the goal is that 
the resources of the State are a common possession, managed· 
on behalf of all, for the benefit of all, by the representatives 
of all. Within this, the justification of planning is that 
"by conscious collective decision of economic 
priorities our frustrations are dimirdSled and 
our freedom enlarged: we have more opportunity 
to do what we want to do". (page 23) 
To achieve this, objectives that ar~ for the b~nefit of all 
must be ascertained and continuously pursued by those who have 
the duty of making decisions for the benefit of all and on 
behalf of all. She suggests methods o£ ensuring that this 
occurs. 
Passionate opposition to state planning came, in 1944, from 
F von Hayek, in his fascinating polemic called ".'The Road to 
Ser fdom" • He advocates free competition under a type of 
laissez-faire liberal state firmly controlled by the Rule of 










view, led to serfdom; free individual competition and open 
markets were preferable. 
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At the other extreme were the Soviet economists, pre-eminent 
amongst whom was Preobrazhensky, writing somewhat earlier. 
To them freedom was a relative concept, linked with the 
freedom of the proletariat to achieve socialism in one or 
more countries. Freedom without planning was not freedom, 
for freedom without planning meant grinding poverty, and it 
.meant wage slavery to a capitalist class. Poverty also 
meant the vulnerability of the proletarian revolution to 
intervention by foreign capitalist powers. 
required planning. 
Today, most states have economic planning, be it central 
socialist planning or state and corporate planning i~ a 
"miJKed" economy. World organisations make fumbling attempts 
at rudimentary planning. African states have plans, many 
of which fail, because African and "Third vJorld" states are 
seldom permitted to control their own destinies. ("PolLtical 
independence and economic dependence" operates at a world level, 
too). States form blocs to raise commodity prices like that 
of oil, while mUlti-nationals are accused of conspiring '-'lith 
State spies to bring down governments, as in the allegations' 
of the ITT, the erA, and Allend~ in Chile. All these are a 
far cry from the economist safeguards for freedom envisaged 
by von Hayek, Wootton, or Preobrazhensky. 
"Freedom" under South African planning is, however, even h2.rder 
to find. The economy is planned and owned id large measure 
by the state or by the very large corporations. The economic 
system is overlaid by a net of "racial" or "ethnic" boundaries .. 
Much legislation, such as the Physical Planning Act, dictates 
the location of industry or raises barriers to entry into 
markets. A large section of the labour force is 
oligopsonistically employed, The private sector teems with 
oligopolies. Marketing boards dominate agricultural 
production and marketing. A tiny minority of adults may 












have a large share of the economy, for example ISCOR, ARMSCOR, 
ESCOM, IDC, SWAWEK and the BIC. The state plans not only 
at a "macro-economic", but also at a "micro-economic" level .. 
The state manipulates the labour market, and labour mobility 
is strictly controlled. 
The Rule of Law, as von Hayek defined it, is now dead in South 
Africa', if it ever existed. 
In addition, South Africa plans not only for .herself and for 
her captive, Namibia, but also for other neighbouring states. 
The Chief of the Mines' Labour Organisation states bluntly that 
the industry's policy is "to encourage interdependence among 
the countries of Southern Africa,,6. Mr Vorster envisages 
politically independent states, which n netheless somehow form 
a "bulwark against communism,,7. 
Perhaps, when speaking of "freedom" under South African planning, 
SWAPO is not incorrect when it claims: 
"South Africa is trying b.;, keep Namibia by 
trying to let it go". (8). 
In essence, South African planning would be anathema to von 
Hayek, to Wooton, or to Preobrazhensky, for it transgr.esses 
all three concepts of freedom, those of'free-enterprise 
capitalism, or "mild" socialism, or of Marxist socialism. 
One Pretoria authority has commented on South Africa's relations 
with its neighbours, as follows: 
"Few people can seriously believe that sovereign 
independent states' international relations are 
determined by motives other than self-interest. 
The question is only whether this self-interest 
is enlightened or not". (9) 
I shall treat below of whether South Africa's motives are 
enlightened self-interest, or plain self-interest. Regional 
development is agreed by many authorities to be generally good~ 
10 interdependence is generally to be encouraged. However;' 
in each case one must study who designs and controls the 











benefits by it. It is in these terms that South Africa's 
"enlightened self-interest" must be evaluated. 
The major economic factors linking Southern African states 
include monetary, customs and tariffs agreements; water; power; 
labour; technological skill; direct investment; export credits; 
tourism; and trade in raw materials, finished goods or services. 
The pblitical linkages range from common interest to open or 
covert manipulation. Military relations range from alliance 
to potential or actual conflict. In all these fields South 
Africa has significant power. 
These int~r-relationships are dynamic. The linkages change, 
as can be seen in the problem for Ian Smith in the finding 
of routes to the sea after the Spinola coup, the independence 
of Mozambique and the Zambian border closure. A detailed 
examination of Southern Africa would be untenably lengthy here: 
G d 11 h ld b It d 11 L' t 12 , . run y s ou e consu e, as we as els_ner ,wno glves 
a South African reply to critics. 
Leistner suggests that South Africa's approach is flhumcirum" 
and "highly pragmatic", having no "g.Land design for the 
economic future", and is "lacking in visionary schemes". 
Be that as it may, Defence Minister P.W. Botha emphasises 
the interaction and interdependence of South Africa's military, 
foreign and internal policies: he speaks of the need for' 
"total strategy,,13. 
One authority, J.E. Spence, takes this further. He writes: 
"The structure of power in South Africa as; it has 
been elaborated over the past two decades suggests 
in some respects the notion of a garrison-state, 
in which the civil and military instruments of 
coercion have been fused together to inhibit in 
advance any threat to its integrity ••.•• Basically 
the (foreign) policy rests on the assumption that 
the territories of Southern Africa constitute a 
regional system which in economic terms is 
dominated by South Africa ll • (14) 











Dr Verwoerd wanted a common market for the region15 , and Mr 
Vorster wants an economic bloc,of politically independent 
states to stave off "communism!l. All the linkages cannot 
be examined here. 
power relationships. 
I shall deal only with the water and 
South African planners envisage an economic interdependence 
resulting from water and power systems stretching from the 
Cape to Zaire. They see South African skills as being a 
key factor in creating these systems. ' Mr Vorster sees this 
interdependence as a way to save the SUb-continent from 
"communism", as he defines it. 
The previous Chief Engineer, Planning, of the Department of 
Irrigation, Dr D.F. Kokot, argues that rivers bind South Africa 
to her neighbours, and that these rivers will playa very 
important role in the relationships between Southern African 
states. He lists possible and actual projects on the 
Zambesi, the Ovango, the Kunene, the Limpopo, the Komati, 
the Krokodil, the upper Orange, the Kwando, and other rivers, 
in which South Africa can playa part. He concludes: 
"So is die Republiek en sy buurstate onderling 
ten nouste deur riviere en rivierstelsels verbind. 
Namate die vraag na water en elektriese krag toeneem, 
sal die band belangriker word. Daarom is dit van 
die opperste belang dat Suid Afrika aktief sal 
strewe na ~ gesonde en vriendskaplike verhouding 
met sy buurstate •. .• ". (16), 
Dr Kokot first put this view forward many years ago, and for 
at least a quarter of a century South African planners have 
worked in terms of a SUb-continental analysis.1 Dr Kokot, 
in a 1949 paper on hydro-electric possibilities, wrote: 
"For the Union of South Africa alone, .•..• the 
possibilities are rather meagre. To relieve 
a somewhat gloomy picture, I have therefore 
included the rivers of our northern neighbours, A7 
namely the Cunene, the Okavango and the Zambezi" • .1. 
As another example, H.J. Quinton write in the South African 










"In December 1969 Dr H Olivier, Chairman of L.T.A., 
foresaw the emergence of an electricity common 
market grid to link the whole Southern African 
region..... It is not beyond the realms of 
possibility to visualise a Southern African 
common market for water". (18) • 
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South Africa's leading water engineer, Professor Midgeley of 
the University of the Witwatersrand, writes: 
"There is little doubt that throughout the 
Southern African sUb-continent larger and 
larger quantities of water will have to be 
conveyed over greater distances".' (19). 
However, in another article, he shows that South Africa is not 
being entirely altruistic in assisting her neighbours' river 
developments: 
"By the year 2000 the water needs of irrigation 
in South Africa will have risen from 265 cumec to 
480 cumec. ("Cumec" = cubic metres per second). 
Urban and industrial needs will rise from 53 
cumec to 530 cumec.... The total demand of 1 010 
cumec exceeds the estimated safe yield from all 
sources" • ( 20) 
Midgeley recognised the fact that: 
" •.•• large water, and especially ~ydro-electric, 
schemes can only be economically beneficial if 
they are undertaken on a large scale and if 
their potential is utilised to the utmost". (21). 
It became obvious in the nineteen-sixties, largely through the 
work of Dr H.J. van Eck of the Industrial Development 
Corporation, that 
"The provision of cheap water and electricity is 
vital for the development of the countrie~ of 
Southern Africa, but that large projects are only 
possible if markets can be found for water, and 
especially power, beyond the borders of those 
countries where the schemes are erec!::ed ll • (22). 
With the growing demand for electric~ty in South Africa, and 
with the technological improvements being made in the transmission 
of power over long distances using high-voltage transmission 
lines, Dr van Eck saw that the Republic's capital and buying 
power could finance river development in many of her neigh- . 










themselves. News/Check wrote of this: 
"It implies a closely-knit Southern Africa, and 
it implies, too, a signal contribution by an 
outward-looking Republic to all the African 
countries clustered in the South. Malawi, 
Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Mo<;.:ambique can 
all benefit by South Africa being used as a 
first-stage buyer of power that they for the 
moment cannot consume. Later the Republic 
will not need that power, and they will use 
it more and more as their own requirements 
expand. In this way all the lands of 
Southern Africa will help each other to advance 
and out of mutual development mutual friendship 
must grow". ( 24) • 
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Professor Midgeley estimated that the power demand in South 
Africa is expected to increase eight times, requiring a total 
capacity of over sixty thousand megawatts. The bulk of this 
must corne from thermal stations on the Transvaal coalfields: 
he predicts that these coalfields will feed the greatest 
concentration of power-stations of any kind to be found anywhere 
in the world. Coal will have to be supplemented not only by 
nuclear energy but also by hydro-electricity, from allover 
Southern Africa. He envisages a 15000 MW sUb-continental 
grid, drawing power from Wankie coal-field thermal stations and 
from hydro-electric plants on rivers such as the Kunene, 
. 25 
Okavango and Zambesi. Finally he conside~the possibility· 
of a link to the world giant: the Inga power plant on the 
Congo River, which could have a capacity in the region of 
30 000 MW. (By comparison,- the Aswan high darn on the Nile 
has a planned capacity of 2 200 MW.) The Afrika Instituut 
has estimated that the Congo River embodies one quarter of 
the world's water-power potential. If Sout9 Africa needs 
energy, this may be a source?6. 
Thus, South Africa's buying power is seen by experts like 
Midgeley, and the I.D.C's van Eck, as the way to achieve their 
sub-continental water and power grid. Midgeley writes: 
"(Because) the revenue to be derived from the 
sale of power to the Republic could, by the 
turn of the century, be R300 million pec annum, 
it is hard to think of a better way for our 27 











Ignoring the possible invalidity of the Rostowian concept of 
"economic take-off", which would take too much space to discuss 
fully, it should be noted that the sum of R300 million per 
annum in the year 2000 is not as large a figure as Midgeley 
implies. The Republic of South Africa is already spending 
over three times that amount each year on her military forces. 
, 
Midgeley in fact sees investment in sub-continental water and 
power infrastructures as being of great military or strategic 
value: 
"Looked at from a narrow financial cost-benefit 
point of view, there may appear to be little more 
than aesthetic merit in making the desert bloom, 
but from strategic and socio-economic angles, 
the need to create modes of development in or 
near a desert may in fact be crucial, almost 
regardless of direct cost. Sometimes the 
indirect costs, for example, in the defence budget, 
of neglecting to develop a region, bear careful 
scrutiny" _ (28) • 
Accordingly, the South African ruling groups laid plans and 
entered into negotiations aimed at establishing sUb-continental 
water and power networks. They did so for economic, poli~icall 
and military reasons. The South African government, private 
enterprise, and Universities (English and Afrikaans-speaking 
alike) all enthusiastically worked towards the achievement-of 
the dream of economic interdependence in Southern Africa. 
These plans were made in the sixties: they are bEing carried 
out today_ Dr Henry Olivier of the L.T.A., Limited, a 
major engineering company controlled by the Anglo-American 
Corporation of S .A., Limited, said in September 1974 that the 
Pan-African power transmission grid was slowly becoming a fact: 
"Such a grid can be in existence within a decade 
and will make possible the beneficial use in 
thermal stations of the caal reserves lying 
fallow in countries like Swaziland, Botswana and 
Rhodesia. The Zamblan~ Rhodesian and South 
African grids have been completed. The Kunene 
scheme is proceeding and the transmission lines 
will come South and go North. Zaire has 
recently let a contract for a high-voltage 
transmission line from Inga on the Congo River 
to Tunga Fungerumo near the Zambian-Rhodesia 
border. This line is similar to the Cabora 











(in Malawi) is barely 300Km from Cabora Bassa". 
Dr Olivier stressed the irrigation potentials of these hydro-
electric projects: 
"By linking the resources of the wet North with 
those of the dry South, and I include capital 
resources, we could first make the entire region 
self-sufficient in food and basic items, and then 
proceed to become one of the biggest granaries or 
food-banks for the rest of the world. 
The engineering, scientific, financial and managerial 
skills for the Pan-African grid are all available. 
It is a field in which South Africa, by virtue of 
her industrial and financial strength could and 
should make a major contribution if permitted". (29). 
This is the crux. The Southern African sub-cbntinent has 
great potential for development. Dr Olivier's plans could 
be executed in a way that fairly and equally distributed 
Africa's wealth to all its inhabitants, that did not divide 
her people along "racial" or ethnic barriers, that gave equality 
of education and opportunity, and that used labour-intensive 
methods when full employment was lacking 30 • Alternatively, 
his plans could be executed to maintain the present system of 
large inequitable inco.me-gaps, of exploitation 31 , of uner:lploy-
ment, of starvation, and education for serfdom. The question 
is: who con-trols this Pan-African development, who controls the 
means of production and distribution? 
South Africa's military build-up shows that South African 
ruling groups intend to control this development of South and 
Southern Africa. They may develop the region, but ~hey will 
do so primarily for their own benefit, using direct rule, or 
using the subtle form of indirect rule known as Separate 
I 
Development. Such is the nature of South African planning 
for Southern Africa: it foresees the creation of political 
"independence" and economic dependence, so as to perpetuate 
minority rule, no matter hO\v indirect, and minority enjoyment 
of affluence. 











the Kunene sctieme must be examined, in the context of the 
creation of separate, politically independent nations to serve 
South African intecests. The water and power infrastructure 
of Southern Africa is very important to the twin apartheid 
goals, which are separation, and the accumulation of riches 
by the ruling groups. If the military situation ~ilows the 
completion of the Kunene project, it could make a great 
c6ntribution to ~partheid in Namibia and in the sub-continent. 
We shall consider below whether the Kunene projects, if 
completed, might be used in the interests of all the people by 
some future democratic government. 
In this chapter we have seen South African planning in the 
lj.ght of a debate on freedom under planning, and we have 
discussed the visionary Pan-African water and power schemes 
of the South African government and of the large lilining--
industrial groups. The schemes must be seen in the politic~l 
context of Mr Vcrster1s expressed method of saving the region 
frorn IrJi1dt he ter:ms "communism". 
In the following chapters, the plan for the use of th~ Kunene's 
water will be discussed. The Minister of Water Affairs 
scdd of this plan in 1969: 
"It might even be the most ambitious water 
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THE KUNENE, THE CUVELAI, AND THE BORDER DISPUTE. 
In 1886 the German Empire and the Kingdom of Portugal reached 
agreement about the border between their territories in South-
Western Africa. The boundary would run from a certain point 
on the Kunene River along a parallel of latitude to the Okavango 
River. By 1896, the border was in 'dispute; by 1926 the 
South Africans and the Portuguese had reached a settlement. 
In 1974 the "Owambo Executive Council" announced that it was 
re-opening this border dispute, which had been settled for 
fi fty years. 
The present border runs from the Ruacana Falls on the Kunene 
across to the Okavango, thereby splitting the Cuvelai River 
basin in half. This chapter will examine aspects of the 
history, the geography, and the political economy of the two 
rivers, and of the border dispute. 
Over one million years ago, the Kunene River probably drained 
into the Etosha Pan1 • Today, a sandstone scarp2 separates 
the Cuvelai River, which drains southwards through Ovamboland 
to the Etosha Pan, from the Kunene, which has been captured, 
or "beheaded", and flows to the Atlantic Ocean. Map Sixteen 
shows the drainage system of the region. 
The Kunene drains a basin whose catchment area measures 
106 500 square kilometres, of which 14 100 square kilometres 
are in Namibia. The river is one thousand and fifty 
kilometres long, from its source on the Angolan Bih~ Plateau, 
near the town of Nova Lisboa, to its mouth on the Atlantic 
Coast, some two hundred and thirty kilometres south of the port 
of Mossamedes. The river flows 550 kilometres southwards 
from Nova Lisboa, then turns and flows 150 kilometres south-
westwards to the Kazambua rapids and the Ruacana Falls, where 












remainder of its course to the 3 sea • 
The Kunene's source is on the great Angolan watershed, along 
which the Benguela railway is laid, and which is the sour~e of 
several other major rivers, such as the Okavango, the Kwando, 
and the Zambesi. The Kunene obtains most of its water from 
this watershed, which receives a high rainfall, in excess of 
1 500mm per annum. There are many rapids and falls in this 
initial stretch. On leaving the highland areas at Matunto, 
the river meanders sluggishly across the flat Kalahari sands 
of its middle reaches until it comes to the rapids and the 
Ruacana Falls, below Calueque. Thereafter it plunges 
rapidly to the sea through the harsh, broken Baynes Mountains 
and the sands of the well-named Skeleton Coast. Rainfall 
in these lower reaches is only a few millimetres per annum, 
and evaporation is high. The river is therefo~e exotic to 
Namibia, and receives very little water from the territory. 
For many years it was believed that the Kunene overflowed 
its banks in the wet season, and thus watered Ovomboland4 • 
This was an understandable error, for the Cuvelai water channels 
are extraordinarily difficult to understand or map. Their 
courses change, and the gradients are very slight. Nitsche; 
presenting a dissertation on the region's geography to the-
University at Kiel in 1913, wrote about th~ first detailed 
maps of the area, as follows: 
"When one looks at the three maps of Duparquet, 
Bernsmann and Ro~adaz, one does not at first 
get the impression that they deal with one and 
the same area, that is, the floodplain of the 
Kunene and the Cuvelay Omurambas". (5). 
Duparquet's work is reproduced as Maps Seventeeh to Twenty; 
Charles Andersson!s earlier map is reproduced as Map Twenty-
One; a later map by the explorer of the Lower Kunene, Maudslay 
Baynes, published in 1923 and reproduced as tlan Twenty-'l'wo, 
still shows ignorance about the Cuvelai, although Baynes knew 
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Today, we have a clearer picture of the relationship between 
the Kunene and Cuvelai basins, which are separated by a 
sandstone scarp. Although the scarp is cut in several 
places, notable at Eriksson's Drift (Calueque) where the 
Kunene may have flowed to the South in ancient times before 
its "capture", it is not possible for water to flow unaided 
from the one river.basin to the other. In the gaps in the 
scarp the gradients are in fact increasing with erosion over 
time. This is clearly illustrated by Map Twenty-Three. 
The watershed in the oshana Etaka is marked "Critical Point". 
Obviously, Kunene water cannot reach the Etosha Pan unaided. 
The watershed can also be seen in Egger's map of Ovamboland 
(Map Twenty-Four), anti in Heinrich Stengel's map of the 
Cuvelai basin (Map Twenty-Five). 
Namibia has been blessed with some highly competent water-
engineers, and Heinrich Stengel is among them. He has been 
bringing water to man, animal, and plant in Namibia for forty 
years, twenty seven of those as an employee of the Department 
of Water Affairs. Today's water engineers have more 
sophisticated tools than he had originally, but they are no 
less imaginative, as we shall see. 
Stengel's map shows the Cuvelai basin lying between the Kunene 
Basin and the Okavango Basin. The rainfall of the Cuvelai 
Basin decreases sharply from North to South, from 1 300mm 
per annum in Angola to 400mm per annum in Ovamboland. The 
wet upper regions are a confusion of water courses, but the 
major river is the Cuvelai, with its tributaries, the Mui-Mui 
and the Caundo. The Cuvelai drains southwa~ds through a 
maze of rivers and grassed watercourses, called oshanas. 
At Lake Ossouk (or Oponono) it is joined by the oshana Etaka, 
..... lhich drains western Ovamboland, and which lies on the old 
course of the Kunene in ages gone by. 
The Cuvelai system annually floods the oshanas of Ovamboland 
in a welcome inundation called the Efundja, on which the 
Ovambo agricultural economy depends. In flood times, the 
oshana provides fish which are caught and dried for food 











men and animals, and water the basic crops which are nutritious 
types of millet and sorghum. The oshana system is drained 
from Lake Oponono through the Ekuma into the Etosha Pan, a dry 
endoreic lake. 
The problem, however, is that the Efundja is highly 11nreliable. 
and can vary from very little water to heavy floods. Thirteen 
of the twenty years from 1941/42 to 1960/61 saw floods, but 
seven were dry6 The Ovambo pastoralists depend on the 
Efundja, and, as the shaded areas of Map Twenty-Four show, 
most of the people live near the oshanas. Today, seventy 
percent of the population are estimated to live close to the 
main roads from Ondangua to Ruacana and Oshikango, shown on 
7 Map Twenty-Four • 
The unreliability of the Efundja means repeated and destructive 
droughts. Two mefres below the surface of most of Central 
Ovamboland lies a bitter brine underground lake: boreholes 
can therefore only be used to combat drought in the east and in 
a narrow belt in the west. For the remainder, the most 
populous area, there are only two solutions. Wat~r must 
be conserved from the Efundja for use in dry periods, and 
water must be brought from the Kunene through the gap in the 
scarp. Map Twenty-Three, drawn in 1938, shows the scarp 
gap at Calueque (Eriksson's Drift) between Olushandja and 
Molola Chicola. To conserve the water of the Efundja, an 
ingenious system of storage darns and canals was devised by 
the Department of Water Affairs, and was very successful. 
However, this was by no means enough: the Kunene had to be 
utilised. From this necessity the border dispute had 
already arisen, early in the twentieth century, as we shall 
see below. 
The history of the Kunene River, especially in the south, is 
very poorly recorded, and there is scope for a modern historian 
to piece together the Portuguese material, the reports of ot0~r 
travellers, and local tradition, based on the pioneering work 
by Heinrich VedderB. Lack of space precludes a detailed 











The name of the river derives from the Ovambo word "Okunene", 
meaning "the wide, or right, side" of the river. (That is, 
Southern Angola, as opposed to "Okaoko", meaning "the small, 
9 or left, arm", whence derives today's name "Kaokoveld".). 
The word "Okunene" would seem to have been misunderstood by 
an unknown Portuguese who, according to Vedder, named the 
river "Kunene". Another version is that the full name is 
Omulpnga-Okunene, meaning "river-big", and that this was 
10 shortened by the Portuguese 
The earliest European information about the river and about 
Ovamboland comes from Andrew Battels, an Englishman taken 
prisoner in 1589 by the Portuguese in Brazil and brought to 
Angola, where he was captured by the cannibal Jagga tribe11 • 
He spent sixteen months with them in Southern Angola and in 
Ovamboland, escaped from them and from the Portuguese, and 
returned to England, where he wrote about his travels. The 
Portuguese called the area the "Kingdom of Mataman", but, 
despite their slave-trading operations in the region, had little 
knowledge about it until the nineteenth century. The 
Skeleton Coast, the fierce Jagga, and the Kwanyama warriors 
combined to prevent European penetration, but there are no 
doubt Amer.icans today whose forebears were Ovambo people 
from Southern Angola. 
In the centuries that followed, travellers sailing down the 
coast occasionally carne across the river mouth. de l'Isle's 
map of 1720 shows a small nameless river flowing to the coast, 
whereas the "Cuneni" is an unconnected inland river running 
southwards and ending in the region which we today know as the 
Etosha Pan. This is the earliest recorded version that I 
have been able to find of the belief that Kunene water once 
flowed to the Etosha Pan. 
In 1732 John Barbot published a vast- 716 page tome describing 
the coasts of Africa. It mentions the "Cuneni" river of 
"Lower Ethiopia", where live the "Jagos", who "eat all the 
slain,,12. In this region, too, may be found the land of 











A 1736 Latin map, by one Matthia Hasio, is perhaps for its time 
the most accurate that I have seen. It shows the "fl. 
Cuneni f-lagnus" running through "Cimbebasia" to the coas t, while 
Etosha is unmarked. 
The ea_t'ly Portuguese knowledge of the river is summarised in~ 
the 1854 reports on the overseas territories14 Even at 
this date the question of the direction of the flow of the 
river was not entirely certain. 
In 1785 a Portuguese official found a smooth, inscribed stone 
near what is today the port of Mo~amedes. On this stone 
travellers, from 1645 to 1770, recorded their names, and among 
the inscriptions is the following statement: 
"RIO CUNENE" 
"The Captain Jose da Rosa Alcobaca passed here 
on his way to the Cunene, in the frigate Nossa-
Senhorah da Nazareth, on the 4th January 1765". (15). 
In 1787 Colonel Pinheiro de Laverda reported: 
"The Cunene is the largest river from Zaire to 
the Cape. Its source is in Candumbo, near 
Caconda". (16) 
The Governor of Benguela reported in 1799: 
"rrhe Cunene river has its source in the Huambo; 
it passes t~rough Galangue, Caconda, Quilengues, 
and flows into the,sea at Cabo Negro, where it 
causes a rough sea". (17). 
Not having read the works in English of Battels or of Barbot, 
and thus ignorant of all this, a British ship "discovered" 
the river in 1824 and named it the "Nourse". 
An English traveller, Morrell, wrote: 
"The river Nourse, which was said to have been 
discovered in 1824 by L'Espiegl, was closed at 
the time we passed this part of the coast". (-:J.8) 
The 1854 Portuguese reports continue: 
"In 1824 the English warship Espieglc captained 
by Chapman discovered a river on the coast of 
Africa whose mouth was at 17 0 15' latitude 5, 
and 110 48' longitude E of Greenwich: he called 












From 1850 onwards, 
dramatically20 
European knowledge of the Kunene increased 
Explorers and hunter-traders approaching 
from both North and South reached the fabled river. Hahn, 
Rath, Galton, Green, Smuts, Perreira, Ladislaus Magyar, Brochado,. 
and, of course, Andersson all visited the region and described 
their travels. After several attempts, Andersson finally 
reached the river with Axel Eriksson in 1867, and, after writing 
hls wife some exquisitely detailed accounts of the passions of 
tropical illness, Andersson died there on the 5th July 1867. 
In 1854 Fernando da Costa Leal explored the ~outh21 where 
Portuguese vessels had watered previously, but it was not until 
the present century that the vast, inhospitable lower reaches, 
from the Ruacana Falls to the sea, were explored by people from 
Europe. This was no easy task: Baynes, after whom the 
mountains were named, writes of his 1911 journey: 
" •••• (it) began -in a spirit of picnic and developed 
into a struggle for bare existence". (22) 
The Kaokoveld was largely left alone, for only the Ovatjimba 
could cope adequately with its harshness. However, Christian 
missionaries found they could work in the more physically 
hospitable region to the east of the Kaokoveld. Bishop 
Gray of Cape Town wrote in 1860: 
"There is a great field beyond this diocese in the 
West among the Ovambos untouched: I have long 
been anxious to found a mission th~re". (23) 
Assorted types of Christianity were soon to be available in 
Ovamboland from a variety of preachers, speaking many languages. 
In time, a Kwanyama bible was produced. Christianity is a 
literate religion, and our knowledge of Ovambo~and is enriched 
24 by the works of men such as Duparquet ,who explored the 
region from 1878 to 1880. Unhappily, other Christian writing 
is not available to current researchers, for one important 
archive in Rome operates not a fifty but a one hundred-year 
25 rule.. Despite this, our knowledge of the region's history 
is deepening: I have merely noted here some of those Europeans 











In the 'scramble for Africa', the region was parcelled out 
between the Germans and the Portuguese. A border was created 
which was to become one of Africa's silliest and least-observed 
boundaries, yet one that is highly unlikely to be changed. 
The original partition seemed a clear and rational delineation 
between the two countries' respective de facto spheres of 
influence. There were few, if any, Germans to the north of 
it, and few, if any, Portuguese to the south of it. It was 
~imple to describe, and only slightly less simple to measure 
out on the ground. 
Article Orie of the Agreement between the Government of H;M. 
the German Emperor and the Government of H.M. the King of 
Portugal and the Aigarves, signed on the 30th December 1886, 
read as follows: 
"The boundary line which shall separate the 
Portuguese and German possessions in South West 
Africa follows the course of the River Kunene from 
its mouth to the waterfalls which are formed to 
the south of Humbe by the Kunene breaking through 
the Serra Cana. From this point the line runs 
along the parallel of latitude to the River 
Kubango". (Okavango) (26). 
Within ten years two problems became obvious. The first was 
the Ovambo Kwanyama, whose land had been sliced in half by the 
foreigners. At that stage the Kwanyama were not overly, 
worried, for they were not yet ruled by those foreigners, and 
they blithely ignored the boundary. However, the foreigners 
became worried as the economy of the region developed: who 
was entitled to recruit labourers from the Kwan~ama? Vir-
tually all secular and much religious writing on Ovamboland 
has stressed the area's primacy as a source of labour 27 • With 
the development of the Otavi copper mines, and later the diamond 
fields 28, the demand fo,t" Ovambo labour increased dramatically, 
and Germans came into conflict with Portuguese over recruitment 
rights. 
Labourers can walk across the border if necessary, but river 
dam sites cannot. When it was realised in 1896 that the 











water, the Germans also realised that the boundary line 
~xcluded from th~ir territory the best possible dam-sites: 
for e~ample, at Eriksson's Drift. The boundary might also 
effectively prevent the Germans from using the Ruacana Falls 
to generate electricity. The result was that the boundary 
line was placed further to the North by the Germans, to include 
the labour supply and the power and water sources'. The 
British noted more far-reaching desires on the part of the 
Germans: 
"Knowing that the Germans placed the boundary line 
somewhat further to the North than the Portuguese 
placed it, the latter made repeated proposals for 
an amicable adjustment, but these overtures met 
with no response, as it suited the Germans to 
keep the question open until their plans for an 
administrative protector~te over Angola should 
ripen. Meanwhile, the Germans made free use 
of the Ovambo country, both within the disputed 
belt and in admittedly Portuguese territory, as 
recruiting ground for their copper and diamond: 
mines at Tsumeb and Luderitz Bay". (29). 
The Germans never achieved any of the far-reaching dreams they 
may haye had for all of Angola. However, they did dispute 
the Southern border. They did this not ,only "for the sake 
of re-uniting the Kwan ama people" (which would mean more 
labour for the Germans), but also to gain control of the 
Kunene, to water Ovamboland and to generate power. 
The earliest known plans for watering Ovamboland from the 
Kunene were made in 1896 by Brincker 30 , who ~ished to persuade 
the Kunene to. return to its old habits of flowing to the 1 Etosha 
Pan. These plans were discussed in Cape newspapers in the 
same year 31 , and were enthusiastica'lly taken \.tp Gessert 32 in 
1897, who noted that the plans had also been proposed in 
I 
several other journals. By 1904 Gessert had costed the 
whole proposali and wished to link the Kunene to the Okavango 
Swamps via the Etosha Pan, thereby creating lakes which would 
\ 
dramatically chan~e the climate for the better. He went 
so far as to envisage ships travelling in canals from the 
Etosha Pan to the Okavango. He passionately argued the 











was slowly drying up, which was a problem far worse than that 
of the Herero uprisings at the time. 
"With the Natives we can cope, but far worse 
will be the fight between whites around the 
drying water-holes". (33) • 
Gessert's schemes were impossible dreams, yet he had in essence 
a-solution to the territory's water problems. Nitsche 
commented on them in 1913: 
"Whether an improvement of the climate, amounting 
to a doubling of the rainfall would be observed, 
is very questionable. Just as we are so little 
able, despite numerous attempts, to influence the 
weather by means of high explosives, just so little 
can we make the splendid phenomena of the atmosphere 
dependent upon us". (34) 
Even for his more practical schemes there were 
problems: the Portuguese and the Kwanyama. 
some prior 
Germany did 
not rule the required sites. Nitsche wrote: 
"So long as the Germans are not the absolute 
master of ground and soil, extensive under-
takings are unreal phantasies". (35). 
They were to remain unreal phantasies 
although many scientists continued to 
Portuguese attempted to become master 
Mandume ruled his Kwanyama people, in 
for half a century, 
--
debate them. The 
of the g.r'ound where 
1915. We sa'l'l in an 
earlier chapter how, after a great battle, Mandume fled across 
the border to the South Africans who killed him two years later.' 
By 1915 there were two borders: the German one, drawn on the 
line of latitude 170 17''10''5 from Eriksson's Dr;ift (now called 
Calueque); and the Portuguese one, drawn correctly, in 
accordance with the 1886 treaty, from the Ruacana Falls along 
latitude 170 23'10"S36. Some maps showed an attempted 
compromise, drawing a diagonal line from the North-west to 
South-east across the disputed zone, thus giving the Germans 
access to the river 37 • Colonel Pritchard, who had received 
Mandume's pleas for protection from the Portuguese, arranged 
a provisional boundary along 170 18'10"5 latitude, and declared 
the whole disputed zone to be neutral. Mandume was ordered 











It was Mandume's persistent attempt to rule all his people on 
either side of the border which eventually provoked the South 
Africans to "dispose of him" (as they put it) in 1917. 
Mandume's kraal from 1915 to 1917 is marked on Map ~wenty-Six, 
which clearly shows the neutral zone, and the provisional 
boundary running through Namakunde. 
Map Twenty-Six also highlights the results of an important 
translation error. The German boundary is shown to run 
from the confluence of the Kunene and 'a tributary, called the 
Serra Lana River. 
had read: 
The German version of the 1886 treaty 
"Die' Grenzlinie •.••. folgt dem Laufe des Kuneneflusses 
von seiner Muendung bis zu denjenigen Wasserfaellen, 
welche suedlich von Humbe beim Durchbruch des Kunene. 
durch die Serra Canna gebildet werden". (38). 
The South Africans, discovering this in the Record Office in 
Windhoek, translated it as follows: 
"The boundary ••••• shall run from the mouth of the 
River Kunene up to the waterfalls of the Kunene 
which, south of Humbe, are formed by the junction 
of the Serra Lana river with the Kunene river". (39). 
The "Serra Cana" is, of c urse, not a river, but a mountain 
formation, through which the Kunene br~aks at the Ruacana 
falls. However, the South Africans found a river, further 
upstream near Eriksson's Drift (Calueque) which they thought 
might be the "Serra Lana" river, shown on Map Twenty-Si_x,. 
At this point, there were small falls, known as the Kozumbue 
cataracts, which, the South Africans thought, might be the 
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MAP TWENTY-SEVEN: THE BORDER DISPUTE AT RUACANA, 1915/1916. 










MAP TWENTY-EIGHT: THE RUACANA FALLS. (F.E.Kanthack, 26/7/1920. 











Thus, for a crucial time the South African officials in the 
field believed themselves fully justified by the 1886 treaty 
in claiming the more northerly boundary. They were certainly 
very aware, at the same time, of the Kunene's enormous potential,' 
as one can see from Map Twenty-Seven, which reached the Prime 
Minister's desk in 1916. The need for ground above the 
Ruacana Falls on which to build waterworks is clearly recognised. 
For twelve years after the 1915 South African conquest, a 
combination of bewildering diplomatic'confusion between South 
Africa, Great Britain and Portugal, together with deliberate 
South African delaying action, prevented settlement of the 
dispute. By 1926 a settlement had been reached, in such a 
way that the border was correctly fixed in terms of the 1.886 
treaty, but the South Africans had gained certain rights to 
build inside Angola. The South Africans achieved these 
rights by the sheer dishonest chutzpah of their demands, a 
fact which the private letters of those involved readily 
conceded40 • 
In 1917 the Portuguese put forward a memorandum asking that it 
be agreed that the boundary run from the cataract to which the 
41 1886 treaty obviouslr refers, the magnificent drop at Ruac&na • 
The South Africans at first suggested that the matter could 
only be dealt with at the end of the war, but when they were 
pressed by Portugal, and asked by the British Imperial Government 
to accept Ruacana, as the starting point, the South Africans 
sought clarity from their Administrator in Windhoek; He wrote: 
"The fact that the boundary-line by intersecting 
certain tribal areas might cause difficu~ties 
with the Natives was, as the correspondence will 
show, for long recognised; but it would seem 
that eventually the value of the falls for future 
electric-power and irrigation schemes became the 
dominant factor in the respective claims •.•• 
The Ovakuanyama south of Namakunde are now, since 
Mandume's death, living very quietly and giving 
no trouble!!. (42) • 
Accordingly Balfour replied to the Portuguese, having 
" .... the honour to state that His Majesty's 
Government are prepared to accept the line 










that the Portuguese Government will grant to 
the Government of the Union of South Africa 
the right to draw f~om the River Cunene, by 
the construction of works at the great rapids, 
as much water as may be required for irrigation 
and electric power". (43) • 
152 
Thus the South Africans would give Portugal what was rightfully 
hers, only if Portugal would allow the South Africans to use as 
much water as they required, from Portuguese territory! The 
Portuguese, realising that this foolish boundary might otherwise 
completely prevent the use of the Ruacana Falls by either side, 
replied that they had nothing in principle against the drawing 
of water, provided only that a suitable amount of water and 
44 electric power be allocated to Angola. At this point the 
South Africans delayed further. 
Their officials in Windhoek realised that an error had been 
made concerning the "Serra Lana Riv r", and that, in fact, it 
was the "mountains of Canna" that were referred to in the 1886 
treaty45. The Windhoek officials had also become aware of 
the plans put forward by Professor Schwartz of Rhodes University 
College for utilising the Kunene. The Administrator wrote 
asking that the area be surveyed to examine the scheme's 
, b'l't 46 H 'd th I t- th G t vla 1 1 y. e recelve - e rep y hat e overnmen was 
not anxious to unduly press (sic) tris matter, so the papers 
could go forward in the ordinary way, and the visit to Ovambo-
land could well be put forward until after the rains 47 
These delaying tactics were continued in 1919: the Portuguese 
suggested a joint commission into t~e matter, and the Imperial 
government refused to consider the suggestion ~ntil the Portu-
guese replied to them on the Swaziland/Mozambique border 
question48 • Two boundary commissions were then proposed, 
but Smuts still felt he needed more information about the river 
before a commission sat: 
"This question, therefore, must be hung up until 
we have had the opportunity of investigating the 
position on the Kunene River so as to be quite . 
clear what attitude the Union Government should 
take up on the matter. I would be glad therefore 












Under further pressure, the South Africans appointed a three-
man team, led by F.E. Kanthack, to form a boundary commission 
with the Portuguese team, led by Colonel R. Machado. 'rhe 
Commission met at Ruacana in June 1920, where Kanthack drove 
a very hard bargain. In passing, his report to Smuts 
contains a telling comment on indirect rule, and a clear 
support for Machiavelli's.third way of keeping a state friendly 
to a conqueror. Kanthack wrote: 
"The personality of the two solitary officials, 
Major Manning and Lieutenant Hahn, is sufficient 
to maintain peace, order and goodwill throughout 
Ovamboland.The Portuguese to the North are 
unable to do the same with chains of military 
posts, and a considerable garrison of European 
soldiers and Askaris. The Germans considered 
it bes t to keep out ~'f the country". (50) • 
Kanthack realised that for the irrigation of Ovamboland, Ruacana 
was useless. He wrote to Smuts: 
"It is no wonder that the Portuguese are quite 
ready to our having power and ItJater rights at 
Ruacana. From a practical point of view 
our interests in the water of the Kunene are 
concentrated in the long flat reach from the 
Kavalo rapids near Eriksson's drift up to 
Humbe and beyond... there must obviously 
be some limit to our claims, and it was felt that 
in claiming to extend our control so far to the 
North ~s ~umbe, we were pushing matters td the 
extreme possible limit. It is moreover 
believed that by artificial means all that is 
desired can be attained by control of the river 
belO\,y Humbe". (51) • 
The boundary commission therefore considered three qu~stions, 
on only two of which had the Portuguese commissioners been 
given powers. The first was the question of the starting 
point of the boundary-line; the second, that of the division 
of the water at Ruacana for hydro-electricity; the third was 
the question of watering Ovamboland from any point as far 
north as Humbe. 
The boundary was provisionally agreed to run from the centre 
of the lip of the Great Cataract at Ruacana, and a beacon was 
established on the eastern side, (marked in Kanthack's hand-
writing on Hap Twenty':"'Eight). Each country was to hav.e one 










and a detailed set of rules was established concerning the 
building of a weir, not more than three kilometres into 
P t t · t f t' .c. b tt t' 52 oruguese errlory, or ne use o~ 0 I par-les • 
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On the third question, where the Portuguese commissioners had 
no instructions, they merely noted Kanthack's demands that the 
"South West Africa Protectorate" should be given the right to 
one-half of the water of the Kunene as far north as Humbe for 
irrigation and power purposes, and should also have extensive 
rights to dam the river and divert water into Ovamboland. 
Kanthack affirmed in the provisional agreement that ratification 
of any part of the agreement depended on ratification of the 
agreement as a whole. 
This naturally incensed the Portuguese: their rights to 
recognition of what was patently the correct boundary were 
being made to depend ·on the cession to their Southern neighbours 
of extensive rights to use the Kunene far into Portuguese 
territory. An official of the Portuguese Legation in London, 
as the Foreign Office reported, put it as 'follows: 
"When the Commission got to work, the Portuguese 
were dismayed to find that in return for the 
recognition of the frontier line, which was 
merely a Portuguese legal right, the British 
(South African) commissioners demanded that the 
Portuguese should concede to them the right to 
half the water in the Kunene river from a point 
many miles further north than the cataract 
specified in the treaty, together with the right 
to make canals from the river through the 
admittedly Portuguese territory into British 
territory.... The result would be twofold: 
(1) to hand over to the Union Government a 
tract of territory admittedly Portuguese 
(2) to drain this Portuguese territory of 
Natives who would pass over the frontier/into 54 
the henceforth well-irrigated British territory". 
He added that: 
" ••• the South African authorities were even 
now recruiting natives in the so-called 
'neutral zone' to the annoyance of the 
Portuguese Government~. (55) 
The Portuguese Commissioner, Colonel Machado, wrote bitterly· 
in similar vein in a Lisbon newspaper about the boundary 










,' ••.• our southern neighbours of the mines have 
succeeded in deviating to the South the 
Cuanhama people with presents, with insinuations 
of no taxes to pay, and telling them that they 
are slaves with us!" (56). 
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Accordingly, the Portuguese accepted the first two parts of the 
provisional agreement, but not the third S7 • Kanthack 
remarked on this in a frank private letter to Smuts's secretary: 
"I am scarcely surprised that the Portuguese 
Government have raised some objection. My 
motives for making these somewhat sweeping 
demands, involving considerable infringement 
of Portuguese territory and jursidiction, will, 
no doubt, be remembered and appreciated by 
General Smuts. I hardly expected these 
demands to be conceded in full". (S"Z:». • 
Kanthack's demands were thus an initial posture. In the 
eve~t; these exorbitant demands resulted in a compromise which 
was very much in South Africa's favour. 
The Portuguese, from writings such as those of Professor-
Schwartz and August Karlson, realised that the Kunene was a 
very valuable asset. Further, the demands by the South 
Africans hurt something else very dear to them: national pride. 
Ernest Oppenheimer became involved, and wrote" about this aspect 
as follows: 
"When visiting Angola in order to enquire into 
its business potentialities, one must keep on 
reminding oneself that one is in a Portuguese 
colony and that the Portuguese there will 
continually talk about 'A Portugal in Africa', 
and the 'Portuguese will make their homes 
there' - in short, nationality is the Alpha and 
Omega of every conversation with Portugu~se 
Officials. But subconsciously they know 
they cannot do it, and this makes them all the 
more anxious to do it by word of mouth. It 
also makes them unduly sensitive to anything the 
foreigner may say or do. 
This national movement is particularly 
championed by His Excellency the High Commissioner, 
and it finds its outlet in Decrees and Ordinances. 
Once these are printed the national spirit is 
90% appeased, and if the foreigner makes even a 
semblance of complying with them, the decrees 
themselves remain dormant. They only become 
alive if one points out deliberately that they 










Then, as they know they cannot enforce anything 
against powerful influences they become snappy 
and make minor difficulties, with the result that 
they interfere with the work of exploitation. 
The High Commissioner is an exceptionally clever 
man; an autocrat and a great patriot. He 
believes he can make a great country of Angola, 
and so he would if his citizens were not Portuguese. 
He has no wish to settle in Portugal for the time 
being. The political position there is too 
unstable for him; he is so keen on Angola that I 
believe if Bolshevism got the upper hand in 
Portugal he would not hesitate to break away from 
the Mother Country and make an independent 
republic". (58) • 
Words that might have been written fifty years later! 
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Oppenheimer discussed the border dispute with the High Commission-
er, and sent the following summary to Smuts: 
"His Excellency affirmed that there was, in his 
opinion, no objection to water being taken 
from the Cunene, but he was opposed to a foreign 
power acquiring sover~ign rights in his territory. 
He was quite prepared to give to a Company half 
Portuguese and half South African a concession 
to build such a darn and to construct a canal for 
irrigation purposes.... I do not know whether 
His Excellency's suggestions offer any chance 
of a compromise, but my impression is that he 
is so anxious for a settlement that such a 
Company could get considerable land concessions 
from the Angola Government". (59). 
The eventual compromise was not far removed from this suggestion. 
To cope with "national sentiment" the Portuguese again asked 
in 1923 that Parts One and Two of the draft agreement be 
ratified, whereafter it would be easy to reach ~micable 
t . . t . ht 60 H agreemen on a compromlse concernlng wa er rlg , s. ow ever , 
this was transmitted by the Governor-General to the Union 
Government "for information only", and neither Smuts, nor 
Hertzog following him, saw any need of reply61 
In 1923 a Portuguese delegate who was to see Smuts in England 
about the dispute was indisposed in Lisbon for three weeks, 
thus missing Smuts. The South Africans continued to dela~· 











"The Secretary considers that the question should 
be re-opened by the Portuguese, and that no action 
should be taken by the Government on behalf of 
SWA, as the Governor-General's minute of 22/10/1923 
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was sent only for information and not for reply". (62) 
"The new Portuguese Government, after settling 
their internal difficulties, will probably open 
the question at a later date". (63) 
Even uhder pressure from both the "Advisory Council of SWA" and 
the Permanent Mandates Commission, South Africa was in no 
64 hurry to reach a settlement. By February 1925, the 
South Africans had decided to re-open negotiations
65
• However, 
their offer was not sent via London this time, but direct to the 
Angolan High Commissioner, who forwarded it to Lisbon, where 
it was merely acknowledged without any further action, because: 
" ••. Hitherto negotiations had taken place through 
the British Foreign Office, and the Portuguese 
Government were.not unnaturally a little suspicious 
at being engaged in a triangular correspondence". (6£) 
After the matter had been aired again at the Permanent Mandates 
Commission and in the South African press, the two sides finally 
agreed to meet to settle the matter in 1926. In essence 
Parts One and Two of the 1920 provisional agreement were 
ratified, and a form of compromise was reached whereby Portugal 
and South Africa could build in Angola at Erikssen's Drift-
67 (Calueque), to provide water for the Ovambo people. A 
mixed technical commission sat the following year to examine 
the possibility of this diversion of the river, but met with 
little success for the Portuguese would not consider the building 
of a dam more than 4 metres high68 • The question of using 
the Kunene's water was left alone for the next thirty-five years, 
and will be examined in the next chapter. 
Thus, the boundary came to be fixed, running from: 
"A point at the Ruacana falls above the crest or 
liP: where the middle (of the river) intersects 
the parallel of latitude 170 23'23,73" South, 
thence eastwards along the said parallel of 
latitude" (69) ••• to the Okavango River. 
This boundary, as we have seen, divides in half the Cuvelai 










were never involved in the decision, and to this day they 
accord the border a healthy disrespect. 
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However, in due course a dam came to be built at Erikssen's 
Drift (Calueque), and with Portugal's diminishing control in 
Angola, the prospect of an independent Angolan Government meant 
that the dam was very vulnerably exposed from South Africa's 
viewpoint. At the same time the Kwanyama were still a source 
of labour for the South. Further, at a time when the ruling 
groups were attempting to foster "tribal" loyalties against the 
growing loyalty to "one Namibia", this division of the Kwanyama 
tribe must have seemed more vexing than it had been before. 
Thus it was that Chief Elifas of the "Owambo Executive Council" 
came to reopen the border dispute fifty years after it had been 
settled. He announced this while announcing the second 
. 70 . S . f "Owambo" electl0ns. orne may have considered lt a useul 
election ploy to persuade the Kwanyama to vote. After the 
"successful " election, which ItlaS discussed in a p.revi ous. chapter, 
Chief Elifas announced that he would immediately enter into 
negotiations with the Angolan authorities?1. 
Whether the Chief will be successful in "re-unitihg the Kwanyama", 
who had been so callou~ly split by the European powers, is open 
to question. The dispute tock at least twelve years to solve, 
fifty years ago, and the diplomatic correspondence might now 
involve not merely three, but six or more parties. The issues 
are not markedly different, although Chief Elifas does not 
mention them all. Labour, energy and water are still at 
stake, in addition to the "unity of the Kwanyama people". 
However, perhaps the best comment on the "new" border di'spute 
was made by a Windhoek journalist: 
"The Namib desert will turn into a rose-garden, 
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THE WATER PLANS. 
"The Ovambo make a great fuss about water. If 
I wanted any to drink I had to buy it with beads~. 
C.J. Andersson, 1867. 
In arid regions water is the most crucial factor in determining 
man's progress. Industrial development cannot occur without 
it. AS we have seen, since the last century man has dreamt 
of using the Kunene River to water the arid lands to the south 
of it. Early plans were devised by Germans in 1896-1904, 
but these were fruitless. A South African/Portuguese joint 
economic commission reached stalemate in 1927 over less 
ambitious plans than those of the Germans. The Ovambo people 
continued to scratch for water, and development further South 
was limited by the availability of water for several decades 
more. Yet by the 1970's water was flowing from Calueque into 
Ovamboland. This chapter will examine the \'vater plans and 
their implementation. 
By 1962 political and military factors weI:e combini!1g "Ii th 
increased economic demands, to bring the Portuguese and South 
Africans back to the negotiating table. The 1961 Angolan 
uprisings, and the subsequent war, together with the possibility 
of war in Mozambique, meant that the Portuguese wished to 
develop the Overseas Provinces, (in accordance:perhaps with 
the strategy of economic reform described by Baechler in 
Chapter Three above). Mineral developments meant the 
Angolan "boom". South Africa was under increasing United 
Nations pressure. Ovamboland needed water. Hining, 
and other development in Namibia generally, meant an increased 
demand for water. Dr Verwoerd's policy of Separate 
Development implied development, which required water. Power 
was needed to pump this water. Mines throughout the region 
also needed power. The Kunene was the obvious source of 
Water and Power. Talks began in March 1962, and initial 











In 1963 the blueprint for Separate Development in the territory, 
the Odendaal Commission Report2, recommended a hydro-electric 
scheme for the Kunene. The territory needed water and 
industrial development could only occur "if cheap power were 
available". "'rhe Commission sees the generation of electri-
city on the Kunene as the most important contribution which the 
State could make towards the further development of South West 
Africa" 3. 
One authority commented upon this repo~t and said that: 
"The supply of water is probably essential for 
the success of the homelands". (4) • 
In 1964 a preliminary treaty was signed 5 • This treaty 
envisaged collaboration between the two countries on rivers 
of mutual interest. It set out an initial agreement to 
exchange data, to consult each other, and. to undertake joint 
study of plans, methods and financing. South Africa was 
to submit a plan fer a diversion of the Kunene to Ovamboland. 
Portugal wanted a larger power plant to be erected at their 
existing dam at Matala, which could sell power to Namibia, but 
this was earmarked for further discussion. A hydro-electric 
scheme for the Kunene was agreed to in principle. 
A previous manager of the South West Africa Water and Electricty 
Corporation (Pty) Limited has described the formatio~ in the 
next year, 1965, of SWAWEK: 
"By a White Paper in 1965, the South African 
Government accepted practically all the recommenda-
tions of the Odendaal Commission ••.•• and in 
particular agreed to the Industrial Develppment 
Corporation undertaking the financing of ~ private 
company formed in South West Africa under the title 
SWAWEK, with the object of turning to account •.• the 
very considerable potential of the Kunene river". (6) •. 
The negotiations with the Portuguese.were protracted. Final 
agreement was not reached until South Africa refused to agree 
to its part in the Cabora Bassa scheme, whi~h Portugal badly. 
needed, unless the Kunene scheme were agreed to as we11 7 • 











21st January, 1969, a Treaty concerning the first phase of the 
Kunene schemes was signed8 On the 19th September, 1969, 
the Cabora Bassa treaty was signed9 The notable difference 
between the two treaties is the absence in the Kunene Treaty 
of escape clauses in the event of "Force Majeure", which is 
widely defined in the Cabora Bassa Treaty to include strikes, 
wars, explosions, floods and block~des. Evidently the paities 
did not foresee a major thr~at for Kunene, as they did for 
Cabora Bassa. 
Before power can be generated, a river's flow must be regulated, 
especially when the annual variation is great, as with the 
Kunene. The 1969 agreement aimed to regulate the river by 
a large dam at Gov~, high in the upper reaches and from wllere 
most of the river's water came. The power plant at Matala 
could then be improved, although South Africa did not agree 
to buy power from Matala as the Portuguese had ho~e~ originallyl0. 
Water would be supplied for initial irrigation projects, for 
men, and for animals, in the middle reaches of the Kunene in 
Angola. A smaller dam at Calueque would give further control 
of the river immediately above the Ruacana, and would also allow 
up to six cumecs of water to be pumped across to Namibia to 
provide for: 
" .•• the supply of water for human and animal 
requirements in South West Africa and for initial 
irrigation in Ovamboland". (11). 
Thus, what had been in 1926 a recognition of the wate~ rights 
of the Ovambo people south of the border, was in 1969 converted 
into an agreement to supply water to all of Namibia. , 
Finally, the Treaty envisaged a power station at the Ruacana 
Falls, fed through pressure tunnels from a diversion weir 
above the falls. The falls are 120 metres high12 , but the 
head of water from the diversion weir is 134 metres 13 • 
The financial and property rights agreed to in the Treaty 











Angolan fighting. South Africa paid entirely for the Gov~ 
dam, one half as a loan and one half as a grant, the amount 
being of the order of eight million Rand. The loan is to 
be repaid over twenty years at an interest rate of 5% per annum 
on the outstanding balance: that is, the loan is a "soft" one. 
In exchange for the financing of the dam~ which was to be the 
property of the Portuguese Government, Portugal agreed not to 
use more than 50% of the regulated flow of the river. 
The smaller dam at Calueque was to be paid for entirely by 
South Africa, who also paid the Portuguese Government R220 000 
as compensation for the flooded land. No mention is made 
in the treaty of compensation to be paid to the local inhabitants 
if any. South Africa agreed to credit Portugal with a royalty 
of one half of the flow used for power at Ruacana, at a royalty 
rate of llc per kilowatt hour initially, calculated to payoff 
the loan from South Africa to Portugal over 20 years. Once 
the loan has been paid off, the royalty rate was agreed to be 
RO,05 per kilowatt hour on the energy generated by half the 
flow at Ruacana. In short, Portugal, in exchange for the 
Gov~ dam and the immovable parts of the Calueque dam~ purported 
to mortgage Angola's water for the next twenty years, and 
thereafter to accept the very low royalty of 5c per kilowatt 
hour. 
The Calueque dam has a complicated system of controls. It is. 
remotely controlled by the South Africans at Ruacana, who can 
adjust both the release of water to Ruacana and the amount 
pumped to Namibia. However, a duplicate control panel is 
installed at Calueque so-that a failure in th'e remote control 
system can be remedied, and so that a Portuguese Operating 
Authority could override the South Africans if they operate<;l 
the dam in conflict with the agreement. In terms of the 1969 
Treaty the South Africans may appeal to the "Governado-Geral 
de Angola" in the event of a dispute; the Operating Authority 
may not interfere with the setting without instructions fro~. the 
"Governado-Geral". As an uncontrolled, or spurting, dam could 
play havoc with the generation of power, it is small wonde~ that 











wished to regain the territory previously occupied by the 
Kwanyama Ovambo tribe14 • That territory is presumably 
drawn" to include the Calueque dam, so essential to South 
Africa's power and water plans for Namibia. The boundary 
dispute "settled" in 1926 is not yet over, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. 
To summarise the 1969 Treaty, illustrated by ~Twenty-Nine: 
a large dam fifty-eight metres high was to be built at Gove 
to regulate the flow; a small dam was to be built at Calueque 
to enable water to be pumped to Namibia, and further to regulate 
the flow; a diversion weir and power station were to be built 
at Ruacana. South Africa was to pay for all these, one half 
of the Gove costs being a loan repayable over twenty years from 
the royalty on the Angolan share of the water at Ruaaana. 
Portugal could use the regulated water above Calueque for 
energy generation, especially at Matala, and for other purposes, 
provided she did not abstract more than 50% of the flow. 
Chapter Nine discusses the Portuguese plans for Angola. 
The treaty was not between Angolan and Namibian or Ovambo 
people. Whether a future Angolan government will uphold 
the treaty remains to be seen, as does the question whether a 
~uture Angolan government will negotiate with the ~nlawful " 
occupiers of Namibia. Angola has received two free dams 
and a regulated river, which is of great use, as will be seen 
in Chapter Eight. In exchange she has flooded areas of the 
river basin, and has mortgaged her water for twenty years, 
whereafter she may sell energy at a low rate, if the 1969 
Treaty applies. She has the potential str~tegic weapon 
of an uncontrolled or irregular river in her hands, although 
I do not have sufficient information to judg~ the effectiveness 
of this weapon15 
The South Africans may have made a crucial mistake in refusing 
power from Matala, for there is, under the 1969 Treaty, no 
ongoing payment to Angola for the next twenty years. A f~fure 











negotiate that existed in the case of Cabora Bassa, unless the 
rulers of Namibia were prepared to re-negotiate the matter, 
offering some current economic incentive other than royalties 
offset against loan repayments. However, more recent reports 
indicate that the royalty, which amounts to some R800 000 per 
annum, will be paid to Angola itself, notwithstanding the 1969 
Treaty, and that other arrangements will be made to payoff the 
16 debt to Portugal. If these reports are correct, then the 
point remains that Angola may be able to . batgain for a higher 
royalty, or use her control of the river as part of a composite 
strategy to bring about change in Namibia. 
Table Eight gives the capacities of the Matala, Gove and 
Calueque darns, by comparison with the large dams of the Orange 
River Development Project. 
TABLE EIGHT17 
COMPARATIVE STORAGE CAPACITY OF DAMS. 















It should be noted that the 1969 Treaty departs materially from 
the suggestions of the Odendaal Report. A~ the schemes have 
developed, modifications are continually being made: care must 
therefore be exercised to deal with the current situation at any 
given moment. 
The first phase of the scheme outlined in the Treaty is nearly 
complete. The trucial dam, at Gave, was completed by a ." 
Portuguese consortium in 1972 and its gates were first closed 










"The Calueque pump system was commissioned on 
21st August, 1972 and water from the Kunene River 
reached Oshikati on 1st September 1973. A total 
of 8 053 800 cubic metres of water has already 
been pumped". (19) 
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In 1970 an emergency pipeline of 157Km was laid from Calueque 
to Oshikati in Ovamboland, consisting of two pipes capable of 
delive~ing 1 cumec each, to cope with the drought. With the 
commissioning of the full pump station at Calueque, using the 
Ovamboland canals, this pipeline is no. longer needed, and is 
being taken up20 
Work on the Calueque dam itself is continuing and is nearing 
completion. Draft tender documents were submitted to the 
Portuguese Authorities in 1972 for approval. The dam 
consists of a central concrete structure and long earth 
embankments 21 • The Pretoria water engineering firm, 
Hydroconsults (Pty) Limited, advertised for engineers to 
administer this contract in July 197422 • The contractors 
for this dam may by agreement only be South African or Portu-
guese firms. This qualification does not apply, it would 
seem, to the Ruacana power project. The contractors will 
be detailed in the next chapter. Work on the Ruacana weir 
and power plant is proceeding. A small plant was installed 
to power the Calueque pumping station. The full j.nstallation 
is due for completion by July 1977, although SWAWEK are 
attempting to achieve completion by May 1977 23 • By March 
1973 the Department of Water Affairs had spent some R4t million 
on behalf of SvJAWEK on the Kunene project 24 • 
Having moved the water across the sandstone scarp into Namibia, 
where does it go? Presently it is used only in Ovarnboland, 
and less than 3 cumecs 
25 is pumped across 
of the 6 cumecs envisaged in the Treaty 
The water is pumped to Oshikati by 
canal, where it is purified, and then means of the Owambo 
piped for domestic use to towns such as Ondangua and Onguediva. 
A pipeline is planned to supply the border post of Oshikango~ . 
'The canal system is not yet complete: th~ Etaka.canal is being 











Apart from domestic water in the towns, some water is used for 
rural, human and animal consumption. Research farms have 
had good results from irrigation, but only using a highly 
sophisticated fertiliser system, ill-suited to the needs of 
the Ovambo farmer 26 • To judge by reports on the research 
station and agricultural college, given by Ovambo contract 
workers in Windhoek, irrigated farming is unlikely to be 
widespread in Ovamboland for some time, for strong complaints 
were lodged about the conditions and teaching methods. The 
Ovambo Master Water Plan of 1968 has had to be modified in the 
. 2/ light of new knowledge on Ovamboland soils for irrigated farmlng • 
South African colonial attitudes may be preventing large scale 
irrigated farming in Ovamboland at present, but South African 
planners voice an awareness of the need for successful irrigation, 
in view of the increasing population. 
"It has been estimated that in order to satisfy 
the food requirements of the population at a 
level commensurate with standard of living 
likely to be attained at the end of the century, 
it will be necessary to irrigate at least 
160 000 hectares in South West Africa". (28) • 
It is to be hoped that by that time those responsible for 
irrigating the area will have the enthusiastic support of the 
people involved, but at present the rulers and the technicians 
seem unable to win that support. 
Whatever may be the results of irrigated farming, water is 
provided for the towns in Ovamboland, and for man and beast 
in a pastoral countryside. The extent of this provision 
is uncertain, for contract workers interviewed in Windhoek 
still spoke of the people of Ovamboland diggihg and scratching 
for water. Attractive maps produced by the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs must, therefore, be treated with 
care, for their green irrigated areas are at present merely 
29 dreams • 
On balance, the water engineers seem to be achieving much by. 
bringing Kunene water to offset the droughts caused by the 











available on the distribution of this water among the people 
of Ovamboland, however. If the "success" of a Ifhomeland lf 
depends on water, the potential, at least, exists in "Owambo" 
for "success" in this respect. 
It is in the "white" south that water is urgently needed, 
however. Increased demand comes primarily fro~ mines, 
especially the Rossing uranium mines, but also from the towns. 
The problem was officially seen in 1972 as follows: 
"In South West Africa mining development has 
been accelerated in recent times. During the 
period 1954 to 1969, mining and related industries 
contributed between 28,6 and 44,6 per cent to the 
gross national product of the territory, and this 
sector maintained an average growth rate of 8,9 per 
cent during the fifteen years. Mines played a 
dominant role in starting up development in certain 
specific regions..... The claims that the mines 
made on the water resources of the Territory brought 
them into competition with the agricultural sector, 
and this in turn led to stricter legislation ·and 
greater state control. The policy has therefore 
been laid down that the Department is to act as 
bulk suppplier of water to mines in order to ensure 
that the available supplies are distributed and used 
in the most bene£icial way. Mines are also the 
only consumers who are obliged to pay the full costs 
of the water.... Revenue from water that will be 
supplied to mines in the future will increas~ 
considerably". (30) • 
An official report published in late September 1974 describes 
the problem and its planned solution 31 : 
"During the year reconnaisance work and investigation 
advanced to such an extent that it was possible to 
examine the long-term water source develqpment of 
South West Africa. 
The results that arose out of this broad planning 
were illuminating and showed that the pattern of 
water source development which up to now has been 
able to meet the territory's water needs, will in 
the foreseeable future undergo a complete meta-
morphosis in order to be able to assure a sufficiency 
of water for continued development in the territory. 
A move has already been made away from local supply 
systems towards regional systems which can ultimately 
be integrated into a national network". 
The report continues: 
"This broad planning has been carried through to the 










West Africa and the analyses have in broad outline 
brought the following to light: 
i) Water shortages may occur in the central area 
of Namibia as early as 1977 and these water shortages 
cannot be relieved from local sources. 
ii) A bulk water system from the Northern boundary 
rivers will have to be put into operation by 1986 
at the least in order to prevent serious water 
shortages in the Northern and Central areas of 
South West Africa. 
iii) Arising out of this, estimates have shown 
that the annual capital expenditure on water 
source development will have to ~ise sharply in 
the near future, and that there must be a consider-
able augmentation of the present available manpower 
in order to cope with the expected load of work •••• " 
"Northern River schemes: 
Comprehensive route reconnaissances and cost 
analyses of alternative schemes and combinations 
of schemes were carried out with a view to the 
broad long-term.planning of water source development 
for the whole of the territory, and proposed schemes 
on the basis of a master water plan for South West 
Africa were drawn up with a view to their approval 
in principle ••••• " (32). 
"The serious water shortage in Hereroland has been 
thoroughly examined along with a long-term water 
supply for the whole territory and is a strong 
argument in favour of a water network to import 
water from the Northern boundary rivers Southwards 
to the interior". (33) 
A journalist summed up the problem in 1970: 
"All our internal water resources will be 
exhausted by 1985" (34) 
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He was writing before the large expansion in mining in Namibia 
in the seventies. The development of the Rossing uranium 
i 
mine necessitated a sudden change in the water plans in the 
Western areas, and several other new mines, such as the copper 
mine at Otjihase, near WindQoek, c~eated a large demand for 
water. 
Some of this demand can be met from the Kunene river. The 
flow of 6 cumecs, which may be drawn in terms of the 1969 
Treaty, is equal to one half of the water flow used by the 
entire Witwatersrand industrial complex in 1968. Ovambo-










Bantu Investment Corporation, cannot use anywhere near that 
amount of water, especially if the irrigation plans have 
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encountered problems. The water is therefore to be taken 
South, in a flow of at least 3 cumecs. A further 6 cumecs 
from the river may be negotiated at a later stage35 , especially 
if the demand at Rossing increases. Another five pumps can 
be installed, to increase the flow from Calueque to the South 
to a total of 12 cumecs, only a small portion of which will be 
used in Ovamboland. 
On the 24th July 1974, the Minister of Water Affairs, S.P. 
Botha, speaking at a National Party Congress in Windhoek, 
announced 'a §OO million Rand project to be completed over 
twenty-five years, to bring water southwards from the Kunene 
and Okavango, and northwards from the Fish River basin, to 
the central and western areas of the territory. These are, 
of course, primarily the "white" areas, and the areas of most 
urban, fishing, and mining development. However, water is 
to be brought to "black" a.r'eas as well, especially to the dry 
area allocated to the Herero people of Namibia. 
Map Thirty was prepared from interviews and newspaper reports 36 • 
It shows the directions of the planned water supplies, but doe~ 
NOT necessarily show the actual routes. The money is to be 
found by the South African treasury. R120 million would be 
spent to take water to Hereroland and Windhoek, R90 million 
on a second Okavango phase, and R200 million to supply 
Swakopmund, Rossing, and Walvis Bay with Kunene water. R100 
million would be spent on bringing water northwards from the 
Fish River, but this by itself could not meet Ithe demand: hence 
the northern river projects were essential. Unless the plans 
were executed, Windhoek would have an annual shortage of 
29 million cubic metres of water, Hereroland would lack 6 
million, and the West coast 31 million cubic metres. The 
Minister stressed that it was unrealistic to supply water only 
to one area, for example, the "white" area, and not to the rest. 
He stressed the demands made by-the developing mines 37 • The 
reports are not clear, but at a later stage, a line may take 
water down the coast to the Walvis Bay area from a point further 










The 1974 SvJA Survey describes the position as follows: 
"A master water plan for the various regions 
of South West Africa is'being evolved in order 
to ensure that the overall cost of developing 
water resources will yield the optimum socio-
economic benefits for the people of the 
territory. As plans stand at present, the 
main s0pply schemes alone will involve several 
pipe-lines of more than 1 metre in diameter and 
well over 1 200Km in length, with the necessary 
pumping stations to lift the water against 
static heads of up to 1500 metres. Only the 
availability of ample power will bring these 
requirements into the realms of possibility". (39). 
These plans meandthat Namibia's regions are being finally 
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economically linked into a unit. If separate development 
is carried thnough, the separate politically independent states 
will be economically interdependent. The question of who 
benefits and by how much will be dealt with in Chapter Ten. 
The ""'Jhi te" areas are dependent on Angola and the northern 
"black""areas for water; the "black" areas presently depend 
on the "white" areas for employment. Mr Vorster's strategy 
of economic interdependence toachieve his political goals may 
work: alternatively, it may misfire, if the northern areas 
can deny the South water, power and labour, by political or 
military means. 
This chapter described the water ~roblems of Namibia. It 
analysed the Treaties and plans to use the Kunene River to 
solve those problems. It was seen that mining and urban 
growth in the centre of Namibia created huge demands for water, 
which could only be met from the Northern rivers. The South 
Africans thus plan to develop the territory a~ an economic unit, 
but politically "all options are open" to the ethnically selected 1 
"true leaders u • The South Africans are taking the wise and 
obvious step of using the Northern rivers to water the drier 
South, and are using the Kunene to generate the required energy 
for pumping. 
Mr Dirk Mudge, l''l.cting Administrator of the Terri tory, described 
the scheme as follows: 
"The one contribution that Owambo and Kavango 
can make is water - we wj,II assist them in 
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However, in the following years, the economy grew rapidly, as 
did the demand for electricity. At current prices the Gross 
Domestic Product grew by over 400% from R142,2 million in 1960 
to R615,6 million in 1973. At constant 1963 prices the GDP 
more than doubled, growing;from"R147,1 million to R320,0 million4 
Stoffberg has recently shown that there is a stable linear 
relationship between a nation's economy and its energy 
consumption, if the latter is measured as the electri:city 
equivalent of the energy used by the'final consumers (net energy) 
Moreover, in growing economies electricity has an increasing 
6 share in the total net energy supply Data are not 
publicly available to test these propositions in the Namibian 
case, but there would seem to be a high correlation between 
growth of the GDP and growth of the demand for electricity, 
although the electricity demand will increase slightly faster 
if, in fact, it has ~n increasing share in the total net energy 
supply. In Namibia, over the last fifteen years, the economy 
grew fast and the demand for electricity probably grevJ slightly 
faster. 
sector. 
This resulted largely from growth in the mining 
We saw above that the grov-lth of the mining sector averaged 8,9% 
per annum over the fifteen years to 1969, and that it contributed 
up to 44,6% of the Gross National Product7 • Since 1968 
economic statistics for the territory have been integrated 
with those of South Africa, and figures are not available, 
but the mining sector continues to expand. Mines demand 
great quantities of electricity. Hence the demand for 
electricity is escalating enormously. In;1967 it grew by 
5% per annum; in 1972 the growth I.'ate was 10%; it is even 
higher: today8. SWAvlEK belives that "increasing mining and 
prospecting activities will intensify the demand in future 
9 years If The expected demand is given in Table Ten below. 
The growth is phenomenal. 
SWAWEK was established to use the Kunene River to provide 
cheap power for Namibia via a 'National Grid'. However, 











station had to be built to fill the gap, before Ruacana was 
completed. Hence, the van Eck station was built at Windhoek, 
and the first generator was commissioned on the 5th June 1972. 
The van Eck station has a capacity of 90 Megawatts (90MW) from 
three 30MW generators. A further thermal station is being 
built at Walvis Bay. A national grid, shown by solid double 
lines on Map Thirty-One, distributes the power to the major 
mining and urban areas which, as we have seen, are presently in 
the "white" sector. Map Thirty-One demonstrates very clearly 
the relationship between electricity demand and mining in 
Namibia. Power in Namibia is supplied for mines rather than 
for people. 
The routing of the national grid power line from Ruacana has 
been changed at least twice. Map Thirty-One, drawn in 1967, 
shows the original concept in which the power lines .fed 
Ongandjera and Oshikati; while a third line cros~ed Ovamboland 
to link up with the grid at Tsumeb. rvi2.f! Thirty-One shmvs 
the changes made in 1972. Perhaps for strategic reasons, 
the power line no longer crosses Ovamboland directly to Tsumeb, 
but instead runs south, then kinks to the south-east to link with 
the grid near Omaruru. The 1972 SWAWEK map gives no indication 
at all of a power line to Ovamboland! SWAWEK felt that the 
cost would be too high for the "Owambo Government", but a 
subsidised line may be installed in the future10 • Thus, 
although Ruacana is in Ovambo territory, Ovamboland will not 
initially benefit by its power, which will be taken to the south~ 
Map Thirty-Three shows the route planned in 1975. The broad 
kink to the west has been removed and the line' is to run 
directly through Kamanjab towards Omaruru, presumably to save 
money. However, this creates a part of the Etosha dilemma, 
shown in Map Thi~ty-'rhree. The power line cuts through a 
corner of the game reserve and, according to ecologists, may 
seriously disrupt the movement patterns of the game. Even more 
seriously, the water route to the south cuts the reserve alm9~t 
in half, as the map shows. 
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MAP THIRTY; PLANS TO BRING WATER FROM 'EHE NORTHERN RIVERS 
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(Showing general direction but not necessarily 
actual routes). 
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I"lAP THIRTY-FOUR: LOWER KUNENE POTENTIAL HYDRO-ELECTRIC SITES. 
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MAP THIRTY-FIVE: 
Upper Kunene Development Schemes. 
(Moreno, 1(67). 
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extra to go round the reserve. A canal built through the 
reserve could either be deep, in which case the necessary 
fences would completely cut the game routes, ot shallow, 
in which case the game, as they crossed, would pollute the 
w'ater with diseases ~ 1. Presumably a sufficiently large 
underground pipe-line would be exceedingly expensive, although 
the reason for the use of canals, rather than pipe-lines as 
originally announced, has not been given. The solution to 
this dilemma has, however; not yet been stated by the authorities. 
They must move power and water to the South, but the Etosha Pan, 
with its precious game, blocks the route. 
The Ruacana Falls are seen as the answer to Namibia's sharply 
rising demand for electricity. 
Midgeley writes: 
However, as Professor 
"~ •.• in Southern Africa, because of the strongly 
seasonal distribution of rainfall, the rivers are 
subject to wide fluctuation of flow. To extract 
the maximum benefit from h~dro energy it must be 
used in conjunction with a uniformly available, 
albeit more expensiv~, source of energY,e.g. in. 
an integrated hydro-thermal system; it should also 
be assigned to meet demands near the peak of the 
load curve, or held in reserve to meet unplanned 
outages" • (12) • 
Using sophisticated mathematical techniques, including 
synthesised monthly flow hydrographs where accurate data were 
not available over a sufficiently long time period, Professor 
Midgeley calculated the minimum flow of water available at 
Ruacana by month from 1937 to 1972. Relating this to the 
energy demand and load patterns projected for the territory, 
he deduced the maximum firm capacity which th~ hydro-electric 
component could have at Ruacana, feeding the Namibian grid. 
Table Ten shows the situation in a period of extreme drought, 












RUACANA HYDRO-ELECTRIC CAPACITy14 
-
MINIMUM OUTFLOW FROM 
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6 3 . 
month. CALUEQUE TO RUACANA 10 M per 
ENERGY EQUIVALENT 
57 GEGAWATT HOURS OF STREAM FLOW PER MONTH 
NAMIBIAN 1977 73 GEGAWATT 
ENERGY 
1990 203 HOURS PER ~EMAND MONTH 
2000 433 
AVAILABLE HYDRO-ENERGY 1977 79 
A.S A PERCENTAGE OF 1990 28 PER CEN'r ENERGY DEMAND 
2000 13 
CORRESPONDING 1977 86 
PERCENTAGE OF 
1990 53 PER CENT PEAK DEMAND 
2000 39 
PEAK 1977 134 
DEMAND 
1990 370 MEGAWATTS 
2000 800 
PERI"lISS IBLE 1977 115 
INs'rALLED 
1990 196 MEGA~vATTS ELECTRIC 
CAPACITY AT RUACANA 2000 312 
As Midgeley puts it: 
" ••••• in terms of the load situation in 1,977, the 
maximum capacity that can be installed at Ruacana 
without duplicating plant elsewhere in the system 
is 115WN; by 1990 this may be increased tp 196MW 
and, by the year 2000, 312MW will be permissable, 
provided the pattern and growth of load turn out 
to be as predicted". (15) • 
Thus, from a total installed capacity of 58MW in 1963, Namibia's 
peak demand by the year 2000 is expected to be 800Wd! Ruacana 
is designed to have four 80~~ generators, giving an installed 
capaci ty of 320MvJ, but this \Viii be insufficient, and other 
sources must be found. for even with Ruacana, by 1985 Namibia's 












To meet growth in the demand for electricity after 1985, it was 
originally planned to create a further hydro-electric scheme 
on the lower Kunene River17 • Map Thirty-Four shows the 
potential sites, with their estimated capacities, which were 
considered. However, experience at Ruacana may have shown 
the high cost and difficulty of erecting such stations on the 
inaccessible lower reaches. Security and strategic 
considerations may be important, in addition to simple cost, 
demand and capacity analyses. 
It is possible that the original decision to build the Ruacana 
station was taken more on strategic grounds than in terms of 
simple financial cost-benefit, and that a link with the South 
African grid may have been marginally cheaper. Professor 
Midgeley's remark, quoted in a previous chapter, should be 
recalled: 
" •••• from strategic and socio-economic angleS, 
the need to create nodes of development in or 
near a desert may in fact be crucial, almost 
regardless of direct cost. Sometimes the 
indirect costs, for example, in the defence 
budget, of negle~ting to develop a region, 
bear careful scrutiny". (18) 
For whatever reason, it has been decided not to build further 
stations on the lower Kunene,but rather to link the Namibian 
"d t 'h E S th Af" grl"d19 • A .L'l"ne wl'll be grl 0 t e scorn-run ou rlcan 
built from the existing grid on the Orange River up to the grid 
in central Namibia. A power grid will then exist from Cabora' 
Bassa in the east to Kunene and Calueque in the west,- drawing 
power from sources such as the Drakensberg scheme, the Orange 
River scheme, the nuclear plant planned for tHe Cape, and the 
thermal stations of the Eastern Transvaal. 
The Consolidated Diamond Mine at Oranjemund will also be linked 
into this grid. Escom will bring the power down the Orange, 
but as the works are on Namibian ground, S\-1AWEK will probably 
handle the final distribution of the power in oranje~Und20. " 











link Namibia to the South African grid. Once more, economic 
interdependence is being established, and once more, it may in 
fact affect political "independence". The South African 
Prime Minister speaks of "full independence" within eight to 
ten years21 but his planners are expecting to link the territory 
to the South African grid, also in ten years time. 
Until then, however, it is the Ruacana plant that must cope 
with most of Namibia's increasing demand for energy, which will 
come, as we have seen, mainly from the mining industry. Whereas 
firms constructing Gove and Calueque had to be South African or 
Portuguese, this limitation is not imposed at Ruacana. Hence, 
many international firms are involved in the building of the 
Ruacana plant. 
The excavation of the 1t kilometre tunnel and the vast machine 
cavern, 140m long by'40m high by 25m wide 22 , has been entrusted 
to an Italian firm, COSINT, the directors of which have great 
experience of such projects in Africa. They employ Italian 
and Turkish, as well as locally recruited, workers. Other 
firms involved include L.T.A., G.E.C., Borie Dumez, Voist 
Alpine, Elektro-Hinsch, S.D.E.M. Grenoble, and Dorman Long, in 
'addition to SWAWEK, ESCOM, the SWA Water Affairs Department, 
and the Portuguese Water and Electricity authorities. 
Although most of the Kunene's water will be needed for power 
generation, and will flow from a diversion weir along a causeway' 
to the tunnel, through the huge turbines and out into the 
"hippo pool" below the falls, the beauty of the Great Cataract 
will not be lost forever. The South Africa~s plan to turn it 
on at 10.00a.m. and at 3.00p.m. for tourists. 
Whatever troubles may have been experienced earlier, the Ruacana 
project is now on budget and on schedule. Bv May 1975 it was 
expected that the first section of the power plant would be 
completed by May 1977, the second by October 1977, and the 
remaining sections by April 1978, when the full capacity would 
be installed23 • Apart from Gave, the Calueque-Ruacana complex 
will have cost something in the region of R133,3 million, as 












COSTS OF CALUEQUE AND RUACANA?4. 
Calueque Dam 15,7 Rm 
Interim power station and 
Calueque infrastructure 10,1 
Main Ruacana Power Station 91,1 
Transmission line to 
existing grid 16~4 
TOTAL (in Million Rand~ 133,3 
Whether the scheme will be completed as expected is not certain: 
there is fighting in Angola, and the situation in the Kunene 
basin is thus fluid. However, this chapter has shown that if 
the schemes are successful, Ruacana power is to be delivered 
primarily to the "white" area of Namibia, mainly to meet the 
demand created by the mines - which accumulate their capital 
iri Johannesburg, London and New York, rather than in Windhoek 
or Oshika'ti. Ruacana will temporarily solve the otherwise 
impossible problem of the soaring demand for energy, and will 
also create the economic interdependence which Mr Vorster 
foresaw. We shall return to the relative benefits in a 
chapter below, but the next chapter will discuss the Portuguese 
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THE ANGOLAN PLANS. 
"It is not geography alone that is involved in 
the successful working of water-power schemes. 
Technical and political factors are of great 
importance. The problem of capital is also 
a basic one". (1). 
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The grandeur of Portugal's dream in Africa is shattered. An 
aristocratic general decided that the problem of d tiny corner, 
Guinea Bissau; could not be solved militarily. His coup d'~tat 
opened Pandora's Box. At least for Portuguese Africa, 
the Portuguese people ceased to believe Salazar's dictum: 
, - 2 UA Patria nao se discute, defende-se" • Hence carne independ-
ence, and perhaps an end to several long, hot wars .• 
The economic reforms, centred on the Kunene River's hydro-electric 
potential, were ended also - at least as strategically conceived 
of by the old regime.· Without such reforms the battle was, 
in the long run, lost anyway. Fighting an expensive war, 
the old regime simply could not raise the capital, to win on the 
economic front. Not for nothing has "Portugal in Africa"-
been called "uneconomic imperialism". The battle was lost 
for many other reasons, but the regime's inability to achieve 
economic reform fast enough was among the more important. 
Such capital as could be raised went largely into primary export 
industries, especially mining - which is no way to win over a 
people. 
The South Africans contributed capital, but too little and too 
late for the old regime. The South Africans paid only for 
those Kunene projects which they themselves needed for their 
control of Namibia. 
was a lesser goal. 
The development of the basin as a whole 
The needs of the south were param06nt. 
As contemporary Africa clearly shows, colonialism is a hardy 











to suck the sap long after the Portuguese have flown from their 
troubled nests, long after the migration back to Europe. The 
Kunene's water resources may yet be developed to feed the tree -
or to feed the parasites in Johannesburg, London, Paris, New 
York and elsewhere. The Angolan people mayor may not rise 
above this law of the colonial jungle, but, either way, the 
Kunene has potential for development. 
Experts stress that river basin development should be complete 
and integrated. For political and military reasons it seems 
at present that development of the Kunene basin will be skewed 
towards the needs of Namibia. This chapter will examine the 
plans drafted by the old regime for the Kunene • 
• 
The Portuguese drafted very ambitious plans for the development 
of South-Eastern Angola, based on water and power from a series 
of large dams on the Kunene River. These schemes would take 
more than a generation to complete, and involved the settlement 
in Angola of more than 500 000 Portuguese, "living in good 
economical conditions", as one translation puts it 3 Power 
would be provided for the whole region, and particularly for 
the Cassinga mining developments; water would be provided for 
the irrigation of an eventual total of 147 700 hectares of land 
under crops; and water would be supplied to cattle-farms 
covering 347 000 hectares 4 • When one compares these figures 
to those of the Vaal-Hartz irrigation scheme: their size can 
be appreciated. The Vaal-Hartz scheme irrigates only 36 140 
5 hectares of land for crops , compared to the 147 700 hectares 
mentioned above for the Kunene schemes. Th~ Portuguese thus 
planned vast radical change for the economy of the basin. Such 
schemes would be very costly. A recent report of the ~. 
Committee on Decolonisation estimated the cost at 640 million 
dollars 6 • 
The South Africans never intended to supply all this money, as 
. . 
the U.N. report claims. Under the 1969 agreement, South Africa 
was to pay R8 125 000 for the Gove dam, and the entire cost of 
7-
the small Calueque dam, which was estimated at R15 700 000 • 











. which was the estimate for all the schemes over many years~ 
Further proof of this comes from the South African statistical 
surveys. The South African Govel:nment paid R878 000 abroad 
for Kunene in 1973/74; R254 000 in 1974/75, and budgeted 
R353 000 for 1975/768 • These amounts are of a different 
order altogether from the amount suggested by the United Nations 
report. 
The United Nations report also claims -that the Calueque project 
was completed in 1971. This is also untrue, as reference to 
Q 
the World Council of Churches' report of 1971 will show J • As 
was mentioned above, advertisements appeared in 1974 for engineers 
for the building of the Calueque dam10 • 
The United Nations document is in error concerning a third 
important item. It claims that the Matala power plant would 
supply electricity to Ovamboland. 
as follows: 
The 1969 Treaty reads 
"5.1 The provisions of t.he Agreement of 13th . 
October 1964, referring to the construction of 
the power lines from Matala to the border between 
Angola and South West Africa and to the 
installation of a third generator at Matala are 
revoked, provided that this shall not preclude 
further negotiations should both parties be 
interested therein" (11). 
South Africa is not presently "interested therein" and no plans 
have been approved to bring power to Ovamboland from Matala. 
Six hundred and forty million dollars is not a sum that can be 
raised easily. One of Portugal's major problems was, there-
f 
fore, finance capital. South Africa was prepared to pay only 
for those items directly needed for its Namibian schemes. 
The Gove dam regulates the river, and is therefore essential. 
The Calueque dam diverts water for pumping to Namibia, and also 
gives better control of the river immediately above the power 
plant at Ruacana, which supplies power to Namibia. South 
Africa paid for these, and these were the first to be built."· 
South Africa would not even finance an irrigation network on 
12 the Angolan side at Calueque Throughout his book, 











the importance of the economic problems facing Portugal13 
The problem facing the old regime was its inability to finance 
the grandiose schemes needed to save 'Portugal in Africa'. 
South Africa made a contribution at Cabora Bassa, and ~ smaller 
one at Gove and Calueque, but these were a tiny fraction of what 
was needed. 
The plans drafted by the old Portuguese regime are shown on 












KUNENE HYDRO-ELECTRIC, IRRIGATION AND STOCK FARMING SCHEMES14. 
A. -HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES. 
SCHEME WATER STORAGE POWER CAPACITY 
1. GOVE 2 436 MILLION 25 MW 
2. JAMBIA-IA-OMA 1 240 
CUBIC 
39 METRES 
3. CHIVONDUA -- 15 
4. JAMBIA-IA-MINA 480 81,5 
5. MATALA 60 45,5 
6. MATUNTO 230 50 
7. CHISSOLA 360 6,5 
8. CARINGO 608 4 
9. GUNGUE -- 4 
10. LUCUNDE -- 6,5 
11. CAMBUNDI 404 14,5 
12. CA'fEMBULO 1 060 5 
-TOTAL 6 878 Mm 3 297,5 l'-1W 
B. IRRIGATION SCHEHES. 
SCHEME AREA 
1. MAT ALA 3 000 hectares 
2. MATUNTO 92 800 
3. DON GOENA '1,9 200 
i 
4. CATEMBULO 13 800 
5. CHIBIA 11000 
6. COVA DO LEAO 12 900 
4 
TOT~ 147 700 hectares. 
C. STOCK FARMING15 
SCHEME AREA 
1. MATUNTO 87 000 hectares 
2. CATEMBULO 173 000 
3. COVA DO LEAO 87 000 











The Portuguese also hoped to develop, with the South Africans, 
the power resources of the lower Kunene. The schemes planned 
for below Calueque are shown on Map Thirty-Four and listed in 
Table Thirteen. 
TABLE THIRTEEN 
SCHEMES PLANNED FOR BELOW CALUEQUE16 . 
SCHEME 'VJA'1'ER STORAGE CAPACITY 
CALUEQUE 352 Mm 3 10 MW 
JACAVALE 19 40 
LUANDEGE . 10 180 
RUACANA 18 175 
ONDORUSU 60 50 
ZEBRA 80 40 
EPUPA II 4750 150 
EPUPA I 1 50 
BAYNES 250 160 
MARIEN 720 ).80 
MARTNAN 225 90 
HOMBOLO 200 135 
MCHA 55 50 
-
TOTAL 6740 Mm 3 1310 MW 
(It will be noticed that the figures in Table Thirteen do not 
correspond exactly to the South African estimates on M~ 
Thirty-Four). However, as the South Africans have decided 
against these schemes, it is not certain whether the lower 
i 
Kunene plants will be built, for there is no other obvious 
source of capital. They illustrate the potential of the 
river for energy generation, which will not be used in the" 
foreseeable future. This is a world-wide feature, for we 
presently ~se less than 5% of the planet'shydro~electric 
potential, preferring to put capital and energy into other 
things. 











these development schemes and on farming in Southern Angola17 
I shall not attempt a full review of all their works. Briefly, 
they are convinced of the economic viability of this huge scheme 
over some thirty years, given the time and the money. The 
nomadic herdsmen of the region would be regrouped, together with 
the peasant ~rop-farmers, leaving space for settlement of 
Portuguese family units in large numbers, each unit having 20 
hectares of irrigated land or 8 000 hectares of pasture. Power 
would be supplied for the huge mining industries of Cassinga, 
and for towns and ports such as Nova Disboa, Sa da Bandeira and 
Mo~amedes, where industry would develop. It should be noted 
that the initial emphasis was on primary extractive export 
industries such as mining and cattle-ranching, which would 
earn foreign currency for Portugal. 
The strategic implications of the scheme are obvious. Economic 
reform is on Baechler's list of classic counter-revolutionary 
methods18 , and so is the regrouping of the population19 • . 
Settlement, from the mother countr~of people loyal to the 
established order would also make control of the countryside 
far easier. The existence of a power and water infrastructure 
would encourage foreign investment in the area, which would 
strengthen the likelihood of foreign military support or, at 
least, neutrality. The economy, having raised the initial 
finance, would grow and could more easily support the war effort. 
Development was a necessary factor for belief in Portugal's 
"civilising mission" and, in all, the projects would strengthen 
"Portugal Overseas"} 
The plans did not materialise, and they will not do so now in 
their original form. Gove dam is finished, although a power 
20 plant has not been installed. In January 1974, a start 
was made on dams at Jamba-ia-Mina and at Jamba-i2,-Oma21 • It 
is not known how far they have progressed, and with changes of 
power in Lisbon, together with the possibility of independence 
soon, the development of the river may be greatly altered. 
However, the extractive primary industries and foreign companies 
will continue to demand power and water, and some form of hydro-











In passing, it should be noted that the Cassinga Iron Mines 
are polluting the Kunene's water with industrial effillent. 
Samples of the water show a high pollution index, containing 
minerals such as kaolin and haematite. With increasing 
mining in Southern Angola, the quality of the water may further 
. 22 . 
deteriorate • 
The scope exists for an integrated development of the whole 
region and river basin, rather than the strangely skewed 
development that seems to be occurring in Angola and Namibia. 
The whole sUb-continent could form an integrated economic unit 
with a democratic polity, in which primary production would not 
be for the export market, but for industrial growth, and in 
which a criterion for planners would be a more just distribution 
of resources, wealth and income, according to need. The 
perpetuation of the present skewed underdevelopment is the price 
which the region must pay for ethnic and national consciousness, 
and for capitalism. 
This chapter has briefly examined the grandiose plans· of 
Portugal for the Kunene River basin. War and la~k of 
finance has prevented fulfilment of these plans sQ far, but 
the river has been shown in detailed studies to have enormous 
development potential, which may be achieved in time. The 
development of the river basin to date is skewed, for only 
those projects serving the interests of South Africa have 
been completed so far. Despite occurrences in Lisbon and 
Luanda, some form of river development is needed, and may 
continue, in different forms, if finance can be found. The 
opportunity costs of this particular method of development 
have been questioned, and will be discussed fUrther in the 
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The Kunene schemes, if completed, will allocate two essential 
scarce resources in a particular way. Future governments 
will not be able to change this particular allocation easily 
or quickly. I shall now consider the relative benefits 
for the groups involved, and in so doing, assess the opportunity 
costs. The opinions held by several people concerned will 
be recorded. 
Only in a simplistic sense does everybody benefit by a water 
scheme. Obviously, everybody may have access to some water 
or power. Obviously, the region's economy may grow. At 
these simple levels, everybody may benefit. To assess 
adequately "Who Benefits?" requires deeper questions, however. 
The first' crucial question is how much more water or power 
each group or individual is allocated, by comparison with the 
additional amounts allocated to other groups. The relative 
benefits must be measured, not merely the benefits. 
Secondly, one must see what is possible for each group to 
achieve with their new water and power, in a given situation. 
Water for one group for difficult low-profit irrigated farming 
is different from water for high-profit mining, in terms of 
economic benefits. This means that whereas the =egion's 
economy may grow, one must measure how that growth is 
distributed, geographically and financially. In doing so 
it s~ould be noted that irrigated farming, if successful, could 
further perpetuate the contract labour system of low wages. 
Workers' families will be enabled to continue to live on the 
land, saving the costs of urbanisation in the richer south. 
Yet the riches of the south will still be produced by the l~bour 
of the north. Migrant labour is perhaps better seen as 










Thirdly, one must not compare with what existed before, but 
with what might have been done in another way with an equal 
201 
amount of labour, skill and finance. 
must be included. 
The opportunity costs 
Finally, the schemes must be measured in their totality. It 
is not enough to measure only financial or economic benefits. 
Military, strategic, political, educational and other social 
benefits must be measured as well, if we are to answer the 
question "Who Benefits?" completely. Midgeley's comment 
on the strategic value of making a desert bloom, quoted in 
Chapter Four above, perhaps answers the question for us. 
Such a question cannot presently be answered rigorously and 
precisely. We do not have the necessary facts, such as 
Gross National Product statistics or accurate measures of the 
distribution of wealth. We do not have a mathematical model' 
which could predict the effects of a new water and power network 
on an economy like that of Namibia. Such a model belongs in 
the more complex realms of cybernetics, and even there it is 
but a dream for the future. The effects may not be predict-
able with any accuracy even only in the economic field. In 
the totality, there is no agreed measurement of military, 
strategic, p6litical, educational and other social benefits. 
I shall therefore attempt a general assessment here, for a, 
precise measurement is not presently possible. 
It is clear from the above chapters that the ruling groups will 
benefit primarily and massively from the Kuneqe schemes. We 
have seen that the best agricultural, fishing and mining areas 
are allocated to "whites", and that the Kunene schemes will 
bring water and power to these "white" areas in great quanti'ties, 
to facilitate their development. 
The ruled groups will ben~fit far less. In relative terms, 











the ruled groups benefit at all. It is possible that 
irrigated farming will succeed in Ovamboland on a large scale 
in due course, although this is by no means certain. 
Certainly, more water will be available for man and beast in 
a previously drought-stricken area. However, any schemes 
investing capital on the scale of that in the Kunene project 
ought to solve such a problem. 
The costs for the ruled groups exceed the benefits. Not 
for the first time, South Africa's rulers are carrying out a 
hydro-electric scheme for strategic and ideological motives, 
as much as for direct economic benefit1 • The Kunene schemes 
will maintain the inequitable distribution of land and resources, 
perhaps to achieve "separate development" of politically 
"independent" ethnically divided "states", and perhaps to create 
economic ties between those states in such a way that the ruling 
groups continue to rule. "Separate development" does not 
benefit the people of Namibia: it is a sophisticated method of 
protecting the power and prosperity of the ruling groups~ The 
Kunene schemes could solve two of the big problems facing 
"separate development", which are a lack of water and a lack 
of power in the "white" areas. 
in fact open, and independence 
the Kunene schemes might still 
Even if "all options" are 
is achieved by a unitary Namibia~ 
benefit those who designed 
them to serve the interests of a ruling minority. 
Clearly the ruling groups will be allocated more power and 
water than the ruled groups. There seems to be no indication 
so far that the Ovambo people will be paid a royalty on this 
power and water, taken from a river in their l~nd, but this 
payment may occur in due course. Thus both groups get 
water and power, but the ruling group gets more than the ruled 
group, and does not presently pay for it, except in terms of 
capital investment. The ruling group, through SWAWEK, owns 
most of the scheme. 
One Windhoek authority has analysed the project as follows 










"As a project designed to bring material progress 
to both races, Kunene will boslter the interdependence 
of White states and BlacK states-to-be, like Owambo. 
It will also help create social and economic 
stability on S.W.A's Northern border, which is the 
frontline of the terrorist assault on the western 
part of White-ruled Southern Africa". (2). 
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_ The group that benefits the most, financially, is that group 
which profits by Namibia's mines. 
enormous, and mining profits are high. 
" 
achieved without water and power. 
Mining expansion is 
Neither could be 
We have seen above that, 
at present, the mines are mainly in white areas, and that their 
managers and other highly-paid staff must be white, and that 
no black man, therefore, may manage or Ql.vn a mine in "whi te" 
Namibia. Wages and labour conditions, both on the mines 
and elsewhere, were so bad that they recently resulted in a 
massive strike despite the absence of formal organiqation. 
We have seen above that the strike produced no fundamental 
changes in the system of migrant labour for the mines, and 
that the migrant system is socially devastating. Water 
and power from the Kunene will enable Namibia's minc-owners 
and white mine workers to continue amassing wealth from the 
migrant system. 
Who owns Namibia's mines? Where do the profits go? 
The mines are generally not owned by Namibians, and much of 
the profit is remitted outside the territory. 
include American Metal Climax, Incorporated; 
Corporation of South Africa, Limited; Charter 





Limi ted; Falconbridge Nickel Hines, Limited, {of Canada; 
General Mining/Federale Mynbou, Beperk; the Industrial 
Development Corporation of South Africa; ISCOR; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Company, Ltmited; Metallgesellschaft 
AG, of West Germany; Newmont Mining Corporation; Rio Tinto 
Zinc Corporation, Limited; and Union Corporation Limited 3 • 
In short, many of the giant mining companies of the United 
States, Canada, West Germany, Britain and South Africa will 












These higri mining profits are not necessarily re-invested in 
the t~rritory. The last available figures relate to 1962, 
in which year the Gross Nation~l Product was thirty per cent 
less than the Gross Domestic Product. Put another way, 
one third of the country's product.accrued to foreign capital 
or labour, as we saw in an ~earlier chapter. The Johannesburg 
Financial Mail suggests that this proportion has increased in 
the ensuing years. The gap between white and black income 
has also increased, according to the Financial Mail. In 1962 
it was twenty-one toone, or R352 per annum per capita for whites, 
and R17 per capita for blacks in the homelands. The planned 
allocation for water and power in the Kunene scheme is unlikely 
to decrease that income gap. 
Minerals are wasting assets: they are resources which should be 
carefully used. 'rhe Kunene River, with its water and power,. 
will exist when the minerals are gone. When should Namibia's 
minerals be mined, and by whom? What should be done with the 
wealth? Chief Clemens Kapuuo, not a noted left-winger, gave 
his :answer in 1972, a~ follows: 
"This country, which is our country, is being 
exploited by greed  entrepeneurs, robbed of its 
weal th, and rendered barren for the future.' Our 
fear is that when freedcm finally comes to this 
land, it will be returned with no minerals left. 
Thus you will see the one wonderful asset which we 
have for developing the land for the well-being 
of its peoples will have been taken away from us". (5). 
Perhaps the greatest indictment of the Kunene scheme ~s that it 
will greatly speed up this process of exploiting Namibia's 
min~rals, for the benefit of people" other than Namibians. 
Obviously the minerals must be extracted over time, but their 
wealth should be used for the territory. Botswana is 
attempting to use its mineral wealth to build up its agricul-
ture (and manufacturing industry, if possible) against the day 
when minerals are depleted. Namibia should do the same. 
An opportunity cost of building the present schemes inside the 
strategic framework of the ruling groups is that the mineral 











. The mines are presently a spur to some other growth. For 
example, they process minerals, earning foreign exchange, as in 
the case where 10 000 tons of lead concentrate from Alaska was 
off-loaded at Walvis Bay for processing at Tsumeb, from where 
the lead ingots were shipped to the United States6 • However, 
this other growth is small; the economy is still dominated by 
primary extractive industries working to priorities set by 
large foreign firms. 
The other groups who benefit financially by the Kunene schemes 
are the owners and "white" workers of the fishing industry, and 
of the small, but growing, secondary manufacturing industries. 
These are~ as we have seen, located mainly in "white" areas, 
and will be able to expand using power and water from Kunene. 
It will be argued that this growth will mean more employment for 
"black" workers, and this is conceded. However, there is no 
indication that, except perhaps-in the long term, growth itself 
will break the stranglehold which the "white" farme.rs and workers 
have on the polity and on the economy. Growth has probably 
led to an increase in the wage gap, rather than a decrease. 
The "whites" have shown great skill in expanding the economy in 
such a way-that they retain power and prosperity in their hands. 
The Kunene schemes will probably assist them in this. 
Another ruling group that is likely to benefit is the "white" 
farming community. We saw above that the growth of mining 
led to competition for water between mines and farms, according 
to official reports 7 • The Kunene schemes will benefit the 
"white" farmers by reducing this competition:for an essential 
resource. Without the schemes, perhaps Gessert's 1904 spectre 
of "whites" fighting round drying water-holes is not too fanciful 
after all. 
The rulers of South Africa are highly unlikely to invest between 
R600 million and R800 million in Namibian infrastructure out of 
pure altruism. They see large strategic, political and 
economic benefits for the ruling groups in South Africa a~d in 











money could not be better used in another way, in a way that 
developed all of Southern Africa for the benefit not only of 
whites and their few black allies, but also for all of the people 
of the region. Obviously the Kunene should be developed, 
but not in this way by these people. 
To summarise: The ruling groups benefit by the Kunene schemes. 
The vast profits from mining are accumulated in Johannesburg, 
New York~ and London, while white mine-workers receive high 
returns and black mine-workers receive low returns. The 
white farmers no longer face competition from the mines for 
water. The fishing and secondary industries receive 
relatively cheap power and water. Black farmers and herdsmen 
receive water, but the problem of irrigated farming in the 
"homelands" has still to be solved. The Kunene schemes assist 
in achieving the political and strategic aims of the white ruling 
groups. 
However, the Kunene schemes are  gamble. There is a point 
of view in Windhoek that believes too much is being d?ne for 
the black people of Namibia, and that the schemes may be a 
mistake. It is possible that the northern regions, together 
with Angola, have been given a weapon by which they can hold 
the richer southern areas to ransom. It may be possible 
to deny the south water, power and labout, all at once, and 
thereby to negotiate a more equitable distribution of land, 
resources and power. To do so requires organisation, which 
the ruling groups well know. Therefore, political leaders 
are suppressed, and stringent "emergency" regulations have been 
imposed on political activity. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that ilelections ll 
are boycotted, for free political activity is impossible. 
The ruled groups are also controlled by structural violence. 
If one adds'to this the threats or the use of direct violence 
by the police or military forces, then effective use of the 












To complete this assessment of who benefits, and by how much, 
by the Kunene projects, I shall record some of the opinions 
given by different people involved. 
Asked by a reporter what effect the change of Government in 
Portugal would have on the schemes, Mr Pik Botha, a South 
African parliamentarian who became Ambassador to the United 
Nations, replied as follows: 
"One can only hope that no attempts will be made 
from any quarter to disrupt any progress in this 
regard. The people themselves will be deprived 
of benefits if any such attempt is made. This 
project will be of great.benefit to the peoples 
of Angola and South West Africa". (8) 
Mr Dirk Mudge~ M.E.C., acting Administrator of the territory, 
holds a similar view, and told me: 
"There should be one economic scheme for the whole 
of South West Africa, for we will always be inter-
dependent. Some non-white groups, however, are 
not yet prepared to co-operate, because they believe 
it is a trick on the part of the whites..... In 
South West Africa to solve all our problems we need 
a strong economy to support everybody, especially 
considering that a large percentage of the people 
is unskilled. The Kunene scheme is very important, 
for one just cannot develop these territories without 
water and electricity..... We need a strong economy 
to provide jobs in the southern sector for people 
from the native homelands. One cannot have a 
strong economy without infrastructure". (9) 
I asked Mr Mudge to comment on the stand taken by SWAPO overseas 
against South Africa's presence in Namibia. He replied: 
"They harm their own people. Inexperienced 
people like SWAPO leaders talk of independence 
for South West Africa. It is impossibl~ without 
South~frica. The railways operate at a terrible 
loss, there is no separate monetary system, there 
are no separate institutions. No other 
organisation would invest millions in this under-
developed territory. The National Convention 
agrees that whites have a role, for without whites 
the economy would be ruined. . SWAPO don't really 
appreciate the problem. They think freedom is 
everything, but they don't know what freedom is •••• 
Whatever the political system, we will have different 
groups. Most are not prepared to lose their 










An Ovambo does not want to be called Herero. 
The Hereros and Damaras will not be prepared to 
accept that Ovambos rule the country, which would 
be the position in a unitary state ••••• 
The people must first learn to govern their own 
territory, to gain political experience. They 
must start· from the bottom. It will take years 
to gain independence, but as a result of outside 
inter£erence we are forced to do things faster than 
we would like. They should not become independent 
before they are able to accept responsibility ••••• 
SWAPO are against the Kunene scheme because they are 
not prepared to co-operate. They are doing their 
own people harm: This has nothing to do with 
separate development. The territory must be 
developed. Their opposition to government 
policy should not stand in the way of development". 
By contrast, Richard Wood, Bishop Suffragan of the Anglican 
Diocese of Damaraland,told me: 
"The schemes are not being carried out in consulta-
tion with the people. These schemes ta}~e develop-
ment at its European face value, and they imply that 
our needs can only be met by a capitalist system ••• 
However, oney would be only too glad for regular 
water in the drought-stricken areas ••••• 
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Basically the plans have~.:;been made to generate power. 
Water is a bonus, but it is power that has encouraged 
South Africa to put in vast capital sums, sums which 
might otherwise have been used to enable the "homelands" 
to achieve viability. 
The plans represent an extrapolation of white hopes 
for the future of our country. A black person who 
has no appreciation of the technology can hardly 
conceive of what is involved, and can therefore have 
no effective say or part in it. Were it to be 
done truly benevolently one might say, 'go ahea6', 
but the dice are loaded •.•• 
Do the people want to join the·Western way of life? 
That is where money lies for the elite, but construct-
ive schemes must be aimed at the village communities, 
before we have high capital outlay on technological 
development •••• 
One cannot basically oppose br~ng power and water -
it's like making food cheaper. However, we must fit 
it into the whole development picture, so that the 
political scheme involved must be benevolent and 
humanistic. For example, the Katatura Hospital is 
useful, but it represents an extension of white man's 
dominion. Blacks are not trained to staff it, for 
there are no black doctors there. We need paramedi~al, 
partially trained staff in village health schemes, which 










course, still good to have a hospital, but the 
people are never consulted, and are given no 
training to use these things. Such projects 
become an exhibition of white man's domination, 
and he then expects thanks for it". (10) 
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I asked Dr" J.L. de Vries, Namibian "Bishop of the Evangelical 
Luthern Church, whether the Ovambo people would not wanb~water 
frcm the Kunene schemes. He replied: 
"The Ovambo are very anti-government. If any 
ethnic group were to oppose any particular govern-
ment move, it would be the Ovamba. It is not 
that they do not want development, but that they 
are against schemes imposed from above. The 
country needs development, not as a military 
strategy, but as human development. The Ovambo 
would therefore say NO to the Kunene schemes. The 
people of Namibia do not want to be separate. We 
want to be one Namibia. Development should be for 
the whole of Namibia, but behind the schemes we 
think there lies only the security interests of 
the whites in the first instance. They may want 
to develop blacks, but only secondarily.... The 
Superintendent of the Katatura township says that 
each ethnic group will build its own nest in the 
tree of South West Africa. I disagree: we will 
build one nest in Namibia. We are willing to live 
with the white man in the same tree, but not in" 
separate nests •••• 
All these schemes are not for the black man but for 
the privilege of the whiteman. If we look at 
these schemes, which ethnic group will benefit? 
We will only get the crumbs from the table of the 
white man. We are for development with co-operation 
of all the races, not development planned in Pretoria. 
We say to Pretoria, 'keep your development until ~ 
can decide ••• '. They bring in great projects, but 
we are not willing any more only to receive. The 
whites must stay, but we should be co-workers. 
The whites build good roads, but we see them only as 
a military strategy, for easy movement of/troops. 
The roads are a military policy. In the same 
way power and water are a military strategy. 
We feel that the system is run without consultation. 
We feel that we stand aside from the development of 
the country •••• We want to be free of White colonial-
ism, we want to be partners, not slaves. We ask these 
things because Namibi~ belongs to us. We worked for 
it: every mine-worker worked for the State or for 
the whites. We have a right to participate with 
the white in the development of the ~iches. The 










share in the wealth of the country. We want 
to deal as partners, not merely get cents •••• 
The whites fear the time when all the black 
nations stand together. They will not be 
able to keep the black man down, with all their 
guns. Their policy is one of fear of unity. 
We are not for the homeland POlicy. It is the 
old DIVIDE ET IMPERA". (11) 
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A man who had worked as a migrant for very many years told me: 
"As far as I know, the younger generation will 
have many questions (about the Kunene projects). 
Firstly, the power goes to the white area. How 
can we then develop the economy of the Northern 
regions on an equal basis? We could use the 
power for other purposes. In the mines there 
is no good co-operation. There is the shuttle 
back and forth from the "homelands". Is it then 
possible to develop the economy? ••• The Ovambo 
ask, where is the water? Why do we not get the 
water? They promised there would be water 
everywhere in Ovamboland, but it has not happeqed". (12) 
I asked whether separate development had divided the people. 
K student replied: 
"The answer comes from the practice. It has 
NOT succeeded. The work brought the people 
together years ago. They go together in the 
locations. My father is an Ovambo and my,. 
mother a Damara. It does not come from the 
goveinment.... There must be co-operation for 
all of South West Africa, not for one area. 
The time is ripe that South Africa should leave, 
and a new man should come to develop the land, 
as a class gets a new teacher. They say 
development is coming, but it does not come". (13) 
Another Namibian in Windhoek said: 
"Weiare against these schemes. They ~re not 
for the people of Namibia. They are for 
exploitation, not for anything else. The 
government talks as though the whole purpose 
is for the Ovambos I am certain it is not ••• " 
He summed up: 
"Separate development has no place here •••. " (14). 
The above gives a fange of the, opinions held in Namibia in 
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. CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION. 
This has been an essay in contemporary political economic 
history, treating the detail of a particular social formation. 
It perhaps needs a larger caveat than do most contemporary 
histories. Secrecy, lack of time, war, languages, distances, 
and travel restrictions are problems faced by every writer of 
detailed contemporary history. I am not unconscious of the 
restrictions present in the South African Statute book. To 
these problems must be added the dearth of rigorous conceptual 
analysis of Namibia. Study of social conflict in the 
territory is still in its infancy. We have neither the 
necessary refined conceptualisation nor the required data. 
No rigorously applied general theory exists for the territory, 
nor for the region, and even now, theoretical progress is 
halting and slow, as much current research shows. 
The present work has not been overly concerned rigorously to 
apply and refine such general theory a~ exists. It has 
rather concentrated on impressionistic portrayal of detail. 
It has used simple theoretical bases such as those given by 
Machiavelli, adapted for a Capitalist era. A thorough 
refinement of a general theory of social conflict for Namibia 
would constitute another volume equally long. 
Just as any language is incomplete, so toe is any history. 
More things happen in the world than can ever be recorded, 
orally or in writing. The only complete retord is the human 
condition in operation. Secrecy, bewildering variety, and 
the opacity of social processes, ensure that recorded his torr 
is necessarily inaccurate and incomplete. Historians, like 
South African Select Commissions of Inquiry, are remarkable for 
what they do not discover, despite voluminous research. 
This caveat having been made explicit, rather than left implicit, 











I have discussed the Kunene schemes in some depth, showing that 
South Africa is presently illegally occupying her former mandated 
territory, and that she is arming mightily, to enforce her 
occupation. Land in Namibia is divideq between "white" rich 
areas and "black" poor areas. South Africa wishes to create' 
"nations" in each of these areas, so that her strategic plans 
for the whole region may be fulfilled. 
I have shown, too, that the "white" rich areas need labour, 
water and power from the "black" poor -areas. The Kunene 
schemes satisfy at least two of these needs. The schemes 
may satisfy the third need as well, if Ovamboland's economy 
is in fact "developed" very slowly by the schemes, so that the 
Ovambo workers must seek employment in the "white" rich areas, 
and yet their families have some agricultural income. 
I have shown increasing internal and external, political and 
military conflict about the future of Namibia. Clearly the 
ruling groups will benefit by these s~hemes, economically and 
strategically. However, the schemes could be used in the 
conflict against their designers, if water, labour and power 
were to be simultaneously withheld from the south~rn areas. 
The schemes, if successful, will allow great (illegal) 
accumUlation of wealth in the hands of a few people. This 
(illegal) accumUlation of wealth is backed by, and in turn 
finances, massive force and structural violence. 
It ha~ been suggested that the political conflict has an 
economic base, which includes the economy's i~frastructure. 
This infrastructure is not a neutral factor in the political 
and economic conflict between groups in a society. Thus, a 
country's infrastructure may be designed by those who rule, 
to serve their own economic and political interests, both in 
the short and long term. 
However, the economic interdependence which is created thereby 











organisation on the part of the ruled groups, it may be possible 
to turn the infrastructure against its designers to end formal 
rule. . Accordingly, the ruling groups attempt to hamper or 
destroy awareness and organisation among the ruled groups, by 
the use of structural and physical violence. 
The outcome of the conflict in any particular political economy 
of this type is not certain in the short or medium term, for, 
in addition to the above, there are other important variables. 
For example, where infrastructural domination is att~npted in 
a colonial political 'economy, international factors may be 
crucial in determining the outcome, following what Spinola 
calls the Law of the Internationalisation of National Problems1 • 
The ruled groups in Namibia would be foolhardy, however, to 
depend on international factors to solve their problems for them, 
especially as important foreign interests benefit by the 
Namibian colonial situation. 
Despite this, in time, international pressure and the border war 
may force South Africa to perform a strategic withdrawal from 
direct rule of Namibia. Even then, the design of the Kunene 
schemes is such that they might continue to underdevelop the 
northern areas, and Namibia generally, for the benefit of those 
who accumulate capital in the wo.r·ld system. Such a IIneo-' 
colonial" solution2 would be an efficient application by the 
ruling groups of Machiavelli's third law for conquerors, 
adapted for a Capitalist age. A ruling social class will 
have been created which will allow the continual expatriation 
of Namibia's wealth, yet the country will have its independence. 
How can one oppose colonial development projects? Surely 
dams, pipe-lines and power-plants can only benefit the 
territory? Surely they will be useful after independence? 
Let us look at the motive behind such schemes. 
that one Pretoria authority remarked: 
We saw above 










independent states' international relations 
are determined by motives other than self-
interest. The question is only whether 
this self-interest is enlightened or not". (3). 
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As to enlightenment, one need only look at the pattern of 
distribution of the world's wealth and income in the last quarter 
of , the twentieth century. Meillassoux summarises the problem: 
"The aim of the intervention of the capitalist 
nations in the economies of the underdeveloped 
countries is not the development of those 
countries, still less the granting of aid; it 
is rather the exploitation, under the cover of 
humanitarianism, of resources and men. 
'Exploitation', not development, is the key word 
to describe the relationship between these nations; 
all the so-called techniques of development are, 
in this context, no more than the techniques of 
exploitation designed to expatriate wealth". (4). 
Surely water and power are good things to bring to an arid land?' 
Does not the present diminished opposition to the Kunene schemes, 
since the failure of the Portuguese Angolan settlement dream, 
show that the schemes can be used for the people of Namibia 
"after independence"? Superficially, perhaps ~, yet the 
problems are more complex. 
The Kunene schemes bring water and power pr~marily to Namibia's 
export industries. They will not necessarily promote 
integrated regional self-sufficient development. They will 
perpetuate Namibia's status as an exploite9,pet'ipheral region, 
serving the world economy on a basis of u,nequal exchange and 
low returns to labour. 
The assumption "after independence" cannot easily be made. 
By increasing the wealth and, hence, the power of the ruling 
groups; by diminishing the contradictions within the fractions 
of Capital, which will no longer compete for inadequate power 
and water resources; by enabling the continued fragmentation 
of the people of the 'territory; by maintaining a monopoly over 
the technology of production; possibly by increasing returris 











may delay formal independence, and allow time for the creation 
of a neo-colonial solution. 
Moreover, both before and after'''independence'', racism remains 
to be abol~shed. Pinpointing ownership of the means of 
production is the fundamental tool of understanding.sotial 
conflict, to which must be added an awareness of the "national-
ities problem" and racism. One cannot read Winthrop Jordan's 
astounding workS without realising the destructive deep-rooted 
power of ethnic consciousness fostered by ruling groups. 
As Bishop Wood showed in his arguments quoted above, the Kunene 
schemes in themselves do little to improve the situation. 
The schemes have their drawbacks even "after independence". 
They represent skewed development of the river basin, biased 
towards the needs of the world and South African capitalist 
systems. In the same way as expanding ground-nut production 
is worse for Senegal and better for French, or world, capitalism, 
than developing the Senegal River, so too are the Kunene "River 
schemes not completely in the regions' interests. Like 
ground-nut development in Senegal, they will not "permit' 
really integrated agro-industrial self-sufficient and independent 
development,,6 Together with the balkanisation of the 
Southern African sub-continent, they perpetuate dependency and 
underdevelopment. 
But are not the Great Powers forcing accelerated change oti 
Southern Africa? Will there not be a "move away from 
discrimination", bringing reform and progress? Despite, or 
rather, because of, our recent history, I beiieve Leo Marquard 
correctly understood the folly of reformism when he wrote, almOst 
forty years ago: 
"It is apparent that the limits of reformism 
have been reached, and that any further improve-
ment in the living conditions of the non-European 
proletariat will have to be achieved along the 
lines of industrial action, rather than by liberal 
influence in politics". (7). 










North Atlantic counterparts, will bring about reforms truly 
in the interests of the people of Southern Africa. 
To quote Leo Marquard again, writing of an earlier period: 
"South Africa's apparent political independence 
prevents the Imperial Government from interfering 
in its internal arrangements, but its dependent 
economic status binds it securely to Imperial 
interests in Britain. The ruling class in 
Britain is thus able to enjoy the financial 
benefits of association with South Africa, while 
discarding all responsibility for the welfare of 
the mass of the inhabitants.... Union Governments 
have secured the interests of capitalists by a 
similar arrangement called, in this case, 
segregation, or 'governing the Native along his 
own lines'.... South Africa will not escape 
the consequences of capitalism merely by becoming 
independent of Great Britain". (8). 
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Transposed, his analysis is apt for Namibia today. Namibia 
will not escape the consequences of capitalism merely by 
becoming independent of South Africa; the economic capitals 
of the Southern African empire will still hold sway; liberal 
reformism, by Great Power pressure or by 'verligtes', will not 
bring real change in the condition of the proletaria~; apparent 
political independence, or "governing the Native along his own 
lines", will not end exploitative relationships, internally or ' 
internationally. 
These statements are true only to the degree that the people 
of Namibia and of the whole region remain unconscious of their 
own potential to achieve radical change and, hence, to the 
degree that they are disorganised and unled. Self-determina-
tion, freedom, and a lack of exploitation, are; not commodities 
given away in tinsel wrapping inside a tall building in New 
York: they have to be created on the ground. I have 
suggested that the Kunene schemes will not necessarily aid this 
creation. 
This is not to suggest that the Kunene schemes are not poten~~ally 
useful in the long run. They may yet be used to end formal 
colonial rule. After independence, under a government 











formation of an integrated self-sufficient, and just economy 
for a united Southern African region. Water and energy ~ 
useful in a desert. This is a far-off dream, however. For 
the present, the ruling groups will perhaps find it easier to 
rule and prosper with the Kunene schemes than without them. 
Regarding the immediate conflict, one Namibian, tried under 
South African law, said in court in April, 1968~ 
"We believe that South Africa has a choice -
either to live at peace with us or to subdue 
us by force. If you choose to crush us and 
impose your will on us then you will not only 
betray your trust, but you will live in security 
for only so long as your power is greater than 
ours. No South African will live at peace 
in South West Africa, for each will k ow that 
his security is based on force and that without 
force, he will face rejection by the people of 
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